

HOOVER INSTITUTE STUDIES

Series E Institutions

May 1952

SOVIET ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

The Social Structure of Production Units

by Alexander Vucinich

Introduction by Sergius Yakobson



The Hoover Institute and Library
on War, Revolution, and Peace
Stanford University

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE HOOVER INSTITUTE STUDIES

This series of studies undertakes to describe the world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy. These studies were conducted by the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace as part of its research project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR Project).

The studies and their publication were made possible by funds granted by Carnegie Corporation of New York. That Corporation is not, however, the author, owner, publisher, or proprietor of this publication, and it is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made or views expressed therein.

Harold H. Fisher, Chairman of the Hoover Institute
C. Easton Rothwell, Director of the Hoover Institute
Daniel Lerner, Director of Research
Ithiel de Sola Pool, Assistant Director of Research

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

Copyright 1952 by the Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior University

Printed in the United States of America
by Stanford University Press

First printing, August 1952
Second printing, June 1953

INTRODUCTION

The author of the following case study is to be praised for having freely spent his time and energy on the elucidation of the complex and bizarre picture of social and power relations in the Soviet state and of the intricate government and Party control apparatus which welds together by rule of force the heterogeneous elements of the Soviet society. Any serious and successful study of social phenomena requires on the part of the investigator a keen analytical mind, strict professional training, intuition and vision, self-restraint, endurance, and perseverance. A student of the Soviet society has to overcome a special handicap. He is denied the privilege of firsthand knowledge and observation since direct and rewarding research in the field is not open to him. Still, the ban deliberately imposed by the Soviet authorities upon exchange of information and ideas with the West has failed to prevent American research on the Soviet Union from making considerable headway and gaining steadily both in volume and in stature. And Dr. Vucinich's present study on the inner mechanism of the Soviet state and society is, within its self-imposed limitations, a significant contribution to this impressive scholarly record. Many popular myths are debunked here. The study deals with both the theory and the practice of the Soviet state. There is a wide divergence between ideals and realities in Soviet life, but nowhere perhaps is the observation by Louis Pasteur more applicable than to the Soviet Union: "Without theory, practice is but routine born of habit."

Winston Churchill has wittily, if not very seriously, called the Soviet Union "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." This concept of a mystery surrounding all things Russian has, however, been justly discounted by Churchill's old friend, the venerable Bernard Baruch. In Look, December 18, 1951, he stated bluntly: "It is true that, at first glance, the whole Russian picture appears undecipherable. It looks like a hopelessly confused jigsaw puzzle scattered on the table. But when different people arrange the pieces, one by one, matching colors here, an odd shape there, a pattern becomes visible. With enough patience, a picture finally emerges. We should consider Russia not as an insoluble enigma but as a jigsaw puzzle which can be solved with sense and patience. The very fact that Russia is a dictatorship and a planned economy means that her actions can become predictable." As he had already done before, Baruch urged Washington once more to undertake a minute day-to-day survey of the Soviet body politic, headed by a general staff for peace consisting of the National Security Council plus men like General Marshall, Herbert Hoover, Gordon Gray, Karl Compton, John Foster Dulles, and others. So far, there is little evidence to indicate whether this plea of Baruch's for such teamwork has met with approval in official circles. But his general remarks regarding Soviet Russia hold true in any event. And, as before it is primarily the task of individual scholars such as Dr. Vucinich to undertake—on their own initiative—advanced research on special Soviet topics and, by unearthing new

and significant data, to lay the groundwork for an over-all exploration of Russia. As Auguste Comte observed one hundred years ago, "To predict one must know; to act one must predict."

The existing socio-economic order in Russia with which Dr. Vucinich's study is concerned can be examined only within the peculiar political setup of the totalitarian Soviet state. This has been and remains today a military camp, a garrison state. It is not surprising that the concept of "discipline" plays such a prominent role in the Soviet official thinking and acting.

The Communist state is further an exemplification of unlimited and total party rule. All the various parts of the Soviet state machine are only tools for the realization of the definite aims of a single political party. As has been said by a Russian Social Democrat in exile, Stephan Ivanovich, the Communist Party in the Soviet Union possesses the monopoly of monopolies. It has first the monopoly of legality. All the other parties have been dissolved and forbidden. The Communist Party possesses the monopoly of political activities, thus usurping the political will of the people. The Party rules the government, the army, the courts, the police. It designates the ministers, the heads of trade unions, the directors of industrial enterprises and of banking institutions, the diplomatic representatives abroad, the army chief, and the head of the Secret Police. The Party not only organizes the government apparatus but also controls it. Furthermore, the Party has the monopoly of economic control; it has the monopoly of privileges and exceptional rights. It lays down the rules and fights the slightest opposition. The Party leadership is the cream, the elite, of Soviet society, and this is true not only with regard to the center but also to the periphery and to the rural communities. The single indivisible Communist Party dominates the entire country, all classes and groups, all the spheres of national life; it is the political, economic, and intellectual administrator of the whole Soviet land.

Passive and active rights of citizenship are incorporated into the 1936 Soviet constitution, but their practical realization is prevented and rendered illusory by the one-party state. Andreï Vyshinskii, diplomat, Soviet expert on constitutional law, and former Soviet Procurator General, frankly admits that, "a fundamental error is made by those who think the principle of democracy, which is expressed in the new constitution, limits in any way the principle of proletarian dictatorship."

Another conspicuous trait of the Communist state is the all-embracing character of its activities. Each sector of the economic as well as of the cultural life is regimented. The taking over by the state of the control of all parts of national life has led, in the Soviet Union, to the establishment of a gigantic bureaucratic machine with hundreds of thousands of officials giving rise to unavoidable bottlenecks and red tape. In vain have efforts been made to reduce the number of agencies: they have sprouted again like mushrooms after a rain.

The Communists reject the idea of division of power; they even deny the feasibility of such a division. According to their teaching it is simply a delusion. There is no clear distinction between the legislative, executive,

and judicial branches in the government of the Soviet Union. The principle of intermingled authority instead of the American principle of divided authority is one of the most notable features of the Soviet totalitarian system. The principle of rigid subordination is also one of the basic characteristics of Soviet administration. When Wendell Willkie was grounded in Yakutsk and insisted on proceeding with the journey, the president of the Council of People's Commissars of the Yakut Republic said to him: "You are not going on today, Mr. Willkie, nor probably tomorrow. The weather reports are not good and it is part of my instructions [from Moscow] to assure your safe arrival at your next stop, or I shall be liquidated." But when, the same night, Willkie reminded this Soviet Commissar that they would be late to the performance at the local theater, the latter answered: "Mr. Willkie, the show starts when I get there!"

Soviet domestic policy, focused primarily on the fulfillment or overfulfillment of the Plan, has led to a merciless exploitation of labor and other productive forces of the country. The introduction of planned economy not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent instrument of policy was a sequel of the Bolshevik Revolution. In the Soviet Union, a plan, whether a five-year-plan or a plan of limited scope, is the basis of all activities. Failure to fulfill the plan has severe repercussions and is punishable as an act of high treason.

A close analysis of the social fabric of the so-called "workers' state" reveals it to be in reality an area of total spiritual and physical bondage. Without exception, all the socio-economic units in the Soviet Union operate under minute supervision by Party and State. Nothing there is left to chance and no allowance is made for a free choice since practically everything is predetermined by Party decisions, occasionally dressed up as "recommendations," administrative orders and regulations, economic plans, and non-codified "socialist imperatives." In Soviet economic life, exactly as in the spiritual sphere, the urge for individual self-assertion is curbed and suppressed. And there is virtually no escape from the long arm of the Party and State control apparatus. This is a tightly knit network of interwoven institutionalized controls. In the Soviet factory, as elsewhere, asserts Dr. Vucinich, "every aspect of human life, varying from political-ideological principles, is under constant and thorough surveillance. The strands of the control web are multitudinous and provide avenues for 'checking up' on everybody by everybody. Control functions are differentiated, but the demarcation lines are not clear-cut and allow for extensive overlapping"; and this overlapping by various control agencies is not a chance phenomenon but "is designed by the heads of the Soviet State to reinforce the overall system of control."

Less than two years ago Stalin even attempted, by taking an active part in a much publicized debate on linguistics, to provide—at least by implication—a theoretical justification for the existing totalitarian regime and political autocracy in Soviet Russia. First, he again discarded Engel's theory about the "withering away" of the state under socialism. In his

letter to Comrade A. Kholopov of July 22, 1950, Stalin insisted that "Soviet Marxists, on the basis of a study of the world situation in our time, reached the conclusion that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists and the victory of the socialist revolution has taken place in one country alone and capitalism continues to dominate in all other countries, the country where the revolution has triumphed must not weaken but must strengthen in every way its state, state organs, intelligence agencies and army if it does not want to be destroyed by capitalistic encirclement." Second, by reversing one of the basic Marxist tenets regarding the interrelationships between the economic base of society and its superstructure (i. e., its political, ideological, and legal setup) Stalin proclaimed that although "superstructure is generated by the base this by no means signifies that it merely reflects the base, that it is passive, neutral and indifferent to the fate of its base, to the fate of classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary, having evolved, it becomes a most active force which contributes vigorously to the formation and consolidation of its base, takes all steps to assist the new order to drive the old base and the former classes into the dust and liquidate them." In the summer of 1950, Stalin forewarned, "the comrades who have been attracted by the notion of explosions" that, although social changes were bound to take place by means of "explosions" or by "leaps and bounds" in the capitalistic world divided into hostile classes, this was not applicable to the Soviet society free of antagonistic classes where gradual evolution should be the rule. And it appears that the stringent system of ubiquitous controls installed and perfected by Stalin in the Soviet Union is in complete accordance with his theoretical postulates: it concentrates all power in the hands of the Politburo, it prevents the possibility of social "explosions . . . overthrowing the existing authority and creating a new regime," it forestalls deviations, it directs the accumulated social energies into safe channels, it replaces the free play of social forces by "a revolution from above . . . on the initiative of the existing regime" and thus provides for the perpetuation of the Soviet system.

Central social planning of Soviet leaders has not necessarily produced the results envisaged by Moscow. It was primarily its practical application which turned Soviet planning based upon theoretical assumptions into a "hit-and-miss proposition." Life rebelled time and again against the dogmatic blueprints imposed upon it by the Party, and in many instances proved to be the stronger. The Soviet planners must have been constantly reminded of a tale of a centipede as related by a Soviet writer. Left to its own natural devices, the centipede could freely and rapidly move from place to place to the envy of the turtle. But once it was challenged to rationalize the co-ordination between its fifth and ninety-seventh leg by recourse to "a clearinghouse, red tape, and bureaucracy," it was stalemated and suffered a complete breakdown.

In the programmatic debate on linguistics Stalin referred to the Soviet

Union as a society free from antagonistic classes; he refrained, however, from calling it a classless society. The evidence marshaled by Dr. Vucinich proves convincingly that the early Soviet dream of converting the Soviet land by determined social and political action into a classless society proved to be utopian. Notwithstanding all assertions to the contrary of Soviet leaders and propagandists, the Soviet society consists today, after nearly thirty-five years of Communist rule, of a number of distinct and unequal social groups, each of which adheres to a particular pattern of behavior and possesses its own peculiar group sentiment. Social-leveling and wage-equalization tendencies of the first years of the Soviet regime are things of the past in Communist Russia. The present Soviet society is a hierarchical order marked by a decreasing vertical social mobility and by a rapid widening of the income range. The peasantry is placed at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder in the Soviet Union as a "guided" class whose work is "officially valued as socially less important than industrial work." The next level is occupied by the workers regarded officially as a "guiding" socio-economic force but in fact completely subservient to the absolute authority of the government. The next stratum is assigned to the apparatchiki, a bureaucratic and managerial group, which acts as an intermediary or "transmission belt" between the Party, state leadership, and other social groups. And it is revealing that in line with this accepted hierarchical setup the social identification of each individual in the Soviet "socialist" society is determined not only by sex, age, physical stamina, individual skill, or professional calling but, essentially, by class affiliation, by the nature of privileges and comforts extended to a particular social group, and by the wage differential.

The Soviet society is finally a non-consensual society which, like other social organizations, has its own intergroup conflicts. Social clashes and strains have played and still play a conspicuous role in the life and history of the Soviet state. And the conflict which seems to attract, at present, the special attention of the Moscow authorities and the Soviet censors, writers, and press is that between the Party and the managerial group, particularly between the factory director, on the one hand, who aspires to become an absolute ruler of the enterprise, and the local party agent, on the other hand, who is eager to project himself into the economic sphere by extending guidance to the director and thus keeping him firmly under Party control. A Soviet journalist in his search for an "advanced Soviet man" calls the directors of the Soviet factories and the chairmen of collective farms, who place "their" factories or "their" farms above the interests of the state, peculiar types of "individualists"—a derogatory word in Communist Russia. To the Moscow newspaper, Soviet Art, they appear as overly concerned primitive utilitarians lacking direction and ideological perspective. Recently the Soviet censorship banned from the Soviet stage a number of plays centering upon this very theme. Still the question of distribution of power within the Soviet elite remains acute and unresolved as before.

Dr. Vucinich's study is full of thought-provoking data and observations. Although institutional in approach, it provides an excellent insight into the everyday life of the strait-jacketed Soviet society. If acquaintance with the presented material distresses the reader, this is not the fault of the author: such is Soviet reality

Sergius Yakobson

Library of Congress
February 8, 1952

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION, by Sergius Yakobson	iii
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY	1
The General Problem	1
The Central Theme	2
I THE FACTORY	6
Power Relations	6
Administrative Organization	6
Factory Party Organization	12
Factory Trade-Union Organization	17
Group Alignment and Social Mobility	22
Social Background: The Soviet View	22
Factory Intelligentsia	24
The Workers in the New Fabric of Social Relations	27
The Social Significance of Stakhanovism	30
The Problem of Labor Supplies and Social Mobility	33
The Control Network	36
Government Control	36
Party Control	39
Public Control	40
Voluntary Control	41
The Over-all System of Factory Control	41
Informal Organization	43
"Shturmovshchina"	44
Opposition to Stakhanovism; Thieving Groups	44
"Bureaucratism"	46
Notes	50
II THE KOLKHOZ	57
Kolkhoz Democracy	58
Soviet Interpretation	59
Governmental Guidance and Control	61
Kolkhoz Party Organization	66
"Supplementary" Party and Government Decisions and the Kolkhoz Charter	70
Social Mobility and Status Differentiation	72
The Widening of Remuneration Scale	72
The Experiment with Small Teams (<i>Zven'ia</i>)	74
The Enlarged Kolkhozy	76
Kolkhoz Women	80
Rural Intelligentsia	81
"Survivals of Individualistic Psychology"	83
The Problem	83
Law Versus "Psychology"	84

Four Techniques in the Struggle Against Rural Traditionalism	86
The Kolkhoznik and the Worker	89
Notes	92
III. THE SOVKHOZ	99
Historical Sketch	99
The Sovkhoz and the Kolkhoz: A Comparison	101
Legal Differences	101
Socio-economic Differences	102
Power Relations	104
Sovkhoz Administrative Organization	104
Sovkhoz Personnel	105
Sovkhoz Party Organization	108
Sovkhoz Trade-Union Organization	109
Specific Social Features of the Sovkhoz	109
Notes	111
IV THE MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATION	113
MTS Socio-economic Organization	114
Intelligentsia	114
Workers	116
Peasants	118
MTS Administrative Organization	120
MTS Management	120
MTS-Kolkhoz Relations	121
MTS Party Organization	123
General Trends of Social Development	125
Notes	126
V. INDUSTRIAL AND ARTISAN CO-OPERATIVES	129
General Development	129
The Place of Producers' Co-operatives in Soviet Society	131
Artisan Administrative Organization	132
Artisan Labor	133
Group Differentiation	134
Notes	136
BIBLIOGRAPHY	138

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The General Problem

The factory, machine and tractor station, state farm (sovkhoz), collective farm (kolkhoz), and urban producer's co-operative are the basic production units in the Soviet economic system. Each production unit may be approached in three ways, depending on the concern of the investigator. If the latter is interested in the concrete techniques of production, his approach would be technological. If he is concerned with the over-all organization of production as designed to achieve a high level of output per working unit, his approach would be economic.

This study does not use either of these two approaches. Although it is based on an analysis of economic data, the latter are consulted in so far as they throw light on social correlates of the primary production units rather than on purely economic processes. In other words, the task of this study is to analyze the Soviet factory and other production units as social organizations, as loci of minutely ramified systems of social interaction, and as integral parts of the whole texture of Soviet society.

Let us state this more concretely. The individual employed in a factory is an active agent in a specific production process whose effectiveness, or "rationality," is measured in terms of output. He works and "makes a living": he is an economic man in an economic process. Yet—and this is our primary concern—his very identification with a specific work assignment and the types of relations into which he enters affect many things about his style of life besides those which are traditionally subsumed under the rubric "economic." These social interactions define his place in the "class structure," the "social recognition" given his work, the "power attributes" inherent in his calling, the rough contours of the range of his social mobility, the type of behavior expected from him, and, as Max Weber would say, his life chances.

It should be borne in mind that Soviet production units are more inclusive social organizations than Western production units; they are so organized as to absorb most of an individual's social activity. To its employees, for example, the Soviet factory is not only a place for earning a living, but also a center to which has been entrusted the direction of their social interactions in ways prescribed by the state. The worker finds his factory the nexus of all activities which bear on his and his family's well-being. His leisure is spent under the direction and supervision of the factory; his associations and affiliations fit into the grand blueprint of the enterprise. The factory comprises the institutions by which he is "socially mobilized" and becomes, or is expected to become, a contributor to the building and consolidating of the socialist system. The factory, or the kolkhoz, or any other production unit is a "socialist school" assigned the task of imbuing him with a "socialist consciousness." It teaches him "Bolshevik ethics" and Bolshevik ideology," and presents

him with clear distinctions between officially approved forms of behavior and those which are condemned as the survivals of "capitalistic" or "individualistic" psychology. The primary production units are the workshops in which the design of the new society is translated into living forms and in which social planning is subjected to concrete tests.

The Central Theme

The specific task of this study is to correlate the various aspects of the social organization of the basic production units with the structure of power. Aspects of social organization and social dynamics are treated, in so far as they throw light, directly or indirectly, on the intricate web of power relations. However, power itself is a complex concept.

Any student of Soviet society can discern the difference between what may be called "absolute power" and what may be termed "fictitious power," or between a dozen top Bolshevik power holders and such constitutionally guaranteed political entities as the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. The power held by the Bolshevik leaders is absolute for the simple reason that (a) their decisions, affecting every phase of social life, are not subject to effective review by any other political body; and (b) no organ of government, public organization, or other collective body can pass decisions which would be incompatible with any of their decisions and which would not be subject to their review.

This study does not search anew for the locus of absolute power in the Soviet Union. It accepts as established that it is the Politburo which directs the Soviet state and society. Our efforts are aimed at throwing some light on selected features of the all-important problem of how the holders of absolute power actually govern one-fifth of mankind and remold their society according to the precepts of a definite ideology. The variegated media which enable the top Bolshevik power holders to hold their power may be conveniently termed power instruments. The multitude of power instruments in Soviet society may be classified in various ways. They may be classified according to (a) their part in the production process, (b) the institutions or associations of which they consist, or (c) the social strata with which they deal.

Power instruments viewed in terms of their functional assignments in the primary production units are of three types: managerial instruments, control instruments, and instruments of "social activism" or social mobilization. Managerial instruments are granted the right to make low-level decisions relevant to the running of their production units as economic enterprises. These decisions must, of course, carry out the economic policies of the power holders. Control instruments check whether groups and individuals conform to legal norms and Bolshevik maxims. Finally, the instruments of "social activism" perform mobilizing assignments; their function is to direct the social activities of each individual along officially designed channels. Their ultimate function is to prevent

a dissipation of social energy and to make each individual an active agent in building the new society.

The organizations which play the role of power instruments are of four basic types: government agencies, the Party, the so-called public organizations (trade unions and the Komsomol), and "voluntary" associations. Government agencies, in turn, are differentiated into two general groups: elective (Soviets) and nonelective bureaucratic agencies. In each production unit where it has an organized group the Party operates independently of any other internal association. The public organizations are primarily permanent auxiliaries of government and/or Party agencies, whereas "voluntary" associations (various aktivs, "auxiliary groups," "voluntary boards," etc.) are temporary adjuncts of government agencies, the Party, or public organizations. Government agencies play the leading role in managerial assignments, while the Party organization is the primary unifying force in the systems of control and social mobilization. The public organizations and "voluntary" associations are secondary control and mobilization agencies.

A study of power instruments classified according to the groups with which they deal is actually a study of social stratification. Our task is to locate the relevant data on the status of each social stratum—the intelligentsia, workers, and peasants, as well as their subdivisions—within the over-all power system.

We shall have occasion to note in this study what has often been noted elsewhere: the sharpening of hierarchical lines in the Soviet Union. In each of the case studies below we note a systematic attempt to establish a clear-cut differentiation between peasants, workers, and intelligentsia, as well as some differentiations within each group. In each case we also note a systematic attempt to widen the spread in rewards and to eliminate equalitarian tendencies. And finally we note the growing dominance of the intelligentsia. A widening range of top positions are restricted to them, and they come more and more to dominate the Communist Party. With such sharpening of group lines, it becomes important to differentiate power instruments according to their group identification.

The power instruments listed above leave their imprint on most phases of Soviet social life, and they provide a key for understanding the dynamics of all-penetrating social planning. This study shows how the social correlates of the primary production units fit into this ramified system of power relations.

The data are drawn primarily from six types of Soviet materials: (1) collections of government and Party decisions; (2) juridical monographs, treatises, and journals; (3) the official organs of the Bolshevik Party, trade unions, and Komsomol; (4) the official journal of the Procurator; (5) professional economic studies and journals; (6) semipopular journals which carry belles-lettres in addition to interpretive studies of selected economic and political problems.

The five primary production units to which this study is devoted—the

factory, the machine and tractor station, the sovkhos, the kolkhoz, and the producer's co-operative—are of two basic types: state and co-operative enterprises. The former are typified by the factory and the latter by the kolkhoz. Since they present basic models, these two units are treated in considerable detail, while treatment of the other units is confined primarily to the features in which they deviate from the factory or the kolkhoz.

The state enterprises, with their fully bureaucratized structure and clearly defined status hierarchy, represent the Soviet ideal. They are considered to represent "consistent socialism." The co-operative enterprises are regarded as a temporary concession to the backwardness of the peasant artisan. The autonomy which they enjoy, their independence from the state budget, their ownership of some basic means of production their kolkhoz or co-operative "democracy" expressed in the general meeting of the members, and their deviation from one-man management—all these are regarded as necessary at this stage, but are eventually to be abolished. For the moment, the co-operatives are schools in which the Soviet peasant and artisan may be trained to become eventually the desired "Soviet man" who will fit readily into the bureaucratic hierarchy of "consistent socialism."

This, at least, is what the Soviet regime desires and expects the primary production unit to be. It looks to the primary production unit as a school for the new Soviet man. It regards the factory (and to a lesser degree other rationally organized economic units) as schools of proletarian discipline, precision, and morality.

This notion has become a central one in Soviet social and economic planning. To Soviet planners a prerequisite for the higher development of the productive system and the power of the Soviet state is the transformation of the Russian peasant or peasant-born worker into a new type of Puritan man marked by unlimited energy and purposefulness in struggling for the goals officially assigned him. The "style of work" demanded of this completely disciplined individual is one marked by precision, rationality, regularity, effort, watchfulness, vigilance, consistency, promptitude, and obedience. He must be patriotic, politically conscious, and militantly pro-Soviet. Above all, however, he must completely subordinate his individual goals to official collective norms.

The totalitarian system of Soviet Russia consists of a vast interlocking network of agencies designed to assure the carrying into daily individual practice of the collective norms set at the highest level. On the one hand, this means that all organs for expressing individual and group aims must be eliminated. It means also that a clear chain of command must be kept open through which orders may go from the Politburo down to every Soviet citizen. In Soviet administrative jargon this need is expressed in the principle of one-man management. This principle, which in Western administrative jargon might be called the dominance of the line official, implies that the directive which goes from the Politburo to any Ministry will there-

after go directly without check, balance, or question to the Glavk, to the manager, to the foreman, and then to the worker. Decisions made at each level within this hierarchy merely carry out the directive from the highest organ. The worst possible violation of Soviet administrative theory is an attempt to make or influence decisions which arise outside of the direct line from the Politburo down. This is labeled a deviation from one-man management.

As in any large organization, the practice is far different from the theory. There emerge numerous "informal organizations"—as sociologists have come to identify special groupings which are not called for by, and which in effect are designed to evade the normal functioning of, the blueprint table of organization. These "informal organizations" are in many cases "unexpected results" of social planning on a grand scale; they throw a monkey wrench into the over-all planning scheme which makes remedial planning and replanning imperative. These informal institutions for spontaneous expression of human needs and wants provide centers for the formation of independent group norms. They threaten the absolute power of the Politburo.

Democratic administrative theory, unlike totalitarian theory, believes in tapping the spontaneity and energy which pluralism promotes. The Politburo regards informal groupings as a threat to be eliminated or vigilantly watched. They have sometimes been described and condemned as "family relations." What is wanted are regular, impersonal, bureaucratic relations—the extension of the rationalism of the factory to all of life.

Since the men in the line sometimes disappoint the Bolshevik power holders; since they often follow their private and group interests instead of official socialist norms; since they often behave as "backward" people instead of "new Soviet men"—the Politburo has set up, side by side with the "line" officials, a series of control agencies. One-man management remains the principle. Orders go only through the regular line. In theory, the Party units, the NKVD, the trade unions, the Procurator, the other control agencies, must never try to make or influence decisions. They are simply there to see to it that the responsible persons carry out in their decisions the directives they have received from above. More accurately these agencies have a double function: they control and they stimulate. They must be constantly vigilant in finding violations, errors, or "wrecking," and they must spur on the Soviet citizens to ever higher levels of activity in the struggle for the building of socialism.

In practice, these agencies of control become Frankenstein machines. The NKVD, the Party, and the trade unions each develop bureaucracies of their own, struggling for power and privilege with each other, and they have potent weapons in their hands. The foreman, the manager, or the official may theoretically have full authority to make a decision; but only a very brave or foolish official will court a charge of "wrecking" by any of the numerous control or police agents, or in the local Party paper. In theory, the Politburo has set up clear channels for vigorous execution of its commands, in practice, it so distrusts and fears its agents that the channels are clogged by a vast conflicting web of controls.

I. THE FACTORY

To its Bolshevik interpreters, the Soviet factory expresses and symbolizes the highest and most consistent implementation of Marxian socialist principles that has been achieved thus far. In its complex social system and endless web of social interaction it offers a concrete and panoramic view of the struggle within Soviet society to override the deeply embedded rural social tradition and to achieve industrial urbanism.

The factory presents a graphic picture of Soviet power relations. This interplay of power struggles, in turn, shows the basic trends in the development of Soviet social integration.

It is in the Soviet factory that the problems of social mobility and the processes of social stratification are subjected to concrete tests; and it is here that total social planning brings forth not only its most substantial feats but also its most acute deadlocks. The factory is an area of a minutely ramified control system which is assigned the task of maintaining the established social order—its reality and its myths.

POWER RELATIONS

Three fully differentiated organizational entities share power and a part in decision making in a Soviet industrial establishment: the factory administration, the factory primary Communist Party organization, and the primary trade union organization. Our task is to examine the present-day structures, assignments, and interrelations of each of these three entities as they are related to the system of power.

Administrative Organization

Three interrelated principles govern the administration of a Soviet factory: the over-all production-territorial type of management, the centralization of the order-issuing power within the factory in the hands of one man—"one-man management" (*edinonachalie*), and the status of the factory as a "cost-accounting" (*khozraschét*) unit.

Production-territorial management.—Production-territorial management was inaugurated by the Seventeenth Party Congress (1934) as a substitute for the original "functional" management (*funktsionalka*).¹ Under the "functional" system of management, assignments for controlling the administration of any one plant were distributed among many agencies. A whole aggregate of federal (or union-republican) ministries and commissions, or their departments, issued directives mandatory for individual industrial enterprises. All decisions pertaining to planning emanated from the State Planning Commission, and to financial matters from the People's Commissariat of Finance. Commercial activities of a plant (that is, placing the finished products on the market) were directly regulated by the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade, while the procurement

of raw materials was under various industrial People's Commissariats. This system of management had many defects, a fact readily admitted by the Party hierarchy. Multiform over-all management did not provide a well-defined matrix for a division of managerial duties; it bred duplication and encroachment on the rights and duties of one managing "sector" by another, and made it difficult for central authorities to locate the causes of recurrent mismanagement. Its main defect consisted of division of responsibility among a whole array of authorities.

The production-territorial system of management was devised with a view toward centralizing order-issuing authority and toward providing a clear-cut division of managerial responsibility. Under the new system factories engaged in the production of the same goods and located in the same geographical zone subordinated to a Central Board of Industrial Management (Glavk), which has been empowered to issue all the orders regulating the managerial and production activities of its subordinated plants. It exercises its managing duties either directly (a "two-link" system) or indirectly (a "three-link" system), that is, through an intermediary trust (or industrial combine in light industry).² In the new system the factory manager no longer receives orders from a complex network of federal or republican authorities but exclusively from the Glavk or trust. Orders of various departments of other ministries and federal commissions cannot be channeled directly to individual plant managements; they must be submitted to the Glavk and issued as its decisions.³ Thus in new centralized industrial management the order-issuing power has become a monopoly of the Glavk-trust-factory management ladder.

The Glavk exercises direct and daily management of the plants subordinated to it. It works out technological plans for each enterprise and makes decisions concerning the internal organization of each plant. The plans for capital developments as well as the annual industrial and financial plans (promfinplan) are worked out in detail by the Glavk staffs. The Glavk also establishes the limits of expenditures to be effected by individual plant managements, and it blueprints the minutiae of the procurement of technical and material supplies. It defines the method for the implementation of various parts of the economic plan and provides technical assistance. It makes final decisions concerning the norms of output and wage scales.⁴ Many of these functions the Glavk carries out through intermediary trusts, but the tendency is to eliminate the latter and to maintain direct relations between the Glavks and industrial plants.⁵ This is a part of the general movement toward concentration of order-issuing power and toward centralization of managerial responsibility in the hands of as few persons as possible. The principal figures in the Glavk are so-called engineer-dispatchers to whom is entrusted operative supervision of one or more enterprises.⁶ These are the persons, operating behind the scene, through which each factory is directly and concretely brought within the over-all industrial system. They do not "manage" individual enterprises, yet they offer "technical assistance" to factory directors in their efforts to implement the manifold decisions emanating from the Glavk.

One-Man Management. — The institution of one-man management (edino-nachalie) denotes the concentration of the entire management of an economic enterprise in the hands of a single person. The socialist significance of this type of managerial concentration was emphasized by Lenin in 1918:

Each large machine-manufacturing plant . . . needs an unconditional and strict unity of will which directs the joint work of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of persons. This technical as well as economic and historical imperative is obvious; all those who are concerned with socialism have always recognized it as one of the requirements in building a socialist society. But how can the strict unity of will be secured? It can be secured exclusively by the subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one.⁷

It was not before there was full reorganization of over-all industrial management along the production-territorial lines that any serious efforts toward the consolidation of one-man management could be undertaken. The funktsionalka called for a collegial intrafactory management, which, in turn, was a source of much confusion in the distribution of responsibility and power and of extensive duplication of work and encroachments on the prerogatives of one managing "sector" by another. In his report to the Sixteenth Party Congress Stalin stated: "It can no longer be tolerated that our enterprises are transformed from production organizations into parliaments. It is necessary, at last, to make clear to our Party and trade-union organizations that without full establishment of edinsonachalie and strict responsibility for work processes we cannot solve the problem of industrial reconstruction."⁸

Under the new system the factory director, appointed directly by the minister under whose jurisdiction his plant falls, is an "absolute" ruler of the enterprise; he holds, in theory, but not in practice, as will be shown below, the entire order-issuing power within the factory in his hands. His orders are a "law" for all workers and employees of a given enterprise.⁹ The technical and administrative staffs (engineers, planning staff, finance experts, etc.) who previously formed an operative unit in factory management have been divested of any order-issuing power; they have been reduced to a kind of advisory board to the director. They carry out their specific assignments under direct guidance by, and responsibility to, the manager. The director manages the material and financial resources of the enterprise and exercises strict control over all phases of production and technological processes. He delegates some of his functions to the chiefs of shops (nachalniki tsekha), who, in turn, delegate some of their powers to the subordinated foreman (mastera). The chiefs of shops directly manage within their departments all the activities pertaining to the organization of production. They are also entitled to employ and dismiss workers and to change their assignments. The foremen are directly connected with the workers; all orders of the director are channeled to the workers via foremen¹⁰

Soviet experts constantly reiterate that edinonachalie is a result of the growing consolidation of the Soviet socialist system. However, no student of the Western industrial organization can fail to discern that the Soviet "innovation" has been previously tested by the industrial countries of the West, and that edinonachalie, in its functional aspects, has long been known to larger Western enterprises under the name of "line and staff organization."

In its broadest aspects edinonachalie conforms to Max Weber's concept of the "monocratic" type of bureaucratic administration. As Weber said some thirty years ago:

Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks. ¹¹

It does not matter whether one compares it with "line and staff organization" or "monocratic bureaucracy"; edinonachalie is not an indigenous outgrowth of the socialist system but a well-tested Western practice. The functional similarities between the Soviet and Western organizational arrangements in industry should, however, not be confused with dissimilarities of social contexts within which they operate, a fact which will become clear as we proceed.

The power of the director of the Soviet factory is far from being self-contained; it is for the most part a delegated power. The director may appear to the workers of his establishment as an absolute master of all production and administrative processes; yet almost all the decisions are made for him by the Glavk. He may be called upon to make specific decisions on the matters of daily contingencies which were not directly formulated by his superiors, but even in these cases he must be led by approved precedents and must conform to the Party line. He is, in effect, a bureaucrat serving as a direct link between an economic unit and the government bodies; a device indispensable for the normal functioning of a highly centralized planned economy.

Cost-accounting.—Let us now consider the factory as a cost-accounting (khozraschët) system. The Soviet experts in jurisprudence make a sharp distinction between Soviet institutions (uchrezhdenia) and Soviet enterprises (predpriiatiia). ¹² Institutions (post offices, telegraphic services, scientific laboratories, schools, etc.) are, in the economic sense, nonproductive units which draw their funds from the state budgets and are

not considered independent juridical persons. Enterprises, on the other hand, have their "own" budgets; they possess their "own" basic capital (machinery, tools, transportation facilities) and working capital (raw material, auxiliary material, cash, etc.)¹³ This "independence" has found legal expression in the recognition of factories as independent juridical persons. It would seem that in such a set-up the factory would enjoy considerable autonomy, which, in turn, would indicate plenty of room for independent decision making on the part of the director. This "independence," however, is more formal than actual. The channels and details of raw material procurement are defined by the Glavk as are the cash expenditures and utilization of credits. Either the Glavk or the trust determines the prices of the finished products. In other words, the director's "independence" is expressive more of his right to administer the decisions passed by higher authorities than to make his own decisions. The khozraschët system, to be sure, was not introduced with a view toward enhancing the comparative autonomy of individual enterprises but toward compelling them to calculate production costs and to prepare regular balance sheets, which, in turn, facilitate the work of auditing and control by federal authorities. The placing of factories on their "own" budgets is a device to compel each management to explore all possibilities of "rationalization of production" and to maintain a stringent "regime of economy." Even the Soviet students of jurisprudence warn that the khozraschët principle should not be interpreted too literally: it expresses a specific method of management rather than an autonomous status of industrial establishments. "Khozraschët is exclusively a method of state administration adopted for the purpose of control over the fulfillment of the plan and with a view toward improving the business activity of the enterprise."¹⁴

During recent years an extensive campaign has been unfolded for the establishment of "intrafactory khozraschët," that is, for placing each factory shop on a cost-accounting basis. The primary purpose of the new movement is actually to stimulate collective effort for economy and general reduction of production costs.¹⁵ Experiments centered on making each brigade and even each individual worker a cost-accounting unit are currently undertaken by many "advanced" enterprises.¹⁶ Thus khozraschët has finally evolved into a master scheme designed to facilitate government control over each individual's (a) use of materials, equipment, power, and fuel; (b) application of prescribed technological measures; (c) efforts to improve quality of production, and (d) labor productivity.¹⁷ Accordingly, it is one of the specific means, combining the elements of coercion and persuasion, for raising the responsibility of each individual by recording the manner, method, and intensity of his work, and by making him a constituent part of the complex incentive system. It has opened new avenues for government and Party control. Special "control brigades" and "control outposts" organized by the Komsomol have been assigned the task of reporting irregularities, unveiled through the mechanism of khozraschët, to proper factory and Party authorities.

Business contracts between individual enterprises are officially regarded as special techniques for strengthening khozraschët. According to Molotov, "The system of contract relations is a powerful means for synchronizing the economic plan and the principles of khozraschët."¹⁸ Through business contracts individual enterprises are committed to deliver definite quantities of their products to specified purchasing organizations. These contracts specify not only the amount of various deliveries but also their quality and the period within which their manufacture should be completed. They also stipulate financial responsibility of individual enterprises for nonfulfillment of contracted obligations. The real purpose of business contracts is thus summed up by a Soviet economist:

In order to meet the dateline for deliveries the enterprise-deliverers must effect a rational utilization of all production resources at their disposal, including the equipment and raw materials. On the other hand, timely payments by enterprise-recipients for contracted goods depends on the status of their finances, and, consequently, on their fulfillment of state plans. For this reason, a business contract serves as a powerful financial stimulus in the struggle for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of state plans, and for the strengthening of khozraschët " ¹⁹

We are concerned here primarily with the degree to which business contracts may be expressive of independent decision making by factory management. In order to throw some light on this problem it is necessary to take note of the official differentiation between direct and general business contracts

Direct contracts are effected on the local level without a prescription of business channels by the central authorities. When the factory management is granted any concrete independence of action in business relations with other enterprises, it is expressed in its right to enter into direct contracts.

General contracts are concluded by the central authorities (e g., ministries), those which represent the producers, on the one hand, and those which represent the buyers, on the other. On the basis of this contract each individual enterprise signs so-called-local contracts, which, in actuality, signify a concrete implementation of the generally established business relations through prescribed channels.

During the last twenty years the Soviet authorities have oscillated in their preference for one or the other type. From 1935 to 1949 a considerable amount of direct contracting was practiced. However, on May 29, 1949, the Council of Ministers reinstituted general contracts; it motivated its action by a claim that, owing to inadequate control, direct contracts led to many deficiencies and included wasteful precontract negotiations between the concerned enterprises. This means that at the present time individual factories must sell their products to the concerns determined by

their respective Glavki, which also stipulate in detail the quantity and quality of projected deliveries. The current local business contracts are scarcely more than manifestoes signed by the contracting parties to uphold the central planning system by fulfilling their assignments. The latter, however, is expedited by "production graphs," designed to provide a full picture of the production level at any given moment and to facilitate a planned and timely meeting of obligations stipulated by business contracts. Thus the administrative activities which are associated with the business contract are an integral part of *khozraschët*—a technique which facilitates the control of factory management by higher authorities. 20

Factory Party Organization

The foregoing discussion has shown that decision making is centered in the hands of the director, who delegates some of his routine prerogatives to the managerial-operative staff (line managerial officers), while the technical and administrative staffs (staff managerial officers), have been divested of any order-issuing prerogatives. Power, defined in terms of decision making, is shared, in unequal degrees, by the director and his managerial-operative staff. It should be mentioned, however, that this distribution of power in the hands of the director is constantly challenged by two forces: the efforts of the primary (factory) Party organization to establish its "guidance" in the enterprise, and the extremely slow process in the elimination of the functional system. As in other Soviet institutions, the ambivalent polarity of power to make decisions and power to assume guidance has affected adversely the functioning of new management. The director finds himself quite often between two ill-delimited forces: his legally guaranteed independence in making decisions and the "guiding" pressure coming from the Party. This problem became so serious that the Eighteenth Party Congress (1939) was asked to find a working solution for it. However, Zhdanov answered in behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that one-man management and Party "control" do not exclude each other but form a working unit.

Our Soviet, Bolshevik principle of one-man management implies ability to direct, to organize, to select cadres, to issue correct orders, to demand a report of work done, and to eliminate irresponsibility and divided responsibility [i. e. the remnants of the functional system]. But it also implies the ability to secure the support in this work of the Party organization, the *aktiv* of the factory, and of its whole personnel . . . Those executives who fear this kind of control are making a mistake. 21

Zhdanov's answer was actually a confirmation of the extensive power vested in the Communist Party, rather than a solution of an acute problem in the functioning of one-man management.

The Eighteenth Party Conference (15-20 February, 1941) was dedicated to the problem of defining Zhdanov's dictum in all its ramifications, that

is, of defining all the avenues of Party control in the factory and of specifying the control objects. In the principal speech delivered before the Conference members, Malenkov stated that industrial production suffered from many irregularities and deficiencies, the results of inadequate guidance by higher government authorities and the slackening of control exercised by local and regional Party committees. He outlined fourteen tasks of Bolshevik control. The Party organizations were authorized to see that in each enterprise:²²

(1) Keeping a record of equipment and all kinds of material is carried out regularly and correctly

(2) Equipment is adequately protected and the use of instruments, raw materials, fuel, and energy is subject to a regime of strict economy

(3) Practice of selling dismantled and surplus equipment and materials is brought to an end

(4) Entire property is maintained in good condition

(5) Premises are kept clean and orderly

(6) Planlessness is fully eliminated and daily fulfillment of the production plan is strictly carried out

(7) All the ramifications of the so-called technological discipline are fully implemented

(8) Technology is improved and new machines and equipment are put to full use.

(9) Production costs are gradually reduced and khórzraschët is applied correctly

(10) Managing personnel and skilled workers receive increasingly higher remuneration in comparison with unskilled and semiskilled workers

(11) Absenteeism and unauthorized leaving of job are fully eliminated

(12) One-man management is consolidated, and the director is fully responsible for the conditions in the enterprise and for the organization of production

(13) "Technical leadership" in each enterprise is strengthened through a correct distribution and an increase of specialists

(14) The foremen serve as direct organizers of production and supreme managers of the parts of production entrusted to them

To carry out these assignments effectively a number of organizational and operative tasks have been assigned to the town, regional, territorial, and republican Party committees. They have been authorized, in the first place, to appoint an industrial secretary for each type of industry existing in their respective domains. These secretaries are the chief organizers of Party control in each establishment and the chief architects of "socialist competition." In the second place, the Party has been granted the right to play a larger role in selecting factory personnel and in weeding out all "irresponsible" workers. In the third place, it has been authorized to establish in each enterprise "production and business aktívs," consisting of trusted men, who serve as "front lines" of Party control and indoctrination agencies. In the fourth place, the Party has been assigned the task of seeing

that no meetings of public organizations are held and no extra-curricular activities are carried out during the working hours

Through the industrial secretary the complex hierarchy of organized factory Communists is firmly integrated into the over-all Party pyramid. Although the local and higher Party organizations are authorized to take part in all the above-mentioned managerial or quasimanual functions, it is the plant Party committee, and its executive wing—the plant Party bureau—whose infringements on one-man management are more penetrating and diversified.

The real authority of the factory Party committee is derived from its power to compel the director to change his decisions. In other words, although the Party committee is granted no authority to pass decisions overruling those of the director, it is in a position to compel the director to reverse his decisions to conform to Party demands. This technicality of indirect decisions is introduced with the apparent view toward preserving edmonachalie. Yet the constant reiteration in official Party journals that the factory Party committee must work toward a consolidation of the director's authority should be taken with some reservations. There is an abundance of examples illustrating the Party committee's assumption of purely managerial functions through the process of indirection. Under direct Party pressure, the director is often compelled to change individual provisions of the annual production plan either of the plant or of an individual shop.²³ The Party committee can appoint "technical brigades of specialists" whose "suggestions" for changes of technological processes are dispatched to the desk of the director as irrevocable orders.²⁴

By the virtue of its paramount role in the organization of various Stakhanovite methods of production, the factory Party committee is in a position to reorganize work processes and redistribute manpower in individual shops or sections.²⁵ In the same way, the director may be compelled to replace his individual lieutenants, particularly the shop officials, by the persons amenable to, or suggested by, the Party committee.²⁶

An important function of the factory Party committee is to check the perennial tendency of bureaucracy to resist innovations, in this case innovations for "streamlining" vital managerial functions or introducing new routines. For example, the postwar pressure coming from the central government and Party authorities to place each factory shop and brigade on a cost-accounting basis called for the breaking up of many managerial stereotypes. Shop cost-accounting changes the constellation of functions assigned to the chief of shop; it provides another link whereby the latter is tied with the over-all plant administration; it calls for the introduction of "production charts" as a device of output control. The experience has shown that many plants, even some of those located in Moscow, silently resisted the new economy-control technique, and others abandoned it after initial haphazard efforts to introduce it. At the present time one of the most vital functions of each factory Party committee is to see to it that cost-accounting is implemented on each managerial level within every

plant A recent statement issued by the Party meeting of a Moscow plant reads:

Despite repeated decisions of Party organs, not a single shop in our enterprise has been placed on a cost-accounting basis. The director of the plant ought to be commissioned to work out necessary measures for a systematic introduction of cost-accounting in the shops. It is necessary to introduce strict control over the expenditure of materials, fuel, and electric power. It is also necessary to secure an unconditional fulfillment of plans calling for a reduction of production costs and for acceleration of financial transactions. 27

This, however, was not a mere manifesto or a romantic suggestion. It signaled the unfolding of Party pressure for complying with its demands. Shop cost-accounting in this particular plant was introduced ostensibly by management; yet behind each move of the managerial personnel—the chief technologist, planner, and bookkeeper—was the watchful eye of Party-commissioned experts

Once the managerial sector is moved to act as a result of Party pressure, the Party committee assumes a new double-barreled function: it becomes a control agency and a mobilizing force. As a control agency the Party committee checks on each detail pertaining to the implementation of its "suggestions" and points a finger at each recalcitrant senior or junior manager. The place of the factory Party committee within the over-all factory-control system will be examined elsewhere in this chapter. As a mobilizing force the Party organization performs the task of "synchronizing political and economic work." Multifarious techniques of persuasion are put into motion with a view to convincing each worker that the specific Party "suggestions" and concomitant managerial actions conform to the current policies of central government and Bolshevik authorities. The art of persuasion, which is never divorced from the techniques of coercion, calls for the mobilization of a complex network of communication media of which, in addition to the factory press, most emphasis is placed on meetings. The latter may be held under the auspices of the factory Party committee or shop Party organizations, or they may be conducted by the Komsomol of trade-union bodies. They may follow a professional rather than organizational line, as, for example, the meetings of the individuals belonging to the same professional category. They may take place on different plant levels: the meetings on the level of the factory or of individual shops, sections, brigades, or aggregates. Finally, they may take the form of mixed meetings, as represented by "Party and business *aktivs*," the meetings of "Stakhanovites, Party leaders, and managerial representatives," and numerous other combinations. Behind all these meetings, conferences, and councils stands the ubiquitous hand of the factory Party committee with its monopoly on the entire intrafactory propaganda and agitation system. As a mobilizing or "activating" force

the factory Party committee is indeed an efficient adjunct of management; it assumes the task of convincing each worker of the advantages of timely and full implementation of managerial decisions.

It is clear that the factory Party committee, when it acts as a mobilizing agency, makes concrete contributions to a consolidation of one-man management, while through its power to compel the director to alter his decisions it tends to undermine it. The latter phenomenon calls for an explanation regarding the scope of Party interference with managerial duties. Each Party committee is authorized to coerce the factory director into reversing only those decisions which are of "minimum" legality or for which other legal substitutes more advantageous (from the viewpoint of production) may be found. However, it is not an infrequent occurrence that factory Party committees overreach their authority. In 1950, Bol'shevik complained that "some Party officials" press the factory directors to pass "unplanned orders" and in many other ways "push business executives into open violation of state discipline in order to satisfy various purely local interests."²⁸ It is also not uncommon for factory Party leaders to carry out certain managerial assignments, bypassing the factory executives.²⁹ During the last war there were cases where key members of the factory Party organizations took over the entire "operative management." While admitting that this practice was "correct under given [war] conditions," Bolshevik quarters admitted subsequently that this practice led not only to inadequate management but also to an internal weakening of the factory Party organization.³⁰

Party infringements upon the legally guaranteed prerogatives of management should not be interpreted as an indication that the latter operate fully under the shadow of the former. The Party interference is for the most part spasmodic, intermittent, and highly fragmentary; it tends to concentrate successively on specific objects, particularly those which are at the given time emphasized by the Party press. Its interference in individual assignments of managerial activity is as a rule cyclic: it is systematically worked into a pitch and then gradually dies out, and often is suddenly replaced by Party concentration on another "hot" problem. Party interference scarcely penetrates the intricate web of managerial minutiae, the domain of managerial competence of administrative personnel.

In light of the serious, though not always consistent, efforts of central Party and government authorities to strengthen monocratic management, it seems that all order-issuing authority relevant to business and production activities is gradually being concentrated in the hands of the managerial intelligentsia. The position of the latter is being increasingly strengthened by the growing consolidation of its position in the leading ranks of the factory Party committee—a significant development to be examined below. The local Party has enough power constantly to challenge the intrinsic inflexibility of bureaucracy; yet the latter is in a position to curb zealous officiousness of the Party committee and its subsidiaries by

virtue of the fact that it usually has a solid representation in the strategic places of the Communist organization. The latter development, in turn, is not the result of any stealthy maneuvering on the part of managerial bureaucracy; it is in full conformity with the avowed scheme of Bolshevik authorities to entrust the commanding posts in the Party hierarchy to the intelligentsia. Although factory management is gradually becoming a well-nigh exclusive vehicle for the implementation of decisions passed by the central authorities, the Party organization tends to consolidate its position as the unifying force of "public control" and as the all-important instrument of social activism.

Yet, as our foregoing discussion has shown, the Party is still not only an effective control agency and the moving force of social mobilization, but also a force which has subordinated a number of managing functions to its exclusive authority. Industrial secretaries and their strategic representatives in individual plants have become a managing sector, paralleling, and in some respects overshadowing, government bureaucracy. On top of all this, in many factories one-man management has not been consolidated because of the physical inability of directors to cope with an avalanche of orders from higher authorities and their resultant extensive reliance on the technical and administrative staffs, and because of bureaucratic bottlenecks in the flow of decisions from the supreme economic authorities to the Glavk and to factory management. As late as the beginning of 1949 Bol'shevik complained that funktsionalka still prevailed in many enterprises.³¹

Factory Trade-Union Organization

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the power of the director is a power delegated to him by higher authorities, and that it is not fully consolidated, either because of Party encroachments or incompetence of individual managers, or because of bureaucratic bottlenecks.

The general problem of power sharing in the Soviet factory calls for an analysis of the factory trade-union committee as a specific locus of power and as a unit in the over-all distribution of power.

The factory trade-union committee (fabzavkom) is the primary organization of the complex trade-union pyramid. This does not mean that it is necessarily the smallest trade-union body, for in larger plants each shop may organize its own unit (tsekhkom) and larger brigades may form special "trade-union groups" (profgrupp). The functions of the factory trade-union committee, and the factory trade-union or organization in general, have been defined by the new Charter, passed in April 1949 by the Tenth Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions, as follows:

- (a) Mobilization of all factory workers and employees for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the production plan, for the strengthening of labor discipline, and for the development of socialist competition

(b) Drawing of all workers and employees into trade-union membership and political-educational work

(c) Fulfillment of obligations stimulated by collective agreement

(d) Elaboration of practical measures for the stepping up of labor productivity, improvement of the quality of production, promotion of shop and brigade cost-accounting (khozraschët), reduction of production costs, and raising the profitability of the enterprise; holding of production conferences and control over the fulfillment of their decisions; co-operation in the promulgation of suggestions for rationalization of production

(e) Organization of Stakhanovite schools, the tutoring (shestvo) of new workers by skilled workers and the engineering-technical staff, arrangement of lectures and reports on advanced methods of work as well as other assistance to workers and employees for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the norms of output and for the advancement of their production skill

(f) Daily concern with the improvement of working conditions and the welfare of workers and employees

(g) Satisfaction of cultural demands of workers and employees through an extensive development of cultural and sport activities in the enterprise

(h) Implementation of the decisions passed by higher trade-union authorities and of the general [trade-union] meetings³²

All this clearly indicates that the Soviet trade unions are active participants in several phases of socio-economic activities of the factory. They are, first of all, a mobilizing force: an instrument for rallying the workers. Second, they are called upon to assist factory management in carrying out such important tasks as the increase of labor productivity through concerted efforts of individuals and brigades to reduce the cost of production and to master new technological processes. Third, they are an agency of state welfare administration assigned the task of managing social insurance, sponsoring cultural and athletic activities, caring for the workers' housing and for labor safety techniques. The question which may now be raised is whether they have been granted a right to serve as an organization defending the interests of workers vis-à-vis the state-employer. If the factory trade-union committee were vested with any power, the following three phases of its activity would be expressive of it: (a) its active part in the conclusion of collective agreements with factory managements; (b) its right to hold so-called production conferences for the purpose of discussing factory plans and airing the workers' criticism of management; and (c) its participation, on a par with management, in Appraisal and Conflict Commissions (RKK) for the settlement of labor conflicts

There are collective agreements. They are, however, a summary of

all the duties assigned to the trade unions: they define the factory trade-union committee as a mobilizing force, an auxiliary of management, a welfare agency, and an organization assisting various government control agencies. The collective agreement is, in effect, a joint pledge by management and labor (1) to fulfill and overfill the current plan through systematic raising of labor productivity; (2) to effect a remuneration for labor on a basis of piecework and at prescribed wage scales; (3) to work toward the procurement of skilled workers; (4) to strengthen labor discipline, (5) to meet needs for the general welfare of workers; (6) to organize cultural and athletic activities of workers; (7) to protect the workers by strict application of safety techniques; and (8) to organize control over the fulfillment of the stipulations of collective agreement.³³

The collective agreement is a complicated document worked out and concluded by the factory trade-union committee and management. However, its general form and standard provisions are prescribed by central authorities through a "model collective agreement." Its provisions relevant to actual production are drawn from the "directing letters" issued by corresponding ministries and the Central Committee of the Trade Unions. These letters define the annual production quotas and the details of labor productivity, wage scales, production costs, safety techniques, procurement of new skilled workers, planning on the shop and brigade level, norms of socialist competition, planning for the application of labor legislation, and labor discipline.³⁴ This shows that collective agreement is not a result of "bargaining" but is an official definition of rights and duties of both labor and management. The workers of a factory do not negotiate on wage scales, working conditions, and insurance funds; all these matters are decided for them on a higher level. Nor does organized labor have any influence on employment policies; the workers are employed individually by management and sign individual contracts.³⁵

The collective agreement draws its stipulations from two basic sources: the current production plan and labor legislation. Only minor details remain subject to agreement by the two contracting parties, e.g., three-day norms of output for new workers who have not yet been classified. The collective agreement, therefore, is not an expression of the bargaining power of the trade unions, rather, it is a document of an unqualified subordination of labor organizations to the socialist state and to centralized economic planning. It is no wonder, then, that the Bolshevik authorities emphasize that the most important task of trade unions is to serve as schools for "Communist education of the masses" and the training of future managers, as well as to provide a link between the Communist Party and industrial labor. "The most important function of the trade unions is [according to a decision of the Tenth Party Congress] to serve as a school of communism . . . The trade unions, as a school of communism, must serve all the needs of the daily life of workers. They must gradually draw large segments of workers into the work of state building; they must illuminate the path of their development with the ideas of our

[Communist] program and lead them from private to common interests, and gradually promote their status of non-Party affiliation to communism."36

It is interesting to note that most of the obligations assumed by the workers via collective agreement do not have legal enforcement, they are merely "political and moral" norms, and their nonfulfillment does not call for any legal sanctions against the trade union³⁷ This, too, shows that collective agreement is primarily a moral pledge on the part of the workers to co-operate with management in the execution of the production plan. It does not provide for participation by the factory trade-union committee in management. Trade-union members are encouraged to hold "production conferences" at which they may air their views on various aspects of management, register their complaints at mismanagement, and suggest rectifying measures. However, their suggestions become valid only if accepted by the factory director. In this respect, the trade union is a control rather than a decision-making agency. Warranted complaints against mismanagement may cause the removal or demotion of the director, but this, again, is not a matter decided upon by the organized workers.

In 1950 the official trade-union journal complained that there was a tendency among business and trade-union executives to ridicule any criticism coming from production conferences or to confuse their critics with "loquacious answers." 38

As a supplement to the annual collective agreement a joint commission of management and labor draws up the "factory organizational and technical plan" which actually is an economy plan. This is one of many techniques designed to increase labor productivity by curtailing production costs, applying new techniques and tools, and effecting a more rational distribution of manpower. On the basis of the factory plan, individual shops and sections draw their own plans. The shop or section plan—drawn by a commission consisting of the chief of shop, chief of technical section, "advanced Stakhanovites," and Party, Komsomol, and trade-union representatives—calls for the organization of "mixed brigades" which embrace foremen, Stakhanovites, and trade-union organizers.³⁹ These brigades consist of management representatives and the workers' elite and are assigned the task of giving and receiving suggestions bearing on production improvement. They issue various suggestions, conduct "production propaganda," and call "consultation meetings," but can issue no orders. They are one of many mobilizing forces operating within the factory. Although they are linked with trade-union activities, they obviously are not expressive of any power attributes of organized labor. If anything, they tend to split the workers by formalizing distinctions of rank between the workers' elite and the rank and file.

The collective agreement does not touch upon the hiring of new workers. The latter is handled through a labor agreement [trudovoi dogovor] which does not fall within the jurisdiction of the trade unions; it is "negotiated"

and signed individually by each worker and management, the latter being authorized to make the hiring of each individual worker contingent upon his "political and working qualities."⁴⁰ The labor agreement is usually an oral understanding. The graduates of industrial schools are employed through administrative acts and do not enter into any individualized labor agreements.

The Appraisal and Conflict Commission (RKK), in which management and labor are represented on an equal basis, appraises various complaints of individual workers and suggests appropriate solutions. It handles mostly those wage complaints which are not directly treated by law.⁴¹ Solutions of these bodies become valid if agreed to by both parties; in case of disagreement, a solution is secured either by unilateral action by higher managerial bodies (Glavk), or by court decisions. With the consolidation of one-man management, however, the interpretation of government decisions has increasingly become a monopoly of the director. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of RKK's has been gradually shrinking.

During the three decades of their development the Soviet trade unions have gradually lost any power as an independent instrument for the defense of the interests of organized industrial labor. The collective agreement of 1949 has virtually nothing in common with the collective agreement of 1922. The latter dealt primarily with the conditions of employment and recognized the workers as an independent bargaining power. The 1949 collective agreement does not deal with the conditions of employment; it is, in effect, a joint pronouncement by management and labor to comply with the relevant decisions of the government and the "political and moral principles" of the Soviet system. The type of work expected from the factory trade-union organization is best summed up by an article in the official trade-union journal describing their 1949 achievements. During 1949, according to this article, trade-union organization exercised control over "the fulfillment and overfulfillment" of production plans, mobilized the workers for a more efficient utilization of equipment, for the introduction of "progressive norms" of output, and for a more rational utilization of raw material and fuel. Trade-union committees also sponsored many Stakhanovite schools, the "tutoring" of young workers by Stakhanovites, many conferences of the workers who belong to the same profession, and co-operation of scientific staffs with engineering-technical personnel and advanced workers.⁴²

All this indicates that the trade-union organizations are agile performers of numerous supplementary functions of vital importance for the manipulation of the factory as an agency of socialist development. It is also clear that the trade-union organization, though serving as a "public control" agency, to be described below, constitutes an insignificant part in the power system in the factory—all this despite the fact that the Eighth Party Congress, March 1919, promised that "the trade unions ought in the end actually to concentrate in their hands all the administration of the entire national economy . . ."⁴³

It should be added that the functions of the trade unions are not restricted to serving as agencies of mobilization or as symbols for the mythical power or organized labor. They are in charge of workers' welfare provisions, gardening, and, above all, social insurance. All these are complex assignments requiring considerable bureaucratization of the factory trade-union committee. Several insurance councils, falling under the trade-union jurisdiction of the committee, are the organs handling social insurance within the factory. Organized in each enterprise which employs more than a hundred workers, they handle three types of operations. In the first place, they determine, in terms of existing laws, the amounts of sickness, pregnancy, and childbirth compensations; they select the workers to be sent to vacation resorts, etc. Then, they undertake concrete measures designed to cut down the causes of injuries and other ailments. Finally, they "control" medical establishments, the payments of insurance fees, and pension payments.⁴⁴ There is no doubt that the trade unions have a most concrete *raison d'être* in their administration of social insurance. Yet even in this field they are granted no power attributes. They operate within the framework of rigid legal prescriptions and their most vital work is mere routine.

The development of trade unionism in the Soviet Union has shown two clear-cut trends. In the first place, it has gradually lost any attributes it may have had at its inception of a genuine labor movement dedicated to, and protecting the interests of, the workers. In the second place, it has gradually lost the lineaments which were originally devised to make it a power instrument, or, in Lenin's words, a "transmission belt" of Bolshevik rule. It has been side tracked primarily by a new government bureaucracy. At the present time the trade unions are primarily—though not exclusively—secondary control instruments, a phenomenon to be discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

GROUP ALIGNMENT AND SOCIAL MOBILITY

The development of the factory has been marked not only by a systematic curtailment of the power of trade-union organizations and by an increasing tendency to differentiate between management and Party functions, but also by the gradual narrowing of vertical social mobility of the workers and an expansion of the ladder of status.

Social Background: The Soviet View

But before we examine these developments it would be appropriate to let a Soviet economist state the official Bolshevik views on the social structure of the Soviet factory and the resultant types of human behavior. B. Markus, in his systematic analysis of the social background of the Soviet economic system, treats "socialist co-operation" as a matrix upon which are built the socialist forms of individual and group behavior, and offers nine principles which are regarded as its distinguishing fea-

tures. These principles are a summation of ideal attributes of the new industrial society.⁴⁵

(1) Socialist co-operation is made possible by the public ownership of the means of production.

(2) It is a part of an over-all "planned co-operation"; it forms an integral part of the entire socialist economy.

(3) It creates the basis for social interaction based on "conscious and voluntary" unity of the working people.

(4) It is inextricably tied with "socialist competition" [sorevnovanie] which is an antidote of "capitalist competition" [konkurentsia]. "Under the conditions of capitalism, sorevnovanie assumes the form of konkurentsia; capital strives to set working comrades against each other: it bribes a part of them and builds a 'workers' aristocracy,' which, in turn, is made to work against the mass of workers. Under socialist conditions sorevnovanie unites the workers; it is based on mutual aid among the comrades, which results in the elevation of slow workers to the level of advanced workers."

(5) Socialist co-operation creates a new, "conscious" labor discipline. Under capitalism labor discipline is based on hunger and fear of unemployment. Under socialism, among a great majority of toilers labor discipline is a result of conviction [ubezhdenie] based on socialist competition and on the assistance rendered by "advanced workers" to their "slow" comrades.

(6) Socialist co-operation is cemented by the fact that the manager of each Soviet enterprise expresses and carries out collective interests of "the state will." "The Soviet manager enjoys the people's confidence."

(7) An attribute of socialist co-operation is the fact that in a Soviet enterprise each worker is personally interested in raising labor productivity. Under capitalist conditions personal interests are "dominated by the rule of homo homini lupus," whereas under socialist conditions each worker realizes that his well-being is dependent upon joint-work: "Each member of a group is interested in raising the results of joint work."

(8) In its development the socialist form of co-operation is connected with a full elimination of capitalistic division of labor. Under socialist conditions the contrast [protivopozhnost]⁴⁶ between the city and the village, and between mental and manual labor loses its previous antagonistic character, and will eventually fully disappear.

(9) Socialist co-operation is enhanced by the fact that under socialist conditions the technical basis of work has been radically changed. Whereas the capitalists introduce only those machines which bring savings in their payments for work, the socialist system guarantees the introduction of any machine that leads to an economy of man's work.

Thus goes the official Bolshevik interpretation of the background of the Soviet factory, its social structure, and the resultant human behavior. It is clear that this interpretation is a summation of programmatic dicta, rather than a set of empirical statements. Let us now turn to an examina-

tion of some trends in the development of the Soviet factory as a social system and as an arena of social mobility.

Factory Intelligentsia

During the 1930's the factory grew into a complex administrative and economic unit. It was consolidated as a juridical person, a khozraschët unit, a production planning unit, a contract-negotiating body, and an elaborate control agency. At the same time, it was more firmly integrated into the system of centralized economic management; it became an "organ of administration of socialist economy."⁴⁷ The government began to dictate not only the over-all plans for production but also the minutest details of the internal organization of labor, the distribution of responsibilities, the techniques of control, and the technological processes of production. All this required expert administrative and technical personnel. The higher positions of each enterprise were gradually filled with the members of the intelligentsia, and the possibilities of climbing to top positions in factory management, once unlimited for skilled labor, were drastically curtailed. In his speech on the draft Constitution in 1936, Stalin announced that the Soviet Union had finally created its own intelligentsia, 80 to 90 percent of which were "people who have come from the working class, from the peasantry, or from other strata of the working population."⁴⁸ During the subsequent years, systematic efforts were made to promote to leading positions in industrial establishments persons who combined higher education and adequate political training. In 1938, a Party pronouncement stated in re the role played by the new Soviet intelligentsia: "Workers and peasants of yesterday, and the sons of workers and peasants have been promoted to the commanding posts. Special significance is attached to intelligentsia in a country like ours in which the state directs all branches of economy and culture . . . and in which each state worker, in order to carry his work intelligently and successfully, is obliged to understand the government policies, and its tasks within and without the country."

In 1941 Malenkov stated that a large percentage of factory positions requiring expert personnel were still held by incompetent men, and he made it clear that the new Party program called for the gradual taking over of all managing and engineering-technical functions by the intelligentsia. He suggested that this requirement be partly fulfilled by transfer of expert technical personnel from administrative positions in various government offices to direct production assignments. The Eighteenth Party Conference and the joint Party and government Decision of May 28, 1940, attached great importance to the role of foremen by ruling that such positions should be filled exclusively by experts with specialized technical training.⁴⁹ Currently it is emphasized that the foreman, identified as a "junior commander of production," must possess not only "a technical knowledge and be expert in the economic problems of his section, he must also be a cultural leader and an educator of workers. The

foreman is the first adviser of workers; he must constantly raise his technical knowledge, and his cultural and political level" ⁵⁰ In the words of a Soviet interpreter: "The foreman is the junior commander of production, the direct organizer of production processes, and the full master of his section." ⁵¹ The same writer states that "until very recently the role of the foreman was underrated. The foreman was not a genuine organizer of production, he was not charged with the distribution of workers, nor was he allowed to participate in the drawing of norms of output and production rates. He was not granted the right to promote the workers, to impose penalties upon undisciplined workers, and to decide upon pay rates and skill categories of individual toilers." ⁵²

The new policy has been to employ the graduates of engineering-technical schools temporarily as assistant foremen in order to give them an opportunity to acquire indispensable experience by working in direct contact with workers before they are assigned to higher positions. At the present time a highly skilled worker may be promoted to foreman only if an engineer or technician is not available. ⁵³ All this shows that the crossing by workers of the line dividing the workers' group from the managing staff has been reduced to a minimum. The requirement of education has been instrumental in making the factory bureaucracy a comparatively closed status group. The term intelligentsia has not been precisely defined. It should be mentioned, on the one hand, that distinguished Stakhanovites without adequate formal training are considered intelligentsia and may climb to the top of the status ladder. On the other hand, persons who have completed secondary education which normally identifies them as members of the intelligentsia are not considered so if they are employed as regular workers.

Factory intelligentsia, however, is not a homogeneous status group. It is subdivided into horizontal and vertical subgroups. Horizontally, it is divided into executive ("commanding"), technical, and administrative intelligentsia. The executive group commands the workers, the technical group is in charge of mechanical resources and technology, and the administrative group commands various "functional" sectors (bookkeeping, secretarial work, planning, finances, etc.). Vertically, factory intelligentsia is divided into three basic groups: top factory management, shop management, and section management, in each of which order-issuing is concentrated in the hands of one man.

The group status of the factory intelligentsia may be defined in terms of its relationship to the workers, its special privileges, and its assignments in the Party ranks. The intelligentsia not only occupies the commanding posts of production but is also in charge of Communist agitation, evening courses of technical training, *shestvo* (special tutoring of unskilled workers designed to help them to overcome their deficiencies), ⁵⁴ and general political leadership. Remuneration sets off intelligentsia as a special group. In 1944 a worker had an average monthly income of 573 rubles while an engineer or technician received 1,209 rubles, and the

trend indicates a gradual widening of the gap in remuneration. In 1946 the government passed a decision ruling that members of the managerial staff become eligible to special premiums only when the workers of their plants fulfill or overfulfill their norms of output and reduce production costs. At its roots this measure is an effort to mobilize managerial intelligentsia for a more intensive control over each worker and for a utilization of labor power to a maximum. In the eyes of the workers this may easily appear as an exploitation of their labor by intelligentsia, the more so because the managerial staff receives higher bonus payments than the workers. In the "Dinamo" plant in Moscow, for example, the workers received in 1948 premiums constituting 23 to 24 percent of their total annual pay, while the premiums of the engineers and technicians constituted 35 percent of their total pay receipts.⁵⁵ The intelligentsia is, moreover, granted special housing, provisions, and income tax privileges.

The growing consolidation of the intelligentsia as a well-delineated status group has been particularly accelerated during the last decade by the systematic efforts of the Bolshevik leaders to entrust the commanding positions in the Party hierarchy to persons with secondary or higher education. Zhdanov informed the Eighteenth Party Congress that a considerable "improvement in the quality of [the Party's] leading cadres" has been made by the promotion of the intelligentsia to leading posts in the Party organization. He mentioned that 58.9 percent of secretaries of regional or higher committees and 64.1 percent of chiefs of various departments of regional or higher Party committees had higher, incomplete higher, or secondary education.⁵⁶ Andreev informed the same Congress that "there has been a decided change among our leading Party personnel to higher standards of education."⁵⁷ In accordance with this new Party policy it would seem that the factory intelligentsia has strengthened its position not only by holding the commanding positions in management and production but also by dominating the factory Party committees. The intelligentsia has become a medium through which the blueprints of socioeconomic change are implemented, as well as the basic instrument through which the minutely ramified system of total control is carried out.

In the recent Soviet belles-lettres it is the factory engineer, foreman, business executive, and other members of the intelligentsia, Bolsheviks, or "Party-educated" persons who emerge as principal socialist heroes, a role which in the past was reserved for the ordinary workers. The present-day heroes—the managerial intelligentsia—depict "higher," more penetrating, and subtler virtues of "socialist consciousness." They combine "conscious" loyalty to the Bolshevik cause with organizational acumen. Zeka Samedov, the hero of Manaf Suleimanov's Secret Entrails, Pavel Rogov, the central figure of A. Voloshin's The Kuznets Land, Polyakov of A. Rybakov's The Leaders, and many of their kind epitomize the virtues of the new managing intelligentsia: the ability to organize the intricate network of production processes, to secure the confidence of subordinated workers, and to understand the political and ideological side of each economic issue.

Despite the concerted efforts of the government to entrust all the leading positions in factory management to experts, this has not yet become a full reality. Managerial personnel is still composed of three differentiated groups: persons with adequate education, honored Stakhanovites with insufficient formal schooling, and individuals who have acquired their positions exclusively through outstanding Party or managerial work. In the past the intelligentsia was dominant in technical and administrative branches of management, while the commanding executive positions were entrusted primarily to Party workers. In 1939, for example, only 27.6 percent of the directors of economic establishments had academic training.⁵⁸ Incompetence of directors and other executive personnel (chiefs of shops, foremen) has caused the growth of bureaucratic entanglements in the ranks of the administrative group and the assumption of commanding prerogatives by the technical personnel. The government has had to fight a continuous battle with such bureaucratic tendencies as shelving of orders from higher authorities, giving "free" interpretations to new government policies, and adhering to stereotyped procedures. It has also had to fight recurrent tendencies to "functional management."

The Workers in the New Fabric of Social Relations

The rise of the intelligentsia as a basic instrument through which the dictatorship of the proletariat is effected has relegated industrial labor to a secondary position in the status ladder. Lenin's original dream of entrusting production and control leadership to the proletariat, "the vanguard of socialism," has proved unrealistic. Social planning by trial and error has convinced the architects of Soviet society that the intelligentsia provides the most effective instrument for building a new society, for consolidating total control, and for preventing the emergence of unorthodox loci of power. We have already seen how collective agreements evolved from a "legal act" to a "moral pledge," and from a weapon of labor self-defense to a weapon of state-controlled social mobilization. In the same way, trade-union organizations have been gradually consolidated into government and Party auxiliaries entrusted primarily with mobilizing and labor-controlling functions, and depending, to no small extent, in the performance of their assignments on technical intelligentsia within their ranks. It is significant that by granting the engineers, technicians, and all other members of the technical intelligentsia a right to membership in trade-union organizations the latter have ceased to bear any "class" identification; they no longer could readily be transformed into an organization dedicated above all to the defense of the interests of the workers as a social class. So-called "production conferences," which were originally conceived as channels providing for direct participation by labor in management, have been gradually transformed into instruments of "socialist competition" and purely educational functions, that is, media for dissemination of the "experience of advanced workers." The abolition of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (RKI) in 1934 and

the creation of the State Control Commission (which eventually grew into a ministry) represented a turning point in the development of Soviet labor as an organized force. It signified the formal transfer—the actual transfer was effected gradually during the 'twenties—of control functions from labor-allied organizations to the government bureaucracy (intelligentsia). By 1934 the Soviet system had become an institutional labyrinth requiring professional, scientific control.

As a matter of fact, the intelligentsia has been entrusted with general leadership in order to become an effective instrument for accelerating the transformation of the unwieldy masses of swelling labor into a manageable social force. During the first three Five-Year Plans, Soviet authorities were confronted not only with problems connected with the gradual unfolding of the socialist pattern but also with developing new legions of industrial labor, with transforming the peasant into the worker. The problems were engendered by the industrial as much as by the socialist revolution.

The basic problems which confronted the Party and the government were the establishment of an indisputable subordination of the new labor force to total control, the increase of labor productivity, and the creation of regular channels for the flow of new workers into industry. In practical language this meant that the authorities assigned themselves the task of creating a new labor force in which each member would comply with officially defined standards of "labor discipline," and would employ the maximum of his power and skill. The authorities have also undertaken to keep industrial establishments adequately provided with manpower. This called for extensive planning which has brought forth extensive social changes.

It is proposed now to analyze briefly the most significant methods and effects of this planning with a view to throwing some light on the group status of labor, the hierarchization of individual statuses, vertical mobility within labor ranks, and the widening of state control over the recruitment and distribution of manpower. These problems bear directly not only on the integration of labor into the socialist system but also on the general development of Soviet society. All these problems arise in an over-all plan designed to raise labor productivity, which is "one of the chief and most important factors in building up a new social system."⁵⁹ They may be treated in their relation to vertical differentiation of labor and state control over labor resources.

Vertical differentiation of labor has been subject to meticulous and consistent planning. Each worker is assigned a rank and title expressing his position in the status ladder. Underlying it are differential wages, a complex piecework system, and a classification of labor skill. During the Five-Year Plans, the Soviet authorities have worked consistently not only toward eliminating any traces of wage egalitarianism (*uravnilovka*) but also toward a gradual widening of the range of wage scales and thus toward expanding the status ladder. The major steps which have been in-

strumental in accelerating a drifting away from "petit bourgeois egalitarianism" and in effecting a gradual and continuous widening of income range are piecework, especially progressive piecework, raising of norms, and Stakhanovism.

To be sure, the piecework system in the Soviet industry is as old as the Soviet Union. Yet because of small-range wage scales and comparatively low norms of output during the 1920's an "equalization" in the system of remuneration for labor was fairly common. On June 23, 1931, Stalin said:

In a number of factories wage scales are drawn up in such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between skilled labor and unskilled labor, between heavy work and light work. The consequence of wage equalization is that the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of advancement; as a result he feels himself a "sojourner" in the factory, working only temporarily so as to earn a little and then go off to "seek his fortune elsewhere."⁶⁰

The problem which faced the Soviet authorities was how to make the "advanced" workers instead of the low-producing workers the model for the proletariat to follow. The first measure taken was to enforce classification of workers in terms of their skill and the importance and difficulty of their work. Accordingly, all the workers were classed in vertical categories (razriady), with category six serving as a dividing line between the skilled and semiskilled or unskilled workers. At the same time the differential in piecework rates was increased so as to increase the wage spread between categories.⁶¹ Another step in the planned promotion of inequality in income has been the gradual substitution of individual piecework for brigade piecework. By 1941 only one-fourth of piecework employees were remunerated through the brigade system.⁶² This development is a part of the general trend toward a substitution of competitive individual work for co-operative group work.

Inequality in remuneration has been further accentuated through the gradual substitution of so-called progressive piecework for direct piecework. According to the latter, a worker is remunerated in direct proportion to his production, while according to the former production above the norms of output are subject to higher remuneration.

The gradual raising of norms of output has been another instrument through which the spread in remuneration has expanded. During the 1920's the trade-union organizations were an important factor in determining norms of output, and they showed a tendency to favor workers with low labor productivity. During the early 1930's so-called technical norms were introduced; they were no longer drawn up by trade-union representatives but were set by technical intelligentsia. The new norms took into consideration not only labor productivity of available manpower but also the

physical potentialities of individual enterprises. Generally, however, the norms of output were derived mathematically by adding up units of output of all workers engaged in the production of the same article and dividing the sum total by the number of workers. These norms were known as progressive (or "middle-arithmetical") norms. However, in 1947 so-called middle-progressive norms of output acquired official blessing. According to the new system, the norms of output are averages of the outputs of "advanced" workers exclusively.⁶³ This system has been devised to do away with the fact that in the calculation of "middle-arithmetical" averages low-producing workers by far outnumber the "advanced" workers and thus account for the establishment of comparatively low norms of output. The higher norms of output have been responsible for the fact that smaller numbers of workers may exceed them and qualify for additional pay at higher rates. This system has brought forth a decline in the wages of unskilled and semiskilled workers and has raised the wages of the "advanced" segment within the skilled workers. The Eighteenth Party Conference (1941) issued a directive calling for a consistent increase in the wages of "good workers," and for a widening of the spread in wage scales.⁶⁴

The Social Significance of Stakhanovism

Inequality in wages is part of the planned effort to raise labor productivity through emulation by workers with low output of "advanced" workers (Stakhanovites). It is an incentive system with far-reaching social effects. This system has lengthened the hierarchical ladder within the workers' ranks and it has imposed serious barriers on vertical mobility. The latter has been made dependent not only on acquired skill but also on personal stamina. The unskilled workers directly recruited from the kolkhozy (through the "contract" system) and women in general are in the majority destined to remain the "lagging" group, the former because of absence of initial skill, the latter because of less endurance as well as absence of initial skill. The older persons, the workers with reduced physical capacity, and the "misplaced" workers are also fighting insurmountable barriers in search for higher status. The Stakhanovite movement has been instrumental in increasing labor productivity, but its social effects have been much more drastic. It has eliminated any basis for solidarity of labor as a social class; it has split labor, prevented it from becoming a potential power locus, and facilitated its full subordination to the state. It has knocked out from under labor's feet the basic prerequisites for any independent group co-operation; it has been an officially sponsored instrument for replacing mutual co-operation by far-reaching competition.

Two developments within the Stakhanovite movement give additional evidence on the slowing of vertical mobility within labor ranks. (1) During the first phase of the Stakhanovite movement increased production

was achieved through better organization of work and intensive utilization of machinery (and, of course, manpower), whereas in the subsequent development the emphasis has been placed also on such highly professional projects as reorganization of technological processes and perfection of tools. Whereas during the first phase the workers' experience and stamina were a determining factor in exceeding the norms of output, in the second the requirements have been raised to include also professional technical training. It is interesting to note that in 1929, that is, prior to the introduction of Stakhanovite techniques, the workers belonging to the age group of 45 to 50 made, on an average, the highest annual earnings; in 1936, however, the workers of 30 to 35 years of age formed the group with highest average annual earnings.⁶⁵ The new practice, more than the previous one, makes it virtually impossible for former kolkhozniki to enter the ranks of Stakhanovite elite. (2) Since mid-1939 a new trend in the Stakhanovite movement has emerged in the form of the development of "combined professions" and "multiple work." The former refers to a tendency to make each skilled worker proficient in one or more related trades; the latter refers to an effort to utilize fully the working time of all workers by training them to carry on several assignments simultaneously.⁶⁶ This innovation has been motivated by planned efforts to reduce the need for additional skilled labor, and, of course, to increase labor productivity of individual workers.⁶⁷ Soviet writers greeted the new Stakhanovite techniques as new socialist measures to facilitate workers' climbing up the ladder of professional hierarchy. While multiple work was calculated to breed new habits of intensified productive activity, combined professions were regarded as leading to expansion of each worker's professional orbit. This technique requires that each worker learn additional "neighboring" skills, that is, the skills which are related to, and are of approximately the same complexity as, his original assignment.⁶⁸ Thus a highly skilled worker is expected to learn new complex skills, while the unskilled kolkhoznik is urged to embrace new nonprofessional assignments. Accordingly, this method, when effectively carried out, may lead to an augmented labor productivity, but it is a doubtful stimulus to vertical mobility. It may be added, however, that the new technique is also calculated to do away with the indispensability of individual highly skilled workers—referred to by their less skilled comrades as "virtuosos" or "kings"—for it cuts down their "monopoly" on specific essential and complex assignments.⁶⁹ This phenomenon, it would appear, results in some narrowing of the range of the workers' professional hierarchy, for it tends to deprive the comparatively highly placed worker-experts of their carefully guarded indispensability; it achieves this by the simple device of disseminating each skill among at least several persons.

Stakhanovism, through its methods of combining "the professions which were previously independent,"⁷⁰ is regarded by Bolshevik quarters as a device contributing to a gradual elimination of the division of labor, a capitalistic invention. Relying on Engels' Anti-Dühring, the Bolshevik

leaders claim that "by producing a race of producers with an all-round training who understand the scientific basis of industrial production as a whole, and each of whom has had practical experience in a whole series of branches of production from start to finish, this [Communist] society will bring a new productive force. . . ."71 It is emphasized that in capitalist societies the gradually narrowing specialization leads to an actual "dequalification" of workers, a fact which allegedly transforms the latter into mere appendages of machines. In the Soviet Union, according to Bolshevik experts, narrow specialization was earlier found the most effective medium for the elevation of "the cultural and technical level of the workers," but that "at the present time" the trend points to the broadening of professions and, accordingly, to the gradual abandonment of strict specialization. The ultimate goal is to create so-called workers-universal72 through the technique of combined professions. Only the distant future will tell whether the workers-universal will eventually do away with the division of labor in society; at present this goal is only an ideological dictum contradicting the general outlay of work assignments in the Soviet factory.

During recent years a new Stakhanovite "style of work" has been emphasized; it has been identified as "the highest form of socialist co-operation." The new method places the emphasis on group achievements, and it has been designed to embrace not only the workers but also the engineering-technical personnel.73 It is no longer the individual Stakhanovites who are the heroes of the widely reverberating songs of Bolshevik praise but the organizers of collective Stakhanovism, the men like the senior foreman Nikolai Rossiiskii and the engineer F. L. Kovalev, who produce designs intensifying the work of entire shops or plants. This type of Stakhanovism, however, becomes a mass movement of patriotic texture: an oath taken by individual brigades, sections, shops, or enterprises to "fulfill and over-fulfill" the production plan. Yet it is not without influence on the vertical alignment of social-professional groups. By bringing the engineering-technical staff into the orbit of Stakhanovism it opens new avenues for a consolidation of the leading role of the intelligentsia vis-à-vis the workers, it strengthens managerial supervision over the rank and file, and imposes serious limits on the recruitment of members of the Stakhanovite elite from the groups vested with no formal responsibility. In certain "more advanced" plants collective Stakhanovism is conducted by "shop technical councils" which are staffed by leading engineers. Each department and many leading sections organize so-called complex brigades—consisting of shop chiefs, technologists, and foremen—which are assigned the task of studying, reporting, and selecting "the most rational work methods" with the purpose of applying them to production.74 They, accordingly, become the pivotal force of Stakhanovism. In words of a Bol'shevik editorial: "At present, the leaders of production—engineers and technicians—are the active chiefs of Stakhanovite movement. They help the Stakhanovites work out the most effective work methods, and design and put into practice various kinds of technical improvements and readjustments."75

The foregoing discussion shows that vertical social mobility in the Soviet factory has been gradually slowed down despite the fact that the vertical differentiation has been expanded. Labor as a group has been systematically hindered from penetrating into the managerial "class," on the one hand; and, on the other, by raising the norms of output, by introducing "combined professions," and by establishing higher Stakhanovite standards, the emulation of "advanced" workers by their less skilled and experienced comrades has become increasingly difficult.

The Problem of Labor Supplies and Social Mobility

Labor Fluidity. — Another development important for the understanding of the Soviet industrial society is the unfolding of various measures designed to do away with excessive fluidity of manpower and with dependence on a "spontaneous influx" of new forces into industry. Heavy turnover has been one of the most important factors thwarting a progressive growth of labor productivity: in 1937, according to Soviet estimates, an American industrial worker produced annually 2 to 2.5 times as much as his Soviet counterpart.⁷⁶ The causes of labor fluidity have been manifold, but most probably the decisive factors have been lack of housing, psychological and other difficulties encountered by peasants in adjusting to the comparatively limited confines of a factory, managerial inefficiency, and general absence of unemployment. In 1931 Stalin, after emphasizing the importance of permanent workers for the fulfillment of production plans, admitted that there were but "few factories where the personnel does not change at least to the extent of 30 to 40 percent of the total in the course of a half year, or even in one quarter."⁷⁷ He thought that "wage equalization" and, accordingly, the absence of incentive were the causes.⁷⁸

Experience has shown that he missed the primary causal factors. During the subsequent years the wage spread grew wider and Stakhanovism became a mass movement, but the labor turnover continued to be as heavy as before. To cite one example: in the construction works under the authority of the Moscow Soviet in 1938, 60,000 men were hired for work while 61,000 abandoned their jobs.⁷⁹ A Soviet writer has said that heavy labor turnover resulted from four factors. In the first place, large numbers of workers migrated from job to job because their respective enterprises did not guarantee them continuous employment and provided no facilities for the improvement of their skill. Second, the management of many enterprises failed to grant the workers privileges guaranteed by labor agreements. Third, in many factories no substantial efforts were undertaken to ensure safety. Finally, most enterprises were handicapped by inadequate housing for their manpower.⁸⁰ In the years preceding the war and during the war the government began to apply strong measures, some of which contained the elements of a new social revolution, to blot out the symptoms rather than the causes of this chronic disease. In December 1938 the government decreed that each worker carry a "labor book,"⁸¹ which was to specify reasons for transfer from one enterprise

to another; its main purpose was to discourage labor turnover through denial of seniority to unauthorized transferees. In the same month another government decision provided for punitive measures to curb absenteeism and loitering.⁸² It ruled that persons guilty of loitering or absenteeism be deprived for a determined period of their right to temporary disability compensation, or that they be forced out of factory-owned dwelling places.⁸³ On June 26, 1940, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. proclaimed unauthorized movement from one enterprise to another illegal and ruled that offenders should be sentenced to jail from two to four months.⁸⁴ The same decree ruled that workers guilty of absenteeism should be punished by "corrective labor" up to six months at the same enterprise with reduced wages. How effective these measures were it is hard to say, but it is significant that the topic of excessive labor turnover has disappeared from the pages of scholarly journals, and that Malenkov in his report to the Eighteenth Party Conference, in which he enumerated the Party's "recommendations" for the improvement of industrial production and organization, did not mention the problem of manpower fluidity, thus implying, though not proving, that it no longer posed as acute a problem in their minds.

Planned Recruitment of Labor. — The curtailment of excessive labor turnover was accompanied by concerted efforts to improve the planned distribution and recruitment of manpower. Here, again, is a graphic example of a gradual subordination of labor to the absolute authority of the government. During the 1920's there was both "spontaneous" and planned influx of manpower into industry. However, the planned influx suffered from the absence of uniform and permanent recruiting channels and administrative machinery. In 1931 Stalin said: "We must no longer count on a spontaneous influx of labor power. This means that we must pass from the 'policy' of waiting for the spontaneous influx to the policy of organized recruiting of workers for industry. But there is only one method for achieving this—that of contracts concluded between the business organizations and the collective farms and collective farmers."⁸⁵ This policy, however, failed to bring the expected results.

In 1937 approximately 13,000,000 kolkhozniki were considered surplus rural manpower,⁸⁶ yet the system of "contracts" could not channel these forces into industry. In that year there were 4,000,000 kolkhozniki who were completely idle and 8,500,000 who were only partially active in kolkhoz work. Yet this large surplus produced only 4,000,000 recruits for industrial work.⁸⁷ During the first six months of 1939 only 60.3 per cent of planned recruitment through organized channels was achieved. The failure was attributed to the fact that the recruiting offices were not functionally integrated and that the brunt of the work was entrusted to regional authorities.⁸⁸

In his report to the Eighteenth Party Congress Stalin decided to "appeal" to the kolkhozy "to release, say, one and a half million young collective farmers annually for the needs of our expanding industry."⁸⁹

Four months later the government decided to reorganize the entire labor recruiting network, from central to local agencies,⁹⁰ but the results were only temporarily satisfactory. The government was finally compelled to replace organized recruiting of volunteers by compulsory mobilization. On October 2, 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. passed the Decree on the State Labor Reserves, which ruled that 800,000 to 1,000,000 men be provided annually for industry through training of youth in craft schools, railroad schools, and factory training centers (FZO).⁹¹ Trade schools, offering two-year courses, have been assigned the task of procuring skilled workers for heavy industry and maritime and river transportation. Railroad schools, also with two-year courses, have been designed to train skilled transportation workers, and the factory training centers, with six-month courses, have been organized to train the workers of "mass production," primarily miners. The same decree authorized the Council of People's Commissars to draft annually these 800,000 to 1,000,000 young city or kolkhoz men from 14 to 15 years of age for training in trade and railroad schools, and from 16 to 17 years of age for training in the factory training centers. It made it mandatory for kolkhoz chairmen to draft annually, through standard mobilization procedures, two youths per each 100 kolkhozniki for training in the above-mentioned schools. The numbers of youth mobilized in urban communities are determined annually by the central authorities. During the war approximately 2,000,000 young men were recruited and trained,⁹² and the postwar Five-Year Plan calls for an additional training of 4,500,000 young workers.⁹³

Few measures adopted by the Soviet government have had more profound social effects than the decree on labor reserves. It has, in the first place, legalized forced labor for nonconvicts by introducing the draft system as the principal method of providing industrial enterprises with manpower. It has, in the second place, deprived the bulk of new workers not only of choosing a profession but also of selecting the place of work. In the third place, the new worker has actually lost his traditional right to conclude a "labor contract" with an enterprise; the contract is now signed by the labor reserve authorities (since 1948 headed by the all-Union Ministry of State Labor Reserves) and the authorities of the employment-providing industrial branch. The new workers must stay at the enterprise to which they were assigned for at least four years. Furthermore, the previously discussed regulations see to it that after four years a worker cannot change the place of his work without official transfer or risk of losing seniority rights.

Finally, it is important to note that the new system of technical training has introduced new barriers against vertical social mobility within the workers' ranks: women, who are not subject to the draft system, and those kolkhozniki who come to factories through the "contract" system or of their own choice find it increasingly difficult to rise to the ranks of "advanced workers. The element of "education" has built a "screen" not only between

the managerial and technical intelligentsia and the workers but also between workers who have craft training or elementary factory training (FZO), and those who receive no initial training. However, the dividing lines within the workers' ranks are less rigid, for training carried under the auspices of individual enterprises opens avenues for unskilled or semi-skilled workers to climb, although less rapidly than initially trained workers. In 1950, according to official statistics, 494,000 youths graduated from various craft schools, and 7,000,000 workers took special training in their respective plants.⁹⁴

THE CONTROL NETWORK

The concept of control, as it will be used here, refers to the entire gamut of agencies and channels devised and used by the Soviet government and the Communist Party for two general purposes. Their function is, first, to ensure prompt execution of government and Party decisions, and second, to forestall any deviations from the institutional complexes, codified or noncodified, sustaining the socialist system. Accordingly, our concept of control differs from the very narrow official Soviet meaning accorded to this term. According to Stalin, control entails a "checking up on the fulfillment of the decisions of the central bodies of the Soviet government" (government control), and "of the decisions of the Party and its Central Committee" (Party control).⁹⁵ Our concept is substantially broader. In addition to checking on the fulfillment of government and Party decisions it includes the checking on the adherence of individual institutions and enterprises to the statutes regulating their internal organization and to the relevant laws, decrees, and noncodified socialist norms.

In a typical factory, control consists (a) of supervising the fulfillment of the annual quota of production and the utilization of credits in a manner stipulated by the annual "industrial and financial plan" (promfinplan): (b) of checking on the adherence of management, technical staff, and trade-union organizations to the rules for the internal order of the factory and the distribution of responsibilities; and (c) of guarding "the state security and social order." All of the many control agencies operating in the factory have one thing in common: they are engaged in systematic work dedicated to safeguarding the absolute authority of the Soviet regime and the all-embracing interests of the state. They are integral components of a comprehensive system of control, which is exercised by four distinct sets of agencies: government offices, the Communist Party, public organizations, and voluntary groups.

Government Control

The government exercises control over various phases of factory work through numerous agencies, both those within the organizational pyramid of industrial management (i. e., the offices which simultaneously manage and control), and special organizations engaged exclusively in the work

of control (i. e., the offices which control but do not manage). The first group includes the Glavk, which exercises control through special "control inspection groups," the trust, which exercises a direct and daily control over the managerial functions of subordinated plants, and the factory management. The second group consists of the agents of the Ministry of State Control, the State Planning Commission, the Control and Inspection Board of the Finance Ministry, the District Attorney (District Procurator), the State Arbitration agencies, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The Ministry of State Control was organized on September 6, 1940, as a successor to the State Control Commission. Its control is focused on cost-accounting operations and, in general, on the execution of administrative orders. This agency functions through a complex system of Controllers General (one for each administrative branch) whose staffs include senior controllers, controllers, and junior controllers. Operating in conjunction with these agents are senior and junior inspectors. Junior controllers are installed in all the important enterprises and operate independently of the factory management. Their control is twofold: preliminary and terminal. The first consists of checking on the legality of estimates, plans, and expenditure allotments before any payments have taken place. Its function is to forestall possible deficiencies. The second consists of auditing factory books for the purpose of unveiling unwarranted expenditures and hidden reserves.

The State Planning Commission is empowered not only to draw plans for current and future economic activities but also to control planning operations of individual enterprises. Its agents are usually referred to as "the guardians of planning discipline."

The Control and Inspection Board of the Finance Ministry, organized in 1937, is a highly centralized control agency which operates through a network of controller-inspectors, trained in law, economics, finance, and bookkeeping. These agents, operating from special "control stations," are vested with the right to audit the books of any industrial plant and to report all deficiencies to the District Attorney.⁹⁶

The District Attorney (District Procurator) commands a large army of agents who act independently of any other government agency. These agents exercise control over the observance of general laws, decisions, and orders by both management and trade-union organizations. Their control is centered on such vital assignments as the "protection of socialist property," the maintenance of working discipline, and "the safeguarding of labor."⁹⁷ They are known as "the guardians of legality." Among their more specific tasks in industrial establishments is the struggle against absenteeism, hooliganism, opposition to Stakhanovism, and substandard quality of production. In larger plants control exercised by the organs of the Procurator is intensive and continuous, and smaller establishments are subject to periodic checking. Local agents are also encouraged to give periodic oral reports to trade-union activists on the status of "socialist

legality" in individual enterprises. The purpose of these reports, however, is to give concrete examples depicting the types of violations which are of primary concern to the office of Procurator.⁹⁸

The State Arbitration Board, which is neither an administrative nor a judicial organ of the government—though it possesses some features of both—is entrusted with the task of ironing out disagreements emerging in contract negotiations between various enterprises.⁹⁹ It is fully empowered to supervise the fulfillment of business contracts and production plans. It reports all irregularities either to its higher offices or to the Procurator.¹⁰⁰ Control exercised by the agents of the State Arbitration Board over the fulfillment of contractual commitments entails "control by the ruble," and is therefore designed to be exceptionally effective. Control by the ruble implies that in cases of nonfulfillment of contract obligations the guilty party must meet certain financial responsibilities (fines, etc.). "Thus," says a Soviet writer, "the contract system, which embraces control by the ruble, provides for the fulfillment of economic plans and is one of the basic means in the struggle against deviations from the normal functioning of the enterprise and against an absence of discipline."¹⁰¹

The special police, subordinated to the Ministry of State Security, is attached to each district Soviet, but is directly responsible to the special police administration within the regional Soviet. Its function is to combat sabotage, political nonconformism, and counterrevolutionary forces in general.

The district unit of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia is assigned the task of preventing disorders and safeguarding socialist property. Special sections of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, identified as "departmental militia" (*vedomstvennaia militsiia*), are organized in larger plants by specific agreements between individual factory administrations and the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. They guard the objects of "special importance for the state."¹⁰²

Control exercised by government agencies is professional, bureaucratic, and specialized. Its agents are specifically trained and technically equipped to handle the minutiae of very specialized control objects. Unlike the functionaries of other supervisory bodies, the agents of the government system of control are legally responsible for the nonfulfillment of their assignments. They are vested with the right to undertake legal measures against the individuals deviating from the existing orders, norms, and plans. They constitute the most systematic and thorough portion of the over-all network of control agencies; they are the basis of the control network.

The channels of control inside the government agencies are exclusively vertical, i. e., control is exercised by higher administrative-territorial levels of the same agency. The District Procurator, for example, is accountable to the Regional (or Territorial) Procurator, who, in turn, is subordinated to the Union-Republican Procurator, and he to the Procurator

General of the U. S. S. R. The same rule applies to the organs of state security, internal affairs (police), state arbitration, industrial management, state planning, and state control.

It is significant that local Soviets are not assigned any functions in the control of the factory unless the latter is extremely small and of purely local importance. Local Soviets, which according to the Soviet Constitution (Article 3) are in command of "all power in the U. S. S. R.," have been totally overshadowed by control agencies staff with bureaucratic (i. e., nonelective) personnel.

Party Control

Party control is first of all universal. This means that there is no phase of the political, ideological, or socio-economic "front" which is not wide open to Party control. It is an internal control and therefore it is continuous. It is unilateral, a privilege granted to no other organization in the U. S. S. R.: it controls all other agencies but is not subject to control by them. Since Party control is nonbureaucratic and nonprofessional, it would seem that it is not ideally fitted for highly technical assignments (measuring of labor productivity, setting forth and administering rates of output and norms of production, auditing). In order to overcome this difficulty the Party resorts to the creation of *ad hoc* *aktivs* for the performance of such highly specialized functions. However, the *aktivs* are temporary bodies and are usually created after "violations" have taken place. This "difficulty" is more than counterbalanced by a special feature of Party control, which actually constitutes the core of its predominant position in the complex network of institutionalized control: the Party exercises its control not only through its directing bodies but also by means of a distribution of its members throughout all other control agencies. Management, trade-union organization, police, and all other control forces are permeated by Bolsheviks, who are "the eyes and ears" of their respective Party organizations.

Since the Party units are not subject to control by any outside agency their internal control is tighter and more rigid than that of any other organization. The directing body (the bureau) of the factory Party organization is subordinated to triple intragroup control. It is controlled by (a) the primary Party organization, that is, by the members who have elected it (horizontal control); (b) the local Party organization to which it is directly subordinated and accountable (vertical control); and (c) the special agents of the Party Control Commission, a central office subordinated directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (diagonal control).¹⁰³

In the factory, Party control is centered on the fulfillment of production commitments, proper expenditure of funds, protection of socialist property, and administration of social insurance.

The purpose of control by the Party organization [in a plant] is to assist the commanders of production in their daily work. The

Party organization states irregularities, and recommends the steps to be undertaken by management for the purpose of enabling the plant to perform standard work and to observe technological discipline and the plan. In its control of the work of the [plant] administration the Party organization must strengthen the principle of one-man management. It must enhance the authority of the manager by seeing that his orders and directives are strictly fulfilled. ¹⁰⁴

Public Control

Control exercised by public organizations—the trade-union organizations and the Komsomol—is for the most part nonspecialized and serves primarily as an auxiliary of the Party and government system of control.

The factory trade-union committee and its subsidiaries are commissioned by the specific stipulations of the collective agreement to watch over conformity of the wage scale to legal provisions. They also control expenditures from the director's fund, and internal factory order. ¹⁰⁵ The director's fund represents the financial resources of an enterprise acquired through a planned reduction of production costs and through an "overfulfillment" of output plans in general. These resources are used for (a) the expansion of the means of production and the repair of living quarters, (b) the support of various cultural and social organizations, and (c) premiums to workers and technical and administrative personnel for the "overfulfillment" of production assignments. ¹⁰⁶

With the abolition of the People's Commissariat of Labor in 1933 and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in 1934, the functions of the local offices of these bodies were transferred to trade-union organizations. These functions consist primarily of checking on the observances by responsible managerial personnel of those provisions of the Labor Code which deal with the well-being of the workers, sanitary conditions, and safety techniques. This control is performed by special "public inspectors" who are selected by trade-union organizations. ¹⁰⁷ Trade-union members are entitled to hold "production conferences" at which they are informed about the current plans and are called upon to state mistakes and unwarranted acts perpetrated by management. ¹⁰⁸

The Komsomol, acting under the immediate supervision and under the direct guidance of the Party, looks after the correct application of government and Party decisions by both management and the primary trade-union organization. ¹⁰⁹ The Seventeenth Party Congress (1934) decided that special attention be given to the organization of Komsomol "light cavalry" units which focus their work on exposing managerial deficiencies. ¹¹⁰ At the present time the creation of special Komsomol "control outposts" is particularly emphasized. They are authorized to "raid" various departments and shops in order to "check" on the expenditures of various materials and electrical power. ¹¹¹

The press, although it is not considered a public organization, has

been entrusted with an important assignment in the system of public control. It is an effective medium for unveiling deficiencies in the application of relevant laws and decisions. The press also publicizes the experiences of various control agencies and is accordingly considered a factor contributing to the improvement of supervision.

The agencies of public control are not vested with the right to undertake legal measures against the violators of the law, but may only report their "findings" to proper government and Party quarters. In their internal relations they are subject, in theory at least, to horizontal and vertical control. The factory trade-union committee, for example, is controlled by the general meeting of trade-union members of the particular factory (horizontal control), but it is at the same time subordinated to and controlled by the district trade-union committee (vertical control). It should be stressed, in this connection, that according to one of the principles of Soviet "democratic centralism," decisions passed by higher bodies are mandatory for lower bodies. This means that control over the factory trade-union committee by its membership (horizontal control) is actually auxiliary to the control exercised by the district committee. In the final analysis, the factory trade-union committee is controlled by the All-Union Council of Trade Unions through intermediary organizations at different administrative territorial levels. A similar pattern of dual intragroup control is followed by the Komsomol.

Voluntary Control

Voluntary control is specialized but nonbureaucratic, that is, it does not call for permanent staffs. The most popular voluntary agencies are special control boards, composed of representatives of both management and labor, which are appointed under the authority of the Ministry of State Control. The local agents of the District Procurator organize special auxiliary groups (gruppy sodeistviia), which watch over specifically assigned control objects and report their findings to authorized agents of the District Attorney.¹¹² Another important group is the aktivs of professional experts organized on the initiative of, and close guidance by, the factory Party organization for control over specific production processes. Finally, each plant has an auxiliary militia (brigadmil), which consists of volunteers recruited from among factory workers and operates under the direction of district branches of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia.¹¹³

Voluntary control may require high skill from its members (aktivs of experts), or it may consist of purely mechanical assignments (auxiliary militia). These groups have no independent status: they are adjuncts of Party and government agencies. They are internally controlled by their respective memberships (horizontal control) and by Party and government organizations whose adjuncts they are (vertical control).

The Over-all System of Factory Control

The Soviet factory is subject to a comprehensive system of intertwined

controls. Every aspect of human life, varying from political-ideological behavior to the application of technological principles, is under constant and thorough surveillance.

The strands of the control web are multitudinous and provide avenues for "checking up" on everybody by everybody. Control functions are differentiated, but the demarcation lines are not clear-cut and allow for extensive overlapping. The more important a control object is the more agencies focus their attention on it.

Soviet authorities have formulated various types of discipline, which may be regarded as indices of principal aggregates of control objects. "Socialist discipline" denotes adherence not only to juridical norms but also to noncodified socialist maxims. Its chief guardian is the Communist Party, but most of the other control agencies are concerned with various facets of it. "State discipline" refers to full compliance with the existing laws and administrative decisions and orders. Its chief protector is the Procurator ("the guardian of legality"), with the assistance of all other control agencies. "Planning discipline" implies consistent work toward full implementation of the annual "industrial and financial plan" in terms prescribed by higher government authorities. The agents of the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of State Control, the Finance Ministry, the corresponding industrial ministry, and the State Arbitration Board are its chief guardians. "Production discipline" signifies adherence to the prescribed arrangement of production and is guarded by managerial as well as nonmanagerial government control agencies with the assistance of the trade-union organization and most other groups. "Technological discipline" implies full observance of prescribed technological processes and is guarded by the managerial hierarchy, with the assistance of the trade-union organization. "Technological discipline [according to a Bol'shevik editorial] must become the law of production. No deviations from established norms, standards, production processes, and production schedules ought to be allowed. Directors of enterprises, chief engineers, and chief technologists who allow such deviations must be subjected to court action."¹¹⁴ "Labor discipline" refers to full compliance with work assignments and with the social and cultural provisions of the Labor Code. Its chief guardians are the trade-union organization and management

"Socialist discipline" is a generic concept including all other disciplines as its constituent elements: accordingly, the safeguarding of "socialist discipline" is equivalent to the safeguarding of all other disciplines put together. The Communist Party, as the supreme watchdog of "socialist discipline," is the indisputable guardian of state and Party interests in the factory: in brief, it commands universal control and has been devised to serve as a unifying force in the over-all system of control.¹¹⁵

The organizations and their members engaged in the field of control are constituents of an over-all hierarchical system. The Communist Party occupies the top layer of the hierarchy by virtue of its paramount assignments of safeguarding "socialist discipline" and controlling all other

control agencies. Government agencies, run by bureaucracy, constitute the second layer. They provide specialized, professional, competent, and responsible control. They hold all the arterial strands of control in their hands. Public organizations occupy the third layer; they are Party and government auxiliaries. At the bottom are voluntary groups which operate either as satellites of individual government agencies or as temporary bodies sponsored by the Party. The hierarchy in the control structure does not follow the hierarchical pattern of statuses of factory personnel, for persons of equal status may be distributed among all four groups. In fact, the vertical differentiation of control systems cannot be defined in terms of a single classificatory principle. Although the primary Party organization possesses supreme authority in the over-all system of control, the government bureaucracy commands the highest degree of competence. The basic difference between control performed by public organizations and voluntary groups lies not in their mastery of different scopes of authority and competence, but in the fact that the former holds relative permanence and a wider range of operations. This absence of a uniform classificatory principle is indicative of an incomplete integration of the system of control and of loose co-ordination of various control functions. Despite the fact that the wide overlapping by various control agencies is designed by the heads of the Soviet state to reinforce the over-all system of control, its actual contribution to the integration of factory control may be rather negative, for it involves extensive duplication and conflict of responsibility. It also involves widespread suspicion and distrust out of which often grows intergroup conflict.

During recent years the Soviet authorities have made frequent references to the forthcoming transition of Soviet society from socialism to communism. In Communist society, according to its champions, work will become a habit,¹¹⁶ a "need of each man," and therefore no compulsion for work will be needed. It is alleged that in the not too distant future the organization of work will be regulated not by juridical coercion but by habitually observed rules regulating Communist society and by Communist morality.¹¹⁷ In contrast to this programmatic dictum, no traces have yet been manifested of a relaxation of organized control, which, in the final analysis, is a device for compelling each individual to do his assignment in a prescribed manner. Indeed, all available facts point to a gradual development of a more stringent and ubiquitous control.

INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

The formal structure of the factory, safeguarded by the colorful labyrinth of control agencies, is constantly challenged by "informal groups," usually face-to-face aggregations whose activities imperil the smooth functioning of the blueprint organization. These "informal groups" are the main target of control agencies and the main force thwarting a socialist consolidation of the Soviet factory. The real scope of deviant organizations and

their internal structuring can not be fully grasped without intensive "field work"; the more so because they do not represent an object which "attracts" the eyes of Soviet scholars. Yet their widespread existence and social significance can readily be inferred from various types of official and semiofficial statements.

Deviations from, or challenges to, the formal factory order are of two general types: those effected by individuals who require no organized group backing and those carried out by persons serving as instruments or parts of organizations. The first type includes a variety of villains who are scornfully identified as "shriekers," "flitters," "hooligans," "loafers," "skeptics," and in general the victims of "capitalistic habits." These individuals do not necessarily belong to any informal organizations; they may sometimes be isolated recalcitrants who for varied reasons choose an existence aloof from socialist imperatives. Of more significance are the deviant actions, the nonconformist behavior, which could not take place without deliberate and organized group backing.

"Shturmovshchina"

Take, for example, the much-cursed shturmovshchina, the type of group behavior which challenges the most sacred of all the principles of socialist work—the imperative of planned production. The meaning of shturmovshchina is clear-cut. The workers of a brigade, section, or shop "take it easy" in their work during most of the month, with the obvious result that their output lags far behind the planned quotas. During the last week or so the work becomes a mad rush ("all hands on deck") as if every concerned person is earnestly interested in fulfilling and even overfulfilling the plan.¹¹⁸ The result is usually general confusion and failure to achieve the production quotas. Shturmovshchina is recognized by Soviet authorities as a phenomenon of group behavior which challenges socialist orthodoxy. It is a common occurrence; even the Moscow plants, expected to serve as socialist models, have not been able to find a cure for it.¹¹⁹ We know little about the informal organization without which shturmovshchina could not occur, but we can infer that it follows a vertical pattern. It appears to be a result of surreptitious co-operation between the workers (skilled as well as unskilled), engineers, technicians, and even some "junior commanders of production." It proves that the control system despite its all-pervasiveness and interlocking reinforcements is not ironbound. However, the control system and Party vigilance are the forces which must be credited with checking shturmovshchina.

Opposition to Stakhanovism; Thieving Groups

Another type of collective behavior thwarting an efficient functioning of the blueprint organization is expressed in the workers' opposition to Stakhanovism, which, again, could not take place without adequate subterranean organization. The presence of eager-beaver Stakhanovites leads to the

raising of minimum production rates for each worker and, therefore, to a quantitative increase of output which is not subject to supplementary payments. Accordingly, it tends to decrease the wages of non-Stakhanovites. "Multiple work" and "combined professions," the special Stakhanovite techniques introduced ten years ago, tend also to reduce the number of openings for, and indispensability of, highly skilled workers. Here, too, we know little about the structure of the informal groups which try to make life miserable for Stakhanovites, but we know that this type of unorthodox behavior does exist and that it is a result of organized action. On at least one occasion the struggle "against the tendencies to discredit and torment advanced Stakhanovites" by "anti-state" and other "backward" elements topped the list of assignments to the agents of the Procurator.¹²⁰

Theft in Soviet factories was of such wide proportions before World War II that on August 10, 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R. passed an ukaz specifying exceptionally harsh punitive measures for the protection of "socialist property from plunder."¹²¹ The stringency of the new decree, however, did not put an end to violations of the socialized "Thou shalt not steal." They have continued until the present time to pose an acute problem of far-reaching consequences.

Thieving "crimes" are of two types: those effected by individuals through their own designs, and those which are results of organized group action. In the latter cases factory watchmen as a rule figure prominently. In 1945 Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost'—the official journal of the Procurator—complained that in some plants "the positions of watchmen are filled with persons who had not been fully investigated, which leads to drastic consequences." The journal cites the following example. "In a Noginsk factory (in the Noginsk district, the Moscow region) the chief of the [factory] guard, Kutenev, organized a thieving group, which was engaged in the systematic plundering of finished goods. Analogous developments took place in . . . several other enterprises [of the same district]."¹²² The "thieving groups" include quite a variegated assortment of factory personnel: no level of the over-all hierarchical structure is immune to it. They may include, in addition to rank-and-file representatives, chiefs of storehouses, bookkeepers, and various "commanders of production," and office chiefs.¹²³ The office of the Procurator once complained that in certain shops, thieving groups had made such extensive inroads as to virtually transform them into their "private orbits," their "own firms filling up the orders received from private persons."¹²⁴

According to a Soviet jurist, the stealing of socialist property—usually manufactured goods—is as a rule a group action. "The initiator of the crime [he claims] must of necessity involve a wide circle of collaborators." The same author claims that in most cases the chief organizing and directing function is not performed by persons with official status (the director of the storehouse, the chief of shop, etc.) but by persons who deliberately take positions which do not entail any "formal responsibilities." An admitted thief, interrogated by the same author, stated that in each "job" (the term

used to denote the complex stealing operation) there are two "chiefs": the titular chief (a figurehead) and the real boss. The former is of necessity a factory official who is "formally responsible" for the manufactured goods, or a part thereof. He is virtually placed on the "payroll" of the thieving group and his basic functions are, first, to play "deaf, dumb, and blind" while the stealing is going on, and, second, to "go to jail" in case the "job" is discovered. The latter means that, owing to the fact that he was on the thieving group's payroll—and therefore a paid member of the subterranean organization—it is not in his interest to betray his comrades.¹²⁵

"Bureaucratism"

Let us now consider a set of more subtle, yet equally pressing, deviations from the prescribed behavior: the unorthodox phenomena subsumed under the term "bureaucratism," tagged as "a result of bourgeois influence on our [administrative] apparatus," and as a generic concept for "the worst survivals of capitalism."¹²⁶ Hardly any Party Congress failed to hurl a verbal innuendo upon the so-called perfidity and stubborn inflexibility of bureaucratism.¹²⁷

In the foregoing description, or rather intimation of the existence, of various informal groups we have seen that in some of them bureaucracy has had its representation: shturmovshchina, for example, could not take place unless supported by a group of strategically located bureaucrats.

It is obvious that managerial bureaucratization has been a result of deliberate and systematic efforts by Soviet authorities to entrust the commanding positions in production to a body of competent and efficient persons. Yet the authorities have employed many devices to prevent the bureaucracy from developing a group solidly integrated by community sentiment and a resultant ability to stand as a single body vis-à-vis other groups. The blueprint organization cuts the unity of management by placing it in a complex web of interlocking and overlapping organizations.

Bureaucratism is officially regarded as any tendency on the part of management to ignore the ties which place it within a larger organizational system and to act as a body motivated by specific group interests and dominated by an esprit de corps. This is a definition of bureaucratism which is worthy of note since it is significantly different from that found in some Western discussions of the subject. In American newspaper editorials "empire building" and the tendency of officeholders to develop a special group interest are often mentioned as characteristics of bureaucrats. These characteristics are also attacked in Soviet newspapers under the rubric bureaucratism. American newspaper editorials also single out other traits as typically bureaucratic. Among these are cold and rigid adherence to the letter of rules and regulations, stress on hierarchy, and adherence to red tape. These traits, described so critically in American journals, correspond to the traits listed more sympathetically in Max Weber's classic definition of bureaucratism. He refers to "fixed and official jurisdictional

areas . . . ordered by rules," "a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination," and management based on "written documents."¹²⁸ These traits by which Weber and Western newsmen define bureaucratism are just those which Soviet authorities desire to see in practice and the absence of which they call bureaucratism. In recent Soviet writings, precision, regularity, and obedience to rules are regarded as goals with which bureaucratism interferes. Bureaucratism, in Soviet usage, means substantially the same thing as "family relations"—that is, the emergence of informal personal clique relations. Within the Soviet scheme of things it is the tendency of the bureaucracy to develop unified groups which is considered a heresy; indeed, it is considered an effort to undermine the factory blueprint organization.¹²⁹

In Western societies bureaucracy is grounded in a social texture providing the necessary prerequisites for its development into a group with formalized structure. Soviet bureaucracy commands similar prerequisites; yet the architects of socialist society work toward neutralizing these prerequisites through a continuous war against any tendency toward group solidarity and against any tendency to modify the behavior expected and sanctioned by the formal organization.

In the West the tendency of the bureaucracy to function as a unified group has not necessarily been a challenge to the existing social order in industry; indeed, it has added to its internal consolidation and efficient functioning. Thanks to strictness, stability, and calculability, bureaucracy has acquired "a crucial role in our society as the central element in any kind of large-scale administration."¹³⁰ In the Soviet Union, on the contrary, no organization, with the possible exception of the Bolshevik Party, is encouraged to develop anything resembling an autonomous system: functional overlapping and personnel interlocking are designed to prevent each organization from having its clear-cut *raison d'être*, its specific sentiment, and its unchallenged authority. Organizations are not important by themselves; they acquire their true significance as inextricable parts of a large organizational fabric in which they permeate, and are permeated by, other groups. This is considered an indispensable requirement for efficient functioning of a centrally planned and controlled society. It strengthens the central authority by weakening internal solidarity of individual groups.

The reason why the central authorities keep their watchful eyes on the ever present tendency of bureaucracy to challenge the blueprint scarcely need an explanation. After all, bureaucracy was traditionally considered a foe of socialist designs; it was not before the end of the 1930's that the Bolshevik leaders recognized that the land of socialism had finally acquired its "own intelligentsia," trained in the spirit of, and loyal to, Soviet philosophy. In all organized surreptitious resistance to the consolidation of Bolshevik power the bureaucracy played the most substantial role. Numerous Soviet purges were directed primarily against the members of intelligentsia occupying official positions. Moreover, a bureaucracy in any society shows a clear tendency to routinize its functioning, and, accordingly,

to resist all "outward" interference that imposes changes. The Soviet factory is subject to constant changes and revisions of administrative procedures, and the commanders of production are expected to be alert to the avalanches of new decisions emanating from higher authorities; it should not be overlooked that in the Soviet Union the factory management is a part of the government bureaucracy. Factory officials and experts, wrapped up in their own daily tasks, have a natural tendency to develop impersonal relations toward the workers, yet personal relations are a cornerstone upon which Stakhanovism is built. Finally, it is realized that bureaucracy holds in its hands the most powerful tool for efficient resistance to the innovations for whose acceptance it is not prepared: the competence and ability to engineer intricate indigenous designs. It is no wonder, then, that, considering this background and the pivotal role played by bureaucracy in the Soviet system, a specially rigid control over the work of factory intelligentsia has become a socialist imperative.

Despite the intricate system of control and unremitting Bolshevik pressure, the factory bureaucracy shows many signs of deviant behavior. Examples are numerous. Their existence has been occasionally noted by the Soviet scholarly journals, but virtually no efforts have yet been made to approach and examine them systematically.

Deviant group behavior does not necessarily imply that the informal groups which engender it embrace the entire factory bureaucracy, the latter forms a framework within which diverse informal groups are constituted. Yet unless there is a degree of over-all bureaucratic solidarity most of the extant groups could not emerge, or at least could not take deep roots.

Among the current bureaucratic deviations from expected behavior three interrelated phenomena are most frequently mentioned: the concealment of factory reserves, the reduction of the quality of manufactured goods, and deliberate chalking up of production expenses. During recent years the central authorities have undertaken extensive measures to compel each industrial establishment to put to full use all the "reserve funds"—extra tools, partially used equipment, and plant space. To accelerate control over management's observance of these measures each plant must report all its unused or partly used equipment and factory space. Many factory managements "conceal" their "reserve funds" simply by not reporting them in toto. This "concealing" indeed could not take place unless it were the result of an "informal" agreement between several key administrative persons, including some "junior commanders of production."

The same is true for informally agreed-upon reduction of the quality of manufactured goods and for deliberately magnifying production costs. The latter practice is particularly interesting. It is tied with, or derived from, incessant official pressure to increase labor productivity by curtailing costs of production. This curtailment entails a rational utilization of equipment, fuel, and electrical power, an application of the best technological processes, the most effective distribution of manpower, a "so-

cialistically correct" wage policy, and reduction of spoilage in production. Each factory management is expected not only to work out an annual plan for the reduction of production costs but also to surpass its commitments, to "overfulfill" the plan. However, a closely knit informal bureaucratic organization can make a parody of the planned curtailment of production costs. It is not an isolated practice for factory administrations to "overfulfill" their cost-reduction plans by entering adroitly blown-up costs into the annual plan. Thus it happens that individual plants report an overfulfilled cost-reduction plan without actually raising their labor productivity. Deliberate exaggeration of appraised annual production costs could not be normally effected without close collaboration between a whole array of line and staff managers at different factory levels. It presupposes a co-operation of, and solidarity between, the key line managers (including the director and chief engineers), and the chiefs of the planning, technical, bookkeeping, financial, supply, and sales departments or bureaus. It also presupposes either tacit co-operation or negligence on the part of the Glavk liaison officials.

It is not only in its relation to higher authorities that the factory bureaucracy manifests signs of informal solidarity. Also in management-labor relations it tends to emerge as a primary group held together by community of sentiment. The factory rank and file has two instruments whereby it may influence management, and therefore, "meddle" in managerial affairs. In the first place, through the channels of public and voluntary control it has an access to various phases of administrative work, although via the route of "checking" rather than "decision making." In the second place, the workers are encouraged to "make inventions" raising labor productivity. These "inventions" may make the sweeping of a factory floor more efficient, or make a technological process more rational. Worker's "inventions" must be studied by factory experts and if found advantageous must be put into practice. From the point of view of bureaucracy, they are often an extra headache and a challenge to its prerogatives. They serve as a vehicle whereby the learned experts are challenged by busybody laymen. They give additional work to individual experts entrusted with checking and implementing new inventions. Finally, they tend to weaken well-entrenched production routines.

For these reasons it is no surprise that the wrath of Party quarters is frequently addressed at the bureaucratic suppression of workers' "inventions." In 1949 the journal Novyi mir carried a documented story about the run-around received by a worker-inventor at the hands of dignified experts and commanders of production.¹³¹ Henrikh Bortkevich, a lathe operator in the Sverdlov plant (Leningrad) which manufactures machine tools and which is considered a model factory in efficiency and reliability, worked out a series of related devices, which, if applied would accelerate the rotation of lathes. The chief engineer commended Bortkevich's inventive ambition but asked him to submit his devices to a subordinate engineer

The latter instead of "receiving" the invention for testing tried to convince Bortkevich that his inventive efforts were futile. Not discouraged so easily, the worker-inventor presented his devices to the shop chief who somehow could not get interested in the whole problem. In the meantime the chief technologist heard about Bortkevich's invention and hastened to invite him to his home but only to impress on him the "theoretical" infeasibilities inherent in his devices. The chief of the technical department, the logical person to take up workers' inventions, managed not to hear at all about Bortkevich's devices. To make the long story short, it was Bortkevich's perseverance and stubbornness which finally led to the application of his invention. But undoubtedly the run-around accorded him by the experts is indicative of an informal unity of bureaucracy. Bortkevich's story points at an informal bureaucratic organization, which is set in motion whenever an opportunity presents itself, and which surreptitiously challenges the blueprint provisions devised to prevent the commanders of production from forming a fully integrated social group through self-devised processes.

These types of deviationism should not be interpreted as a deliberate struggle against socialism on the part of Soviet bureaucracy. They mean, at most, a spontaneous search by managerial intelligentsia for a modus vivendi within the socialist orbit. This search, in turn, is a part of the fluid process of social adjustment which necessitates special channels not provided by the socialist system.

NOTES

1. XVII S'ezd VKP (b) (Moscow, 1934), p. 672. Difference between these two types of management are discussed in I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, Administrativnoe pravo SSSR (Moscow, 1946), pp. 39-43.
2. A. V. Venediktov, Gosudarstvennaia sotsialisticheskaya sobstvennost' (Moscow-Leningrad, 1948), pp. 716ff.
3. I. D. Levin and A. V. Karass (eds.), Osnovy sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947), p. 265.
4. S. S. Studenikin, Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo (Moscow, 1950), p. 84.
5. XVII S'ezd VKP (b) (1934), pp. 672-73.
6. E. Lokshin, "Organizatsionnye problemy promyshlennosti SSSR," Problemy ekonomiki, XI, No. 4 (1939), 49.
7. V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, XXII (Moscow and Leningrad, 1929), 462.
8. A. Liapin, "O bol'shevistskikh printsipakh khoziaistvennoi raboty," Bol'shevik, XVII, Nos. 15-16 (1940), 83.
9. Y. Zhukovskii, "Edinonachalie -- osnovnoi metod upravleniia sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennost'iu," Bol'shevik, XVII, No. 17 (1940), 16.
10. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., pp. 298-300.
11. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,

trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 337.

12. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., pp. 35 ff
13. I. D. Levin and A. V. Karass, op. cit., p. 263.
14. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., pp. 36 and 277.
15. A. Vorob'eva, "Vsemerno razvivat' khozraschët vnutri predpriiatiia," Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 7 (1949), 3-15; A. Sokolovskii and V. Mnatsaganova, "Opyt organizatsii vnutrizavodskogo khozraschëta na moskovskikh zavodakh," Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 7 (1949), 93-103; S. N. Bratus, Iuridicheskie litsa v sovetskom grazhdanskom prave (Moscow, 1947), pp. 290-91.
16. S. Tatur, "Lichnye scheta ekonomii — novaya forma sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia i khoziaistvennogo raschëta," Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 10 (1949), 16-26
17. Ibid., p. 21; I. Orlovskii, "V bor'be za dosrochnoe vypolnenie piatiletki," Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 2 (1949), 37.
18. V. M. Molotov, V bor'be za sotsializm; Rech'i i stat'i (Moscow, 1935), p. 258.
19. I. Baranov, "Khoziaistvennyi dogovor — orudie vypolneniia gosudarstvennykh planov," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 5 (1949), p. 65.
20. It should be mentioned that during the regime of direct contracts the director was not vested with full independence in choosing his prospective buyers. The difference between general and direct contracting is that the former entails a minute stipulation of contracting relations by the Glavki (or corresponding offices), whereas the latter entails only a basic definition of business relations by the proper ministries of production and supplies.
21. The Land of Socialism: Reports of the 18th Party Congress (Moscow, 1939), p. 218.
22. G. Malenkov, "O zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii v oblasti promyshlennosti i transporta," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 3 (1941), pp. 10-27.
23. A. Klimanov, "Podgotovka i provedenie partiinykh sobraniï," in A. Klimanov, et al., Partiinaia rabota na predpriatii (Moscow, 1949), p. 11.
24. A. Leskov, "Rol' partiinoi organizatsii na proizvodstve," Bol'shevik, XVIII, No. 2 (1941), 9.
25. N. Klobukov, "O planirovanii partiinoi raboty," in A. Klimanov, et al., op. cit., pp. 23 ff.
26. D. Goginava, "Partiinyi kontrol deiatel'nosti administratsii," in A. Klimanov, et al., op. cit., pp. 51-52.
27. Ibid., p. 56.
28. "Shire razvërtyvat' bol'shevistskuiu kritiku i samokritiku," editorial in Bol'shevik, XXVII, No. 3 (1950), 4
29. Ibid., p. 4.
30. L. Slepov, "O bol'shevistskom metode rukovodstva khoziaistvennymi organami," Bol'shevik, XXVIII, No. 2 (1951), 48-49.

31. E. Sokolov, "Sovetskie profsoiuzy -- shkola kommunizma," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 2 (1949), 47.
32. "Ustav professionalnykh soiuзов SSSR (27 april' 1949)," Professional'nye soiuzy, No. 5 (1949), p. 24.
33. A. E. Pasherstnik, Kollektivnyi dogovor v SSSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 11. See also by the same author, "Voprosy kollektivnogo dogovora v SSSR," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 4 (1948), p. 50.
34. A. E. Pasherstnik, Kollektivnyi dogovor v SSSR, p. 11.
35. I. D. Levin and A. V. Karass, op cit., p. 415.
36. VKP (b) v rezoliutsiakh, I (6th ed., 1941), 371.
37. A. E. Pasherstnik, op cit., p. 18.
38. E. Sokolov, "Kritika i samokritika -- bol'shevistskii metod vospitaniia kadrov," Professional'nye soiuzy, No. 1 (1950), p. 34.
39. L. Khudorovskii and K. Yaroslavov, "Zavodskoi organizatsionno-tekhnicheskii plan," V pomoshch' fabrichno-zavodskim i mestnym komitetam, VIII, No. 23 (1947), 8-11.
40. A. S. Krasnopol'skii, "Trudovoi dogovor kak forma вовлечения rabochei sily v narodnoe khoziaistvo," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 6 (1948), pp. 45-51; N. G. Aleksandrov (ed.), Sovetskoe trudovoe (Moscow, 1949), p. 126.
41. N. G. Aleksandrov (ed.), op. cit., pp. 298-300.
42. A. Osipov, "Kollektivnye dogovory na 1950 god.," Professional'nye soiuzy, No. 1 (1950), pp. 16-19.
43. VKP (b) o profsoiuzakh, p. 95, as quoted by Isaac Deutscher, Soviet Trade Unions. Their Place in Soviet Labour Policy (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), p. 29.
44. N. G. Aleksandrov, op cit., pp. 327-28.
45. B. Markus, "Uslovnye voprosy organizatsii truda v tret'eii piatiletke," Problemy ekonomiki, XI, No. 3 (1939), 153-60.
46. V. I. Lenin, Leninskiĭ sbornik (Moscow, 1924-45), XI, 357.
47. S. N. Bratus, op. cit., p. 33.
48. J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (11th ed.; Moscow, 1943), p. 545.
49. "Rezoliutsiia po dokladu tov. Malenkova, priniataia XVIII Vsesoiuznoi konferentsiei VKP (b)," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 3 (1941), p. 54.
50. "O roli mastera na proizvodstve," editorial in Problemy ekonomiki, XII, No. 7 (1940), p. 19.
51. A. Liapin, op cit., p. 84.
52. Ibid., p. 84.
53. "O roli mastera na proizvodstve," op cit., p. 19.
54. M. Prots'ko, "Intelligentsiia strany sotsializma," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 6 (1949), p. 17.
55. I. Orlovskii, op. cit., p. 41.
56. XVIII S'ezd VKP (b) (Moscow, 1939), p. 529.
57. Ibid., p. 106.
58. Ibid.
59. V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, XXIV, 342; B. Markus, op. cit., pp. 152-66.

- 60 J. Stalin, op. cit., pp 362-63
61. B. Markus, "Trud," Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. SSSR (Moscow, 1947), pp. 1116-18.
62. I. Dvorkin, "Sotsialisticheskiĭ printsip raspredeleniia po trudu," Bol'shevik, XXIV, No. 4 (1947), 37.
63. P. Ivanov, "O vnedrenii sredneprogressivnykh norm v promyshlennosti," Planovoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 4 (1947), p. 47; A. P. Liapin, Trud v strane sotsializma (Moscow, 1947), p. 31
- 64 "Rezoliutsiia po dokladu tov. Malenkova, priinaiata XVIII Vsesoiuznoi konferentsiei VKP (b)," Planovoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 3 (1941), p. 53.
65. S. Kheinman, "O vosproizvodstve rabochei sily pri kapitalizme i pri sotsializme," Pod znamenem marksizma, No. 3 (1941), p. 53.
66. A. Grigor'ev, "Novye formy sotsialisticheskogo truda," Planovoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 9 (1939), pp. 27-37
67. A. A. Arutinian and B. L. Markus (eds.), Razvitie sovetskoĭ ekonomiki (Moscow, 1940), pp. 492, 497-98.
- 68 V V Kuznetsov, "O khode vypolneniia sotsialisticheskikh obiazatel'stv v chest' tridtsatoi godovshchiny Velikoĭ oktiabr'skoĭ sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii," V pomoshch' fabrichno-zavodskim i mestnym komitetam, VIII, No. 15 (1947), 7; I. Kuzminov, "Novye formy stakhanovskogo dvizheniia," Bol'shevik, XVII, Nos. 11-12 (1940), 35.
69. Nikolaĭ Rossiĭskii, "Novye gorizonty," Oktiabr', No. 9 (1949), pp. 162ff.
70. I Kuzminov, op. cit., p. 35.
71. Frederick Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science [Anti-Dühring] (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 332
- 72 Nikolaĭ Rossiĭskii, op. cit., p. 162
- 73 N. Maslova, "Lenin i Stalin -- vdokhnoviteli i organizatory sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia v promyshlennosti," Voprosy ekonomiki, III, No. 1 (1950), 35; Nikolaĭ Rossiĭskii, "Trud i mir," Oktiabr', No. 9 (1950), pp. 180ff.
74. V. Mnatsaganova and A. Sokolovskii, "Metod inzhenera F Koval'eva v deĭstviĭ," Voprosy ekonomiki, IV, No. 3 (1951), 103-8.
75. "Ispol'zovat' tekhniku do dna," editorial in Bol'shevik, XXVIII, No. 3 (1951), 5.
76. S. Kheinman, "Ob izliskakh rabochei sily i o proizvoditel'nosti truda," Problemy ekonomiki, XII, Nos. 11-12 (1940), p. 106
77. J. Stalin, op. cit., p. 362.
- 78 Ibid., pp. 362-63.
79. N. Aristov, "Organizovannyĭ nabor rabochei sily," Planovoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 11 (1939), p. 97.
- 80 S. Trubnikov, "Istochniki komplektovaniia rabochei sily v SSSR," Problemy ekonomiki, XI, No. 6 (1939), 158-59.
81. Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Economic System (Cambridge: The University Press, 1947), p. 350; N. Aleksandrov, "Pravovye voprosy ukreplenii sotsialisticheskoi dissipliny truda," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 1 (1939), p. 82.

82. Alexander Baykov, op. cit., p. 350.
83. N. Shvernik, "O perekhode na vos'michasovoi rabochii den'," Bol'shevik, XVII, Nos. 11-12 (1940), 9.
84. Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1938-1944 gg (Moscow, 1945), pp. 141-42.
85. J. Stalin, op. cit., pp. 360-61.
86. N. Aristov, op. cit., p. 94.
87. S. Trubnikov, op. cit., p. 153.
88. Ibid, p. 151
89. J. Stalin, op. cit., p. 91.
90. N. Aristov, op. cit., p. 91.
91. Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1938-1944 gg, pp. 139-40.
92. E. Mokhova, "Gosudarstvennye trudovye rezervy - osnovnoi istochnik popolneniia rabocheho klassa v SSSR," Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 4 (1949), p. 41.
93. Zakon o piatiletnem plane (Moscow, 1946), p. 51.
94. P. Khromov, "O rezervakh povysheniia proizvoditel'nosti truda v sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti," Bol'shevik, XXVIII, No. 4 (1951), 22-31
95. J. Stalin, op. cit., p. 515.
96. B. Krynskaia, "Finansovyi kontrol i finansovaiia distsiplina," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, No. 3 (1938), pp. 93-101.
97. B. I. Arsenov, "Iz istorii uchrezhdeniia sovetskoi prokuratury," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 5 (1947), pp. 22-31.
98. A. Uzunov, "O nadzore za sobliudeniem sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v oblasti promyshlennosti," Sotsialisticheskaiia zakonnost', VII, No. 11 (1940), 13.
99. I. Baranov, op. cit., p. 69.
100. V. N. Mozheiko, "O pravovoi prirode sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo arbitrazha," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 6 (1947), pp. 16-23.
101. A. Liapin, "O bol'shevistskikh printsipakh khoziaistvennoi raboty," Bol'shevik, XVII, Nos. 15-16 (1940), 87.
102. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., p. 202.
103. For a succinct description of the development of this office, see Julian Towster, Political Power in the U.S.S.R. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 171-74. Trends in the relative importance of these three types of Party entity are discussed somewhat in the chapter on the kolkhoz and so will not be discussed here.
104. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., pp. 271-72; B. Moore, Jr., "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 1928-1944," American Sociological Review, IX, No. 3 (1944), 270-76.
105. A. E. Pashernstnik, "Voprosy kolektivnogo dogovora v SSSR," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 4 (1948), p. 51.
106. N. G. Aleksandrov (ed.), Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo (Moscow, 1949), pp. 211-12

107. N. Rytikov, "Sovetskie profsoyuzy," Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia, Vol. . SSSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 1756.
108. E. Sokolov, op. cit., p. 46.
109. I. Dorofeev, "O partiinom rukovodstve komsomolom," in A. Klimanov, et al., op. cit., pp 71-77.
110. XVII S"ezd VKP (b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1934), p. 633.
111. F. Revyakin, "Agitatsionno-massovaiia rabota sredi zavodskogo kollektiva," in A. Klimanov, et al., op. cit., pp 99-100
112. A. Uzunov, op. cit., p. 13.
113. The brigadmir should not be confused with the so-called departmental militia, mentioned earlier, which consists of regular militiamen
114. N. Nemov, "Tekhnologicheskaiia distsiplina—nezyblennyi zakon proizvodstva," Bol'shevik, XVIII, No. 6 (1941), 28.
115. A. Leskov, op. cit., pp 8-15.
116. V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, XXV, 151.
117. N. G. Aleksandrov, "Obshchestvenno-trudovye otnosheniia i pravo," Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR. Otdelenie ekonomiki i prava, No. 5 (1946) p. 362
118. "Vsemerno uluchshat' rukovodstvo sotsialisticheskim sorevnovanem v promyshlennosti," editorial in Bol'shevik, XXVII, No. 9 (1950), 4; Rezoliutsii XVIII Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii VKP (b) (Moscow, 1941), p. 15.
119. D. Gogonava, op. cit., p. 49; G. Kosiachenko, "Gosudarstvennyi plan—nerushimyï zakon," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 1 (1951), p. 40.
120. A. Uzunov, op. cit., p. 14.
121. N. Rychkov, "Okhrana obshchestvennoi sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti—sviashchenii dolg trudiashchikhsia," Sotsialisticheskaiia zakonnost', XII, Nos. 1-2 (1945), 6-11.
122. I. Sapozhnikov, "Bor'ba s khishcheniami na predpriiatiakh tekstil'noi promyshlennosti," Sotsialisticheskaiia zakonnost', XII, No. 3 (1945), 26 For other examples see S. Livshits, "Nedostatki v sudbenoi praktike po delam o khishcheniakh i razbazarivaniu prodovol'strennykh i promyshlennykh tovarov," Sotsialisticheskaiia zakonnost', XII, No. 6 (1945), 28-31
123. Ibid. See also [?] Sukhorukov, "Iz praktiki bor'by s raskhiteiami sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti," Sotsialisticheskaiia zakonnost', XII, No. 8 (1945), 37-39
124. L. Smirnov, "Chemu uchiť opyt rassledovaniia khishchenii i rastrat," Sotsialisticheskaiia zakonnost', XII, Nos. 11-12 (1945), 50.
125. L. Smirnov, op. cit., p. 49 How far this description of the organization of thieving is accurate and how far it suffers from the Soviet propensity to extend responsibility from those directly concerned to all those anywhere around, and from the Soviet propensity to interpret inadequate vigilance as equaling guilt, we cannot say (Cf Margaret Mead, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,

1951.] The source, the official journal of the Procurator's office, is not, however, a propagandistic one, and so we may well conclude that, like most such charges, it contains an element of truth as well as some distortion.

126. "Shire razvärtyvat' bol'shevistskuiu kritiku i samokritiku," editorial in Bol'shevik, XXVII, No. 3 (1950), 7.

127. For a brief summary of officially defined attributes of "bureaucratism," see M. P. Kareva (ed.), Teoriia gosudarstva i prava (Moscow, 1949), pp. 333-35.

128. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 196-97.

129. For "constant instability" of the intelligentsia, see Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," American Sociological Review, XV, No. 4 (1950), 479.

130. Max Weber, op. cit., p. 338.

131. I. Gorelik, "Stalinskiĭ laureat," Novyi mir, XXVII, No. 12 (1949), 102-74

II. THE KOLKHOZ

Soviet society, according to its Marxian architects, is presently in the stage of development called "socialism" which, theoretically, is to be succeeded by "communism." Socialism is identified as a "lower" form of communism, or the latter is identified as a "higher" form of socialism.¹ The claim that Soviet society has reached socialism does not imply that all its organizational components have attained the same grade of development. These components are subdivided into two basic categories: those which are identified as integral parts of "advanced" or "consistent" socialism, and those which are implicitly identified as "inconsistent" constituents of the socialist system. The former express a higher, and the latter a lower, attainment in the scale of socialist ("precommunist") development.

The factory and the kolhoz provide typical examples of organizations epitomizing the two different levels within the present-day socialist system. The former is a "consistent" socialist organization, whereas the latter is, in several respects, an "inconsistent" socialist unit. The factory has become a component of the socialist orbit through full expropriation of industrialists and nationalization of industrial resources. The kolhoz has entered the socialist orbit through the co-operative movement. It should be noted, however, that there have been three principal types of kolkhozy: agricultural communes, artels, and associations for joint cultivation of land (TOZ's).²

The agricultural commune, representing a "higher form of kolhoz movement," is based on the principles of full socialization of land, means of production, and labor. It excludes private property of any kind. The artel differs from the commune in several respects. In the artel (a) land is socialized, yet parts of it are allocated to individual kolhoz households for private use; (b) the means of production belong either to the state or to the co-operative association or to individual kolhoz members; (c) labor is not fully socialized inasmuch as individual kolhozniki work in their "private" plots of land along with the main work on co-operative land; and (d) private property is granted also in the form of ownership of dwelling places and personal belongings.³ The TOZ, representing "the simplest form of co-operation," is based on the principle of collective work but not on socialization of the means of production.

During the first few years of the Soviet regime, communes were the most numerous kolkhozy, although they never assumed the proportions of a mass movement.⁴ At that time, however, the Communist Party favored and encouraged equally the creation of both communes and TOZ's.⁵ During the NEP period communes were reorganized to allow for an establishment of artel-type share investments,⁶ while TOZ's began gradually to socialize their means of production; thus, both these organizations came closer to the internal structuring of artels. On March 16, 1927, the government decided to place special emphasis on the development of TOZ's. By

1929 the latter represented 70.2 percent of the total number of kolkhozy, and artels represented 33.6 percent and communes 6.2 percent.⁷ On January 5, 1930, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided that TOZ's should no longer be the principal organizations of co-operative agriculture and that the artel should become "the chief form of the collective-farm movement at the given stage."⁸ In 1932, with mass collectivization virtually completed, artels represented 95.9 percent of the total number of kolkhozy, whereas TOZ's represented 2.1 percent and communes 2 percent.⁹

TOZ's and communes were abandoned for very different reasons: the former were found inadequately socialistic, whereas the latter were considered too socialistic for the given stage of development of Soviet peasantry and Soviet society in general. Accordingly, TOZ's were regarded as outdated, whereas communes were proclaimed the organizations of the future:

The future communes [Stalin informed the Seventeenth Party Congress] will rise out of developed and prosperous artels. The future agricultural commune will arise when the fields and farms of the artel are replete with grain, with cattle, with poultry, with vegetables, and all other produce; when the artels have mechanized laundries, modern dining rooms, mechanized bakeries, etc.; when the collective farmer sees that it is more to his advantage to receive his meat and milk from the collective farm's meat and dairy department than to keep his own cow and small livestock. . . . The future commune will arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of a more developed artel, on the basis of an abundance of products.¹⁰

The remaining few communes were practically transformed into artels by the government orders of June 15 and 20, 1934, that every commune member be allowed to hold in private possession a cow and some small livestock and poultry.¹¹ At the present time, TOZ's and communes are almost nonexistent, and the artel has become synonymous with the kolkhoz.

"KOLKHOZ DEMOCRACY"


The agricultural artel is a co-operative association based on the principles of elective management, internal "democracy," and indirect subordination to state authorities. Accordingly, it is basically different from the factory, which, as has been shown, is based on the principles of monocratic and nonelective management, internal "absolutism" of the director, and direct subordination to state authorities. The basic principles of artel organization would imply that, in comparison with the factory, power is more widely shared in the kolkhoz and that it enjoys a more pronounced degree of independence. The degree to which this implication is true will become clear as we proceed.

Soviet Interpretation

The principles of co-operative management and internal "democracy" are closely interwoven and should be treated as such. The highest internal authority of the kolkhoz, according to the Model Charter of the Agricultural Artels, which is considered "the highest law regulating the creation of a new rural community,"¹² is the general meeting of kolkhoz members consisting of all its working members over sixteen years of age. The general meeting, according to the kolkhoz charter, elects the chairman of the association, the managing board, and the auditing commission, admits new members or expels members who have failed to adhere to the rules of internal kolkhoz order; prepares the annual estimates of income and expenditures; establishes the annual production plan, the financial plan, and the plan of capital construction; concludes the annual agreement with the MTS; decides upon norms of output and ratings of various kolkhoz jobs; defines the rules of internal order; and determines the size of various funds. It also concludes all agreements with organizations outside the kolkhoz.¹³ Its approval is needed for loan requests from the State or Agricultural Banks, and for employment of "hired labor" on kolkhoz work.¹⁴ All these problems are "decided upon" at meetings in which at least one-half of the members must be present. In some cases, as for example in the expulsion of insubordinate kolkhozniki from the association, the presence of at least two-thirds of the members is required.

The general meeting, which assembles once or twice a month, elects its executive committee, whose size varies from five to nine persons, depending on the size of the association. This committee constitutes the continually functioning managing board of the kolkhoz and is entrusted with directing the co-operative's production and attending to the daily business routines. Its principal *raison d'être* is to serve as a vehicle through which the decisions of the general meeting are carried into effect. Because of the complexity of kolkhoz work, the managing board carries out many of its functions through a staff of appointed managerial and auxiliary personnel. It appoints, for example, the brigadiers of agricultural and specialized brigades, chiefs of livestock farms and various other branches of the collective enterprise, accounting officials, etc. One of its main functions is to undertake systematic measures to fulfill the annual production plan. It determines the composition of permanent brigades and *zven'ia* (small groups within brigades), prepares and submits to the general meeting norms of output and piecework rates for various work assignments, organizes so-called socialist competition, controls the work of brigades, and imposes penalties on violators of labor discipline.¹⁵

The chairman of the managing board is simultaneously the chairman of the kolkhoz. He represents the artel in its outside dealings, controls and directs the work of the managing board, schedules the general meetings of the kolkhoz members, selects the nonelective kolkhoz officials, and directs financial activities in accordance with the charter and the decisions of the general meeting.



The general meeting of the kolkhozniki elects the auditing commission, an "organ of public control in kolkhozy," which audits kolkhoz books at regular intervals and reports its findings to the general meeting.

The supreme authority of the general meeting is best indicated by the fact that it may express its lack of confidence in the chairman and management whenever it feels that they do not pursue commonly accepted policies. Thereupon he must resign, a new chairman is elected, and new managerial personnel appointed.

The foregoing description of "kolkhoz democracy" is actually a summation of the official Soviet views on the system of artel "self-government" and active participation of kolkhozniki in the management of their co-operative associations. The Soviet authorities recognize that some vital tenets of "kolkhoz democracy," as officially defined, are not fully implemented in many kolkhozy, usually referred to as backward (*otstauushchiĭ*) artels. Deviations from "kolkhozy democracy," however, are also engineered by the economic policies of the central authorities.

The question which interests us now is the degree to which the official definition of "kolkhoz democracy" corresponds with the actual operations, whether the kolkhoz charter gives an accurate picture of its functioning as a socio-economic unit and as a local network of power relations.¹⁶

Governmental Guidance and Control

Despite the aforementioned attributes of its self-government, the kolkhoz is not an essentially independent entity and its "democracy" is subject to extensive limitations. The kolkhoz, like the factory, is subject to the unified state economic plan, unified over-all state administration, and the unified over-all state-control system. In this respect, the difference between the co-operative association and the state enterprise is one of degree rather than of kind. The state rules both the factory and the kolkhoz; the difference is that whereas the state management of the factory is direct, that of the kolkhoz is indirect. The state, as the Soviet jurists put it, manages the factory and "guides" the kolkhoz. Needless to say, the scope and intensity of state guidance stands in an inverse relationship to the scope and intensity of "kolkhoz democracy": the more extensive the state guidance, the narrower the orbit of "kolkhoz democracy."

What does state "guidance" of the kolkhoz mean? In the first place, neither the general meeting of the kolkhoz members nor the artel administration can pass any decisions which are not in full agreement with the existing laws, economic plans, noncodified socialist imperatives, and the stipulations of the Model Charter of the Agricultural Artels passed by the Party and the government on February 17, 1935.¹⁷ It has been mentioned above, for example, that the general meeting of the kolkhoz members determines the annual production plan; actually, it rubber stamps the production plan drawn for it by the district (*raion*) Soviet authorities on the basis of the unified state economic plan. The general meeting has no legal right to reject the production plan drawn by the district government au-

thorities. Furthermore, the distribution of kolkhoz produce and the delivery of a part of it to the state are specified and standardized by government authorities.

To take another example, the general meeting of kolkhoz members has the legal right to expel a kolkhoznik from the association—but only under one condition: namely, if this expulsion has been approved by the raion Soviet authorities.¹⁸ It is also pertinent to note that, according to the kolkhoz charter, the general meeting of the kolkhozniki may “elect” only those persons to the auditing commission who are acceptable to the raion Soviet authorities.

The “guidance” and control of the kolkhoz by Soviet authorities (that is, by the state) is effected through the following institutions:

1. The village Soviet (sel'sovet) is legally empowered to participate in “the operative guidance of kolkhozy.” It has the right to read the minutes of kolkhoz meetings and to request the elimination of unlawful decisions. The chairman of the village Soviet exercises control over the fulfillment of the production plan by individual kolkhozy and over the adherence to the rules contained in the kolkhoz charter.¹⁹ It should be noted that the functions of village Soviets—which often have jurisdiction over smaller territory than the kolkhoz (i. e., a kolkhoz may have more than one village Soviet)—are primarily “mass control” and social mobilization. They do not serve as agencies through which government decisions are channeled to kolkhozy. “Mass control” of sel'sovety is expressed through special aktivs and “groups of deputies,” organized in each working unit of the kolkhoz. Their function is to “assist” the kolkhozy in organizing their work, increasing labor productivity, and in unveiling deficiencies.²⁰

2. The executive committee of the raion Soviet (the raïspolkom) provides the main link between the kolkhoz and the government. It approves the kolkhoz charter, decides upon the expulsion of individual kolkhozniki from the association, names the kolkhoz members to be “elected” to the auditing commission, reviews the annual kolkhoz estimates of income and expenditures, and approves the contracts signed by the kolkhozy and MTS's. Government plans for agricultural production and all other official measures relevant to co-operative agriculture are channeled into the kolkhozy through the raïspolkom. The latter is fully empowered to annul all decisions of both the general meeting of the kolkhozniki and the kolkhoz management which it considers unlawful. It exercises control over the compliance of kolkhoz management with the regulations contained in the charter.²¹

3. The agricultural section of the district Soviet (raïzo)—representing the Ministry of Agriculture in the federal government—is the agency through which the Soviet government exercises its determining influence on the planning end of kolkhoz activities and on the selection of personnel possessing sufficient skill to perform the technical functions of the administration. These sections are authorized to decide upon crop rotations and seasonal use of kolkhoz land in general. They “assist” kolkhozy in drawing up the production and work plans. They also give technical “advice” as to the

organization of socialist competition, the determination of production quotas for various crops and work rates, and the classification of the kolkhozniki into nine categories, depending on their individual skill and the quantity and quality of work that their assignments require. All electrical facilities in the kolkhoz are directly managed by the district agricultural section 22

The chief agronomist of each *raïzo*, theoretically subordinated to the district Soviet, an elected body, is actually a link in the highly centralized Agronomic Service: he is an appointed official receiving his orders from the Ministry of Agriculture through various intermediary offices operating at higher administrative-territorial levels. He, in turn, conducts his work in kolkhozy indirectly through MTS chief agronomists or directly in the areas not having an MTS. The apparatus of Agronomic Service performs a number of vital functions in kolkhozy. They exercise expert control over the implementation of state sowing plans. They press the artels to carry out prompt delivery of predetermined quantities of produce to the state and to reimburse the MTS's for their work. They give daily assistance to kolkhozy in all production and administration matters; they are particularly concerned with "correct" formulation of production plans as well as the plans for a systematic increase of public property. The personnel of Agronomic Service bears chief responsibility for crop rotation, the application of scientific agronomic measures, and the development of mechanization. Finally, they figure prominently in the organization of "agricultural propaganda" designed to improve the technical knowledge of kolkhozniki. The latter is conducted through the organization of "study circles," lecturing, "production conferences," and "agricultural expositions." 23

4 The Machine-Tractor Station (MTS) is being gradually consolidated as an important instrument through which the central government authorities "guide" the internal management of individual kolkhozy. It is a repository of heavy agricultural equipment by which kolkhozy are serviced, and it performs a definite part in the over-all kolkhoz work. Its functions are, however, much broader than its direct participation in various production processes. According to Article 6 of the model contract, which is concluded annually by the kolkhoz and the MTS, the latter is empowered to give "continual help" and counsel to the kolkhoz in its organization and economic activities; it helps the kolkhoz to draw its annual production plans, to prepare estimates of income and expenditures, to apply the most advantageous crop rotation, to organize work and distribute income, and to train skilled kolkhozniki. 24 This shows that many functions of the MTS in kolkhozy overlap with those assigned to the district agricultural section. This is the result partly of the well-established Soviet practice of administrative duplication for the benefit of strengthened control (checks and balances), and partly of the gradual transfer of expert agricultural personnel from administrative bodies to production units. It should be borne in mind, however, that the district Soviet authorities are the link connecting the decision-making state authorities with both the kolkhozy and the MTS's.

5. The District Procurator does not participate in the shaping of managerial and productive activities of the kolkhoz; yet his office is one of the most efficient instruments of state control over all kolkhoz activities. He operates independently of any other Soviet agency and his office is staffed with personnel specifically trained in the techniques of control. The office of the District Procurator watches over the adherence of kolkhoz management to the rules contained in the charter and the compliance of individual kolkhozniki with government decisions bearing on agriculture. It safeguards the socialized property in the kolkhoz and sees that kolkhoz produce is delivered to the government in prescribed quantities.²⁵

6. The Council of Kolkhoz Affairs, a highly centralized organization subordinated directly to the federal Council of Ministers, was organized by a joint government and Party decision on September 19, 1946.²⁶ This office has been empowered to co-ordinate government efforts to consolidate kolkhozy as parts of the socialist economy. It has been created primarily to check the rising tide of illegal activities in co-operative agriculture. The same decision which created this office enumerated several typical illegal activities which became commonplace in the rural community during and immediately after the last war.²⁷ Prominent among these unlawful activities were extensions of private plots of land at the expense of kolkhoz property, abuses of kolkhoz funds by kolkhoz chairmen, district Party committee secretaries, chairmen of raion Soviets, and MTS directors, substitution of equal payments for remuneration of labor based on piecework, and failures of kolkhoz chairmen to call general meetings of kolkhozniki at regular intervals.²⁸ The council issues orders which are mandatory for central and local authorities and are designed to eliminate the violations against the established order in kolkhozy and the decisions pertaining to agricultural production. It is the supreme guardian over state interests in the kolkhoz, and it operates through special inspectors who are attached to republic governments and local Soviets, but are fully independent of them. These inspectors may establish their surveillance over any kolkhoz; and whenever violations of the law are unveiled, they may request the local Soviets, MTS, and kolkhoz authorities to apply corrective measures, or they may undertake legal action against the offenders.²⁹ It is significant that all the strategic positions in the council are entrusted to the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party: its chairman is A. A. Andreev, member of the Politburo; vice-chairmen are V. M. Andrianov, member of the Orgburo, and N. S. Patolichev, secretary of the Central Committee; the secretary is G. V. Perov, member of the Party Control Commission.³⁰

It is clear from the foregoing description of the scope and nature of the participation of various state agencies in the administration and control of the kolkhoz that the independence of the latter, as well as its much-publicized democracy, is hardly more than a myth. Kolkhoz management has but little more de facto power than factory management: both of them are channels through which government plans and decisions are transmitted to the producers, and both of them are the guardians of these plans and decisions.

There is, however, an important difference between the factory director and the kolkhoz chairman. The former is a bureaucrat and is legally subordinated exclusively to the higher echelons in the management pyramid (trust, Glavk). The latter is an elected official and is legally subordinated exclusively to the kolkhoz members. In other words, whereas the factory director and his staff are subject only to vertical government subordination, the kolkhoz chairman is subordinated to horizontal nongovernment control. The difference between these two types of subordination is not, however, as drastic as it may appear. Kolkhoz management is responsible to the artel members for its fulfillment of government decisions. In the kolkhoz, as in the factory, it is the government which determines the production plan. Kolkhoz management and factory management are only two different methods whereby the central authorities implement the integrated economic plan and control all production in the country.

The Soviet authorities consider, mostly by implication, kolkhoz management inferior in many respects to factory management. In the kolkhoz, for example, the state shares some of its power with the general meeting of the kolkhozniki which may, and often does, replace the chairman before his term has expired. The chairman is placed in an awkward administrative position since his responsibilities to the state and to the kolkhozniki are often conflicting. The delivery of kolkhoz produce to the state in planned quantities is the yardstick by which the government measures the efficiency and loyalty of kolkhoz management. The kolkhoz members, on the other hand, are inclined to judge the management in terms of its loyalty to the local interests of the association. The government has been aware of the divided loyalty of kolkhoz management and has continually tried to establish full dominance of state interests. The trend has been toward crippling the power of the kolkhoz meeting and toward strengthening and expanding the channels of direct state interference with the co-operative associations. The creation of the Council of Kolkhoz Affairs has marked a radical step forward in this direction. At the same time the jurisdiction of the raion Soviet authorities and MTS's over kolkhozy has been widened and elaborated.³¹

The question which may be now raised is why did the Party and the government choose elective management for kolkhozy, despite their admission that it is not the most efficient instrument for the consolidation of state authority in the rural community and that the factory-type ednonachalie and indisputable vertical control would be more advantageous for the strengthening of government control of agriculture. The architects of Soviet society do not hide the fact that co-operative management of the kolkhoz is transitional, though they do not intimate that the factory-type management and exclusive state control would be the logical substitutes for it. At the present stage of socialist development, co-operative management is considered the most expedient medium for the re-education of peasant masses in the spirit of socialist ownership and concentrated state authority. Says one Soviet writer:

The attraction of the kolkhozniki to the management of co-operative associations is dictated by the need for education of kolkhoz members in the spirit of collectivism, for their transformation into true workers of socialist society. By entering a kolkhoz the peasant cannot at once become a socialist, he cannot immediately discard his individualistic psychology, with its old habits and traditions which grew out of the centuries-old system of small production . . . Some time is needed to overcome the survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of kolkhoz peasantry. The kolkhoz is a historically necessary form of production, which serves as a tool for the re-education of kolkhoz peasantry in the spirit of socialism, and for weeding out all the survivals from the past from their consciousness. The more actively a kolkhoznik participates in the social economy of the association and in the building of a new, collective life, the more successfully and actively will be effected the re-education of the kolkhozniki on a socialist basis.³²

Accordingly, "kolkhoz democracy" is more an educational system than a real expression of power vested in the agricultural co-operatives. It has been devised, among other things, to make state interference in every phase of kolkhoz life as inconspicuous as possible. Many essential "functions" performed by the general meeting of the kolkhozniki or by kolkhoz management—such as drawing the annual production plan, determining the quotas of production for various crops, and concluding the annual contract with MTS—are scarcely more than ceremonious pledges by the kolkhoz peasantry to work toward the fulfillment of their assignment in the over-all economic plan and to carry out their work in the manner prescribed by the government.

Kolkhoz Party Organization

Interference with "kolkhoz democracy" comes not only from the Soviet authorities; it also comes from the Communist Party. Party work in the rural community is regulated by the Agricultural Departments of regional Party committees (obkom), and is actually organized and supervised, lower in the hierarchy, by the district Party committee (raikom). The raikom controls the work of all organizations engaged in socialist agriculture (Soviet authorities, MTS, kolkhoz, etc.), organizes seminars for indoctrination of rural Party leaders, provides authoritative interpretations of the decisions passed by higher authorities, makes the plans for agitation and propaganda in the village, recruits new Party members and candidates, and organizes campaigns for placing the "right people" in the responsible positions in the kolkhozy. Subordinated directly to the raikom are the primary Party organizations in the individual kolkhozy.

The Bolshevik Party has until recently drawn only a minor fraction of its total membership from the rural community. In 1939 there were only

12,000 kolkhoz Party organizations, which means that approximately 95 percent of the kolkhozy did not have a primary Party organization.³³ Only 9 percent of the total Communist membership was drawn from kolkhozy, which, according to the census of 1939, contained 44.6 percent of the total Soviet population.³⁴ Since World War II, Party work in the countryside has been very intensive. According to Andreev, during the last ten years the number of kolkhozniki Communists has been doubled, and the number of Party organizations in kolkhozy has been tripled.³⁵ During the second half of 1949, Bol'shevik carried two articles which throw some light on the development and activities of primary Party organizations in the Khar'kov Region (the Ukrainian S. S. R.) and the Altaï Territory (R. S. F. S. R.) respectively³⁶

In the Khar'kov Region there were 689 kolkhoz Party organizations in 1939 and by April 1949 their number had grown to 1,450 with a total membership of 9,752. Of the total number of organizations 159 consisted of fifteen to twenty members, 663 organizations of six to ten Communists, and the remainder of three to five Communists. The increase of Party membership was effected through the return of soldiers who became Party members while in the armed forces, transfer to villages of Communists from towns and rural district centers, and direct recruitment of new members from among the kolkhozniki. In some districts of the Khar'kov Region (for example, the Volensk District) every kolkhoz has a primary Party organization.

In the Altaï Territory 2,300 kolkhozy, or approximately 60 percent of all kolkhozy in the territory, have primary Party organizations. The remainder of the artels have Party-Komsomol groups or Komsomol organizations.

If these two areas indicate the general trend of the expansion and consolidation of Communist organizations in the rural community—and there are no reasons to believe that they do not—it is clear that the functioning of "kolkhoz democracy" cannot be understood without considering the organized work of kolkhoz Communists.

There are, to be sure, various types of Party organizations in the kolkhozy, depending on the number of Communist members. If there are no Communists in the kolkhoz the Party work is entrusted to the Young Communist League (Komsomol), which exists in almost every co-operative association.³⁷ If there are less than three Party members special Party-Komsomol groups are established under the guidance of Party organizers appointed to the raïkom. Primary Party organizations are founded in kolkhozy which have not less than three Party members. If the Khar'kov region is taken as typical, it would seem that 89 percent of the kolkhoz primary Party organizations have less than ten members, and that on the average each kolkhoz primary Party organization has six to seven members.³⁸ Individual kolkhoz brigades which have not less than three Communists may organize so-called Party groups. They enjoy organizational

independence within the limits granted to them by their primary organizations.

To illustrate what the central Party authorities expect the primary Party organizations to do in kolkhozy the following two descriptions carried by Bol'shevik may be quoted in extenso, one of them showing how a Party organization should work and the second how it should not:

A The Primary Party Organization of the Kolkhoz "Ul'ianov," Krasnokutsk District, Khar'kov Region:

The primary Party organization of kolkhoz "Ul'ianov" consists of eleven Communists. All of them occupy strategic places in social production (chairman, brigade leader, manager of the kolkhoz brickyard; other Communists work in the brigades). The Communists serve as examples in work and are organizers of well-timed and highly skilled execution of all agricultural work. For a while the fourth agricultural brigade lagged behind the other brigades: its personnel was distributed incorrectly. The Party organization recommended to the kolkhoz management to appoint Comrade Progonnog to be the brigade leader. The Communists rallied the kolkhoz aktiv around the Party, strengthened work discipline, and organized socialist competition. The result was that within a short period the brigade became an advanced organization.

The Party organization of kolkhoz "Ul'ianov" holds Party meetings regularly: these meetings focus their attention on the discussion of Party and government decisions relevant to the development of agriculture, problems of the organization of work and socialist competition, measures for the introduction of advanced methods of agricultural technology, problems of political work among the kolkhozniki, political studies of Communists, fulfillment of Party assignments, etc. The Party organization manages extensive educational work among the kolkhozniki, explains to them the most important Party and government decisions and current political events. The result is a constant growth of political and cultural horizon of the kolkhozniki. Strict work discipline has been established in the kolkhoz. The Communists have rallied around themselves the aktiv and all kolkhozniki. The kolkhoz is now one of the most advanced co-operative associations in the district. It has conquered the entire arable land and collects from its fields high yields. The value of the workday has grown. There are hundreds of similar Party organizations in the Khar'kov Region. 39

B. The Primary Party Organization of Kolkhoz "The fourteenth Party Congress," Krupiansk District, Khar'kov Region:

How neglected in some Party organizations is the inner-Party

and mass political work, and whereto this negligence leads, is shown by kolkhoz "The Fourteenth Party Congress," Krupiansk raion. A number of Communists of this organization do not fulfill their obligations. Party meetings are either held infrequently or conducted on a low ideological plane. Mass political work among the kolkhozniki is poorly organized, speeches and reports are seldom given, and socialist competition between brigades zven'ia [parts of brigades] is not developed. The Party organization did not gather around itself the kolkhoz aktiv and did not attract the village intelligentsia to public life. The Communists have not undertaken any systematic work for raising their political-ideological standards. Moreover, individual kolkhozniki have ceased to read newspapers. Kolkhoz "The Fourteenth Party Congress" is a backward [otstaiushchii] kolkhoz. In 1948 its harvest was low. Responsible for this were the primary Party organization and the Krup'ansk raikom, which have allowed such negligence in Party and political work to take place.⁴⁰

Although these two citations do not give a full picture of Party work in the kolkhoz, they indicate that it is of large magnitude. The kolkhoz primary Party organization sees that the "right people" (not necessarily Communist members) are elected to the strategic places of artel management; it is the organizing and supervising force behind all the cultural activities of the association (lecturing, Communist agitation, etc.); it is the mobilizing force in socialist competition and high-yield campaigns; it is an authoritative interpreter of Party and government decisions, and it is an agency of continual and direct control over the entire work of kolkhoz management. In order to carry out this compound assignment fully and efficiently the primary Party organization makes systematic efforts to extend its influence over as many kolkhoz members as possible. It concentrates, first of all, on marshaling a number of "non-Party Bolsheviks," who form the kolkhoz aktiv, and serve as an instrument through which the Party organization establishes itself as an unquestionable force behind kolkhoz management. Around the aktiv are gathered passive collaborators—the persons on whom the Party can rely in voting its proposals through the general meeting of the kolkhozniki. The comparatively independent Komsomol organization is another pillar on which Party domination in the kolkhoz rests. The Communist youth plays an important complementary role in "cultural activities," in engineering socialist competition, and, in general, in taking an active part in current campaigns carried out under Party auspices. The meetings of the primary Party organization are secret or public. Only the Party members may participate in secret meetings, at which matters of strategic importance are discussed. Public meetings, which normally take the form of rallies, are open to all kolkhoz members⁴¹

The central figure in the primary Party organization is its secretary, usually appointed by the raikom from the ranks of experienced and tested

Party organizers. He is, in effect, the political commissar of the kolkhoz, and the highest authority in the association in matters of the interpretation of Party and government decisions. Whereas the kolkhoz chairman cannot discharge the Party secretary, the latter has sufficient power in his possession to engineer the dismissal of any chairman unacceptable to kolkhoz Communists.

In terms of the internal distribution of authority, the kolkhoz Party organization is dominated by professional Party organizers (partorgi), sent to kolkhozy by district Party quarters, and so-called leading kolkhozniki: members of the kolkhoz administration and brigade leaders. Kolkhoz agronomists—members of the intelligentsia—are usually the leading Party members and often hold the position of secretary of the primary Party organization. All Party as well as Komsomol members are considered members of the "leading cadres of the kolkhoz village."

"Supplementary" Party and Government Decisions and the Kolkhoz Charter

The foregoing discussion has indicated that "kolkhoz democracy" is functionally limited by the fact that government and Party authorities have at their disposal a minutely ramified network of channels through which their authority is placed in a position to overshadow the power vested by the model charter in the elected kolkhoz officialdom. The blueprint organization of the artel, as set forth by the kolkhoz charter, does not give a true picture of kolkhoz "self-government." Most of the articles of the model charter, particularly those defining power relations and the distribution of decision making within the kolkhoz, obtain their real significance only when interpreted in terms of supplementary government and Party decisions. Although, as a rule, the charter articles bestow upon kolkhoz administration a large array of power attributes, the supplementary decisions transform these prerogatives into mere rubber-stamping of government and Party orders. The limitations on kolkhoz democracy by government and Party interference are of three main types: (1) those which impose restrictions on the rights of kolkhozniki to select their officials, (2) those which infringe upon the functions entrusted by the charter to kolkhoz management; and (3) those which define in more specific terms the rights and duties of kolkhozniki.

The first group of limitations is best exemplified by the right granted to the executive committee of the district Soviet, and often assumed by the kolkhoz Party organization, to request the removal of kolkhoz chairmen whose work and general behavior they do not approve. On the other hand, although the charter grants the kolkhoz chairman the right to appoint brigade leaders and a number of other functionaries, all these may be removed at the insistence of government and Party quarters. The right of each kolkhoznik to be elected to the highest position of his artel is being gradually limited by the present-day trend to entrust the chairmanship of each artel to experts, notably agronomists.

The second group of limitations—those restricting the decision-making prerogatives of kolkhoz officials—is even more extensive. The administration, for example, is guaranteed the right to draw the annual production plan. Actually, this plan is worked out by MTS and district agricultural officials on the basis of production assignments received from government authorities and in terms of planning categories stipulated by the government-promulgated model plan. The fine distinction drawn by Soviet jurists between the kolkhoz production plan and “planned production assignments” given to kolkhozy by the government becomes a mere juridical finesse ostensibly devised to save, at least in theory, the right of kolkhozy to draw their production plans. In the same way, the charter grants the kolkhoz administration the right to work out crop rotations, although supplementary government and Party decisions give the same right to district agricultural authorities and, recently, to MTS agronomists. The charter grants the kolkhoz meetings the right to promulgate the rules of internal order—established for the purposes of strengthening work discipline, of ensuring correct organization of work and rational utilization of working time, and of raising labor productivity⁴²—although actually, in most republics, the government authorities have issued model rules of internal order as minimum regulations to be applied by each kolkhoz. Similar “models” limit the right of kolkhoz administrations to set forth the norms of output and work rates, as well as to determine the numerical strength of production brigades.

The third group of limitations emanate from government and Party decisions and “recommendations” which supplement the charter by introducing specific regulations affecting the duties and prerogatives of kolkhoz members individually and as a group. The charter states, for example, that all activities in the kolkhoz are carried out by artel members themselves and that the function of each individual is defined by kolkhoz authorities. Yet a minimum of workdays to be effected by each kolkhoznik is stipulated by a number of successive government and Party decisions. The higher authorities have also prescribed the penalties to be imposed on each individual for failure to achieve the stipulated minimum of annual workdays. The charter empowers the kolkhoz meeting to expel an individual whose work and behavior are considered unsatisfactory by his fellow kolkhozniki; yet the government and Party decision of April 19, 1938, rules that no kolkhozniki can be expelled from the artel prior to approval by district Soviet authorities.

All this shows that the functional side of the kolkhoz formal organization as stipulated by the model charter does not provide an adequate key to an understanding of Soviet rural socialism. “Kolkhoz democracy,” whose basic attributes receive an untiring verbal endorsement by official quarters, has shrunk to insignificance before the continually expanding network of channels devised to subordinate the countryside to an indisputable authority of central government and Party quarters. The function of

"kolkhoz democracy" is primarily psychological: it is designed to make the peasant a willing builder of rural socialism by vesting him with various degrees of formal responsibility and to create favorable conditions for the development of habits compatible with collective work. "Kolkhoz democracy" is an all-important force of social mobilization or social "activism": it is designed to serve as a medium whereby the peasant is made to feel that the building of the rural socialist community is his own work and whereby he is consulted in the matters pertaining to the implementation of socialist formulas, although not necessarily in shaping them. Despite all this, our foregoing discussion has shown that central authorities do not rely on "kolkhoz democracy" as an actually functioning organism for the consolidation of Bolshevik power in the rural community, and they curb it by gradually instituting government regulations of every phase of kolkhoz activity.

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND STATUS DIFFERENTIATION

The Widening of Remuneration Scale

The blueprint organization of the kolkhoz as defined by the Model Charter of the Agricultural Artels represents, in Stalin's words, "only a form of organization," which has been carefully "guarded" by supplementary legislation and government ordinances. "The content that is put into this form,"⁴³ has varied from time to time. It has been open to changes devised by the Bolshevik directors to accelerate the full integration of co-operative agriculture into the socialist system. In planning the "qualitative" changes within the kolkhoz, the Soviet authorities have selected the state enterprises, particularly the factory, as a model to be followed and eventually emulated. We propose now to survey some trends in the social content placed within the framework of the kolkhoz.

"Collectivism," "co-operation," "joint work," and similar slogans brought forth by the social revolution in the Soviet rural community during the 1920's, had the ring of social leveling and social equality in their literary sense. In the period during which collectivization was dependent more on persuasion than coercion, the government manifested tolerance toward egalitarian tendencies. During the early 1920's the number of consumers in each kolkhoz family, and during the late 1920's the number of working members of each family, determined the amount of produce to be received with the completion of the harvest.⁴⁴ Egalitarianism in remuneration for work was paralleled by the general absence of vertical social differentiation within kolkhozy. Egalitarianism, of course, provided no incentives for the increase of labor productivity and was duly condemned immediately after the program of collectivization was curtailed. One of the most significant trends in the development of the kolkhoz as a socio-economic unit during the last two decades has been the gradual differentiation of kolkhoz peasantry in terms of hierarchized statuses, professional callings, and remunerative categories.

In 1930, the first Model Charter of the Agricultural Artels recognized piecework as the authorized system of remuneration for labor, but neither the charter nor the existing legal provisions provided for any guiding principle on the basis of which the new remuneration system should be put into effect.⁴⁵ Egalitarianism was still in full force, despite the fact that the government found it necessary to issue a supplementary explanation to the effect that "the distribution of artel income among the kolkhozniki is not to be carried out in terms of persons [per kolkhoz family] but in terms of a correct consideration of the number of workdays effected by individual artel members."⁴⁶

On February 28, 1933, the government approved a decision ruling that all types of kolkhoz work be grouped into seven vertical categories in accordance with the degree of skill and the amount and intensity of labor they require.⁴⁷ The main feature of this system was that it entailed different remuneration for each of the seven categories. For a day of satisfactory work a kolkhoz member belonging to category one received credit for one-half workday, and each successively higher category received credit for an additional quarter workday. At the end of the year each kolkhoznik received remuneration in produce and cash equivalent to the total number of workdays he had given to the kolkhoz. According to this scale of payment, a highly skilled person who belonged to category seven received four times as much remuneration per day of work than an unskilled kolkhoz member who belonged to category one.

The seven-category system was devised with a view toward transforming the kolkhoz from an egalitarian organization into a fully and minutely hierarchized social system. Each kolkhoznik now acquired a title and a rank and each had a definite place in the professional status ladder. Planned inequality, that is, the hierarchical differentiation of kolkhozniki through a planned effort, was introduced to provide the necessary groundwork for an incentive system; it favored the persons who worked intensively and steadily and who were capable of improving their skills. The new system of planned inequality, however, had its functional shortcomings. In the first place, the classification of all work assignments into seven categories was entrusted to kolkhoz administrations which often modified it to suit the egalitarian tendencies. For example, as late as 1946, the kolkhozy of the Kazakh S. S. R. did not place any work assignments into category one, whereas in the Tambov region of five hundred classified jobs none belonged to category one, and only six or eight to category two.⁴⁸ In the second place, this system did not provide for a satisfactory differentiation of remuneration within individual categories on the basis of piecework achievements for it did not take into consideration the quality in addition to the quantity of labor productivity. Accordingly, the government was faced with the problem of reorganizing kolkhoz work so as to facilitate the measurability of the quality of labor productivity of each kolkhoznik.

This specific problem was inextricably woven into a much broader effort to increase labor productivity through a widening of the remunera-

tion scale. The first and basic problem was to devise more effective techniques for application of the piecework system. This was a major enterprise calling for several expedients.

In 1940 the government "recommended" that kolkhozy base the system of remuneration not only on the number (quantity) of achieved workdays but also on the results (quality) of labor. The immediate intent of this measure was to do away with the recurrent practice of honoring with higher remuneration kolkhozniki who worked more but produced less than those who worked less but produced more.⁴⁹ During subsequent years the government passed several decisions which guaranteed supplementary payments to those kolkhozniki who fulfilled or overfulfilled their production quotas.⁵⁰ The significant feature of supplementary payments is that additional remuneration to persons who excel is effected at the expense of persons with average and subaverage production. If, for example, in a kolkhoz a total of one hundred eighty tons of grain is available for distribution among kolkhozniki a part of this quantity is allocated exclusively for supplementary payments, and the remainder is distributed among all kolkhozniki in terms of completed workdays. In 1948 this method was streamlined by the introduction of the practice that the kolkhozniki who overfulfill the production plan receive for each percentage of overfulfillment an additional one percent credit in workdays, whereas the kolkhozniki who do not fulfill the production plan receive one percent less remuneration for each percent of nonfulfillment.⁵¹

Another important step contributing to the widening of the income range of kolkhozniki, and, in effect, to the expanding of the status ladder in the rural community, was initiated by the decision of the Council of Ministers of April 19, 1948, which replaced the seven-category system by a nine-category system. At present a skilled kolkhoznik placed into category nine receives five times as much remuneration as an unskilled kolkhoznik placed into category one.⁵² The same decision ruled that many kolkhoz jobs, which had previously been given a higher rating, be placed into categories one to three. Accordingly, the raising of the income of top categories has been paralleled by a reduction of the income of lower categories.

The Experiment with Small Teams (Zven'ia)

The systematic endeavor on the part of the government to introduce as full an application of the piecework system as possible in kolkhozy was tantamount to an effort to replace the traditional "collective work" (in which the brigades are "the basic units of production") by "industrial work," in which the individual or the small team (zveno) are the basic units. During three postwar years (1947-50), the government and the Party promulgated several measures designed to introduce "industrial work" in kolkhozy. The most important of these measures was the directive issued in February 1947, which "recommended" small-group and

individual piecework as the only valid criteria for remuneration of kolkhoz members. This was the first serious step in the transition of kolkhoz work from brigade co-operation to small-group or individual competition. The brigade, consisting on the average of from 35 (in the northwestern regions) to 76 (in the Ukrainian S.S.R.) able-bodied persons engaged in a specific branch of kolkhoz work (land cultivation, animal husbandry, etc.), was not abolished.⁵³ Although it continued to be the basic unit in the over-all planning and organization of production, the zveno, which consisted on the average from 7 to 14 persons, and the individual became the basic units in the measurement of labor productivity.⁵⁴ Emphasis was given to individual piecework, whereas zveno piecework was reserved for agricultural works not adapted to an advantageous recording of the labor achievements of each individual kolkhoznik.⁵⁵

Small-group and individual piecework were effectively introduced in only a few kolkhozy. One of its basic prerequisites is a strict division of labor, which is much easier to apply in the factory than in the kolkhoz. Kolkhoz work fluctuates seasonally and requires several specializations on the part of each member. A complex agricultural operation is not as easily broken down into its measurable components as a complex industrial operation. Furthermore, the results of agricultural work may be affected by adverse weather conditions and therefore serve as an inadequate criterion for the measurement of the amount and intensity of labor put into it. Finally, since agricultural work lacks the spatial concentration of work in a factory, it requires proportionally more technicians to appraise and register the results of work. The great difficulty in implementing piecework in co-operative agriculture is best indicated by the fact that the Soviet authorities were not able to devise a comprehensive system for the appraisal of labor productivity on an individual and zveno basis.⁵⁶ Soviet rural society still has a long way to go before the Sovietized socialist dictum "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" is consistently and effectively applied.

Kolkhozy were originally associations characterized by "simple" co-operation, that is, by joint work without specific division of labor and wage scales. Gradually the division of labor became a basic social feature of agricultural artels: the work assignments were classified into vertical categories and kolkhozniki were professionally differentiated. The brigades became the basic units of social work. The new trend was dominated by "competitive co-operation." The members of a brigade co-operated in carrying out the assignments of their specific group, while at the same time they competed with other similar groups for higher labor productivity. This competition was originally confined within the framework of individual kolkhozy, but gradually it was placed on an interkolkhoz basis. Although "competitive co-operation" remained an essential feature of the social division of kolkhoz work, the officially sponsored efforts to introduce small-group and individual piecework between 1947 and 1950 were calculated to transform kolkhozy into associations dominated primarily by the element of competition.

The Enlarged Kolkhozy

In one of its less subtle reversals, the Bolshevik hierarchy, after three years of intensive experiments with the zveno system of work, came unexpectedly to the conclusion that the brigade system provides the most effective organization of kolkhoz work, particularly in grain production. This was tantamount to a decision that, from the production point of view, brigade co-operation could not successfully be replaced by zveno and individual competition. The reversal received its first publicity in a Pravda editorial of February 19, 1950, which stated: "The production brigade, when correctly organized, is a medium for the most productive application in kolkhozy of MTS industrial techniques and of the means of production of kolkhozy themselves. It also facilitates a full realization of the advantages of collective forms of work, which are appropriate for large-scale socialist agriculture." The same editorial continued: "It is necessary to state clearly that it is only the production brigade which opens wide possibilities for the application of large-scale work processes in agriculture and which creates all the conditions for a full utilization of the public means of production and for agricultural improvement. In grain production the zven'ia hamper an application of large-scale technological processes, and therefore the demand for their widespread distribution is contrary to the interests of organizational and economic strengthening of kolkhozy."

It may be stated parenthetically that this sudden condemnation of zven'ia as paramount units in kolkhoz production caused a great deal of embarrassment to Soviet scholars, who—not anticipating the sudden reversal—gave in their studies full "endorsement" to zven'ia as allegedly effective forms in the social division of labor and in the increase of labor productivity. T. L. Basiuk, in his learned Economics and Organization of Socialist Agricultural Production, attacked all "enemies" of zven'ia and claimed that experience had fully proven their superior qualities.⁵⁸

The new development has been a part of a larger design, unfolded in 1950, calling for the creation of large kolkhozy through a process of merging the artels occupying contiguous areas. This step has been one of the most drastic social developments in the countryside since the mass collectivization of the early 'thirties. By the middle of 1951, the total number of kolkhozy was reduced from 252,000 to 123,000.⁵⁹ Instead of "small" kolkhozy, the countryside is presently covered by giant collective farms. In the Kostroma regions, for example, on January 1, 1950, there were 3,129 artels; during the summer of the same year, 2,956 of these were merged into 849 giant agricultural artels.⁶⁰ In the Moscow region, on November 1, 1949, there were 6,069 kolkhozy whose number was reduced by June 20, 1950, to 1,668. Previously, each kolkhoz consisted, on an average of 42 households and 163 hectares of plowland; at present, a kolkhoz has an average of 152 households and 713 hectares of plowland.⁶¹ In the same way, 2,000 kolkhozy of the Leningrad region were merged into 600 large artels; and in the Ryazan (Riazan') region 3,925 small kolkhozy have been merged into 1,639 collective farms.⁶² According to Bolshevik

authorities, the creation of enlarged kolkhozy paves the way for a firmer integration of the countryside within the socialist system and for the increase of labor productivity in agricultural work.⁶³

In the first place, it is alleged that larger farms create the conditions conducive to a more efficient utilization of MTS equipment and a more advantageous application of crop rotation—the latter may now be applied to the units containing larger complexes of land.

Then, it is officially claimed that larger kolkhozy favor the development of specialized agricultural branches—horticulture, fruit growing, cultivation of industrial crops—to a considerably higher degree than do small kolkhozy.

It is also emphasized that the new giants establish the necessary requisites for a more rational and effective utilization of manpower: they cut down the number of persons in various administrative and service capacities, and, accordingly, increase the number of persons placed directly on "productive" assignments. In some kolkhozy, the number of white-collar kolkhozniki has been reduced by 30 percent.⁶⁴

The new kolkhozy are considered a substantial step forward in the avowed Bolshevik efforts to urbanize the rural community: they create the conditions for the building of urbanlike economic and cultural centers as the pivotal points around which the new, concentrated settlements will be built. The plan calls for a resettlement of scattered villages into new "agricultural cities" (agroroda). At present, the new kolkhozy consist of many villages, hamlets, and "settlement points," some of which are as much as seven miles apart from each other. The planned concentration of kolkhozniki into larger settlements—a project which will take years to realize, provided it is not abandoned in the meantime—serves to tighten the control over the rural community by both Bolshevik and government authorities. Experience has shown that in the past khutory—isolated households and hamlets—have been the arenas of the most drastic violations of kolkhoz socialism. It is significant that at least in some areas the "building" of "agricultural cities" does not mean construction of more modern, "urbanized" dwellings, but the movement of old peasant houses and auxiliary buildings to a central point. Some illuminating information relevant to this problem is contained in a Literaturnaia gazeta correspondent's interview with a war widow who, together with all her covillagers, was moved to a new, comparatively large settlement. Asked how her village was moved she answered: "Very simply. I'll illustrate it by describing the movement of my family. One day a group of kolkhozniki took apart my house, barn, wash house, and vegetable hut. The trucks moved everything in a few trips to the new settlement, where with the help of kolkhozniki each building was reassembled and placed at its proper place."⁶⁵

In contrast to the recently abandoned efforts to set forth the zven'ia as the pivotal work group, it is now held that the brigade is not only the indispensable and central production unit, but also that it must be enlarged in order to acquire additional efficiency. The new kolkhozy have created

favorable conditions for the establishment of expanded brigades which are allocated larger complexes of land and more farm equipment and beasts of burden.⁶⁶ In many areas, the brigades are now one-and-a-half times as large as they were prior to the creation of large kolkhozy. It is also emphasized that the new kolkhozy favor the creation of specialized brigades which work in various branches of "subsidiary economy"—such as the production of construction material (bricks etc.).

Finally, it is officially emphasized that the merging of small kolkhozy has created "exceptionally favorable conditions [for] the strengthening of Party guidance in kolkhozy."⁶⁷ It has facilitated a concentration of Bolshevik forces in the rural community and thus strengthened the Party's over-all position without recruiting new members.

The future will show whether the enlarged kolkhozy will bring new victories for rural socialism and whether they will provide new media for increasing agricultural labor productivity. In the meantime, it is certain that they will enable government and Party authorities to exercise greater control over the countryside and to superimpose upon "kolkhoz democracy" a network of tighter and more direct state regulations. It is also certain that the creation of enlarged kolkhozy is only the beginning of a series of structural changes within the kolkhoz village which will take place in the near future. It is officially claimed that the enlarged kolkhozy will not fully show their superiority over the small kolkhozy before kolkhozniki are resettled in concentrated communities, the managerial responsibilities vested in expert personnel—particularly agronomists—and work reorganized to allow for the creation of enlarged brigades. The intelligentsia has already begun to assume the commanding positions in kolkhoz production: many kolkhozy are already headed by agronomists. The trend would seem to indicate that kolkhoz chairmen, and some of their leading lieutenants (chiefs of sections), will, for all practical purposes, cease to be elected officials.⁶⁸

A quick survey of kolkhoz literature shows that the zveno has not been abolished but that its role in kolkhoz production has become a secondary one; it is usually entrusted with special assignments which require the work of small groups. For the latter reason, it has been fully eliminated only in grain production, which does not call for breaking up work into small-group assignments. "Small-group [zveno] organization of work in grain production contradicts the general trend of technical progress, the trend of complex mechanization of agriculture, and the substitution of machines for handwork."⁶⁹ The zven'ia have been retained in the raising of industrial crops and in horticulture, where mechanization is still at a low level.

In the system of remuneration, the brigade has become the basic unit for assessment of supplementary pay. Extra produce allocated to each brigade for distribution among its members is assessed on the basis of overfulfillment of the production plan, or on the basis of the degree to which average production per brigade has been surpassed. The supplement-

tary produce allocated to a brigade is divided among its members in terms of each individual's total annual, or seasonal, workdays. The persons who fail to achieve the legally prescribed minimum of workdays are not entitled to supplementary remuneration.⁷⁰ Needless to say, the supplementary payments-in-produce favor the kolkhozniki of higher professional categories. Thus, individual "piecework" has been synchronized with the collective efforts of brigades. The individual figures in the quantity of work—that is, in the achievement of workdays—whereas the brigade figures in the quality of work, measured in terms of yields per hectare of cultivated land.

The sweeping and hurried enlargement of kolkhozy has been accompanied by serious dislocations of social significance. It has hit hard at pronounced tendencies of kolkhozy to develop into primary groups with informal unity sustained by community of sentiment and sufficient internal solidarity to present a challenge to state interference. The small kolkhozy had retained much of the traditional patriarchalism and unwillingness to subordinate themselves to an indisputable external control. The large kolkhozy are designed to be "agricultural cities" which by their sheer size are expected to preclude any possibility of the artels' developing into communities with integrating sentiments that would challenge socialist designs. The uprooting of informal kolkhoz communities will not be fully effected before the planned resettlement to centralized points is carried out. There can be no doubt that for some time the enlarged kolkhozy will be the arenas of clashing community interests among their constituent small artels.

The emerging of kolkhozy into large agricultural associations has resulted in a considerable dislocation of established hierarchies as well as in extensive changes in professional alignments. In the enlarged kolkhozy, many former kolkhoz chairmen, as well as other administrators and brigade and *zveno* leaders have—owing to new organizational blueprints—moved to other positions with lower social ranks. In the same way many white-collar kolkhozniki received manual assignments. Even the kolkhoz Party hierarchy has been affected: many former kolkhoz Party organizers have been of necessity demoted to the rank of brigade Party organizers.⁷¹ On the other hand, the chairmen of enlarged kolkhozy and the leaders of new brigades and secretaries and organizers of new kolkhoz Party organizations have been promoted to positions of higher social standing and additional formal responsibility. In the light of all these rearrangements of rank, it seems probable that many "leading kolkhozniki" have not accepted the new organizational changes voluntarily as the Party press often says. The future will undoubtedly reveal the extralegal forms in which this resentment will be externalized.

It is also too early to conclude whether the enlarged kolkhozy will be instrumental in eradicating the pronounced differences in "public wealth" between individual kolkhozy—the differences between "rich" and "poor" kolkhozy. The type of production, ecological setting, proximity to urban centers, and the degree to which prior work habits were conducive to socialist transformation—for example, collective agricultural work was

not as alien to peasants from the regions of the traditional mir as to peasants from the areas where pastoral nomadism prevailed—have played an important role in determining the differences between “rich” and “poor” kolkhozy. These differences in wealth may be concretely illustrated by the fact that at the present time cash remuneration for kolkhoz chairmen varies from 24 rubles per month in “poor” kolkhozy to 400 rubles in “rich” ones.⁷² This ratio is reflected in the remuneration of other kolkhozniki holding corresponding positions in different artels.

Kolkhoz Women

The social status of the kolkhoz woman illustrates vertical group differentiation in the rural community. Legal, social, and economic equality of women with men is an achievement officially attributed to rural socialism. The peasant woman, according to the official theory, has ceased to work for her father or husband and has been given the full rights of a kolkhoz member.⁷³ Yet, in a society which lays primary stress on competitive labor, it would seem that upward movement on the professional ladder is made more difficult for women than for men. Kolkhoz labor is predominantly manual, and women lack the physical endurance to compete successfully with men. It should also be mentioned that in selecting personnel for various types of mechanized work preference was given, until recently, to men. Equally important has been the fact that elective positions in kolkhoz administration have been predominantly staffed by male kolkhoz members. Prior to World War II, the women occupied only 18 percent of the positions on managing boards, and among the tractor brigadiers only one percent and among tractor drivers only 4 percent were women.⁷⁴

Before the war, men were decidedly predominant in the higher professional categories, whereas women constituted a majority in the lower categories. This is implied in the fact that in 1938 women constituted 52.7 percent of all kolkhoz members, while during the same year they were credited with only 37 percent of the total number of completed workdays.⁷⁵ During the war, owing to a heavy exodus of men from the kolkhozy, the higher professional categories were rapidly filled by women, and at present they share almost equally with men in several leading mechanized jobs. In elective positions, however, they have continued to play a minor role. In 1946, for example, among the chairmen and deputy chairmen of kolkhozy less than 5 percent were women.⁷⁶ In 1949–50 only 14.6 percent of the students of the two-year courses for the leading cadres of kolkhozy—kolkhoz chairmen, members of artel administrations, brigadiers, and Party and Komsomol members—were women.⁷⁷

The general trend seems to indicate that during the coming years women will continue to occupy an increasing number of positions in the higher categories without challenging male leadership in over-all management. Easier access to the higher categories by women has been, to a considerable degree, a result of the official preference for recruiting men for work in

industry, whether this recruiting is effected on a "contracting" or a draft basis. Through the system of the state labor reserves, legions of young peasant boys (but not girls) are drafted for industrial training leading to urban employment.

Although no statistical data are available on the number of women occupying leading positions in kolkhoz Party organizations, a survey of personal names mentioned in writings on Bolshevik work in artels of individual regions seems to indicate that political-organizational leadership is a male monopoly. It is well-known that this discrimination is not a unique characteristic of the kolkhoz village. The Central Committee of the Communist Party, as constituted by the Eighteenth Party Congress, had only one woman in its membership (out of a total of seventy-one regular members), and the Politburo, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and the Orgburo—the Party's three top executive bodies—have religiously tabooed women from their ranks.

All this shows that although Soviet authorities favor a gradual influx of women into higher ranks in the professional hierarchy, they are reluctant to undermine the male corner on those positions which confer administrative, organizational, and political leadership. The much-publicized equality of men and women in Soviet society means in actuality that a woman has equal rights with a man in cases where the two occupy the same position; however, inequality is expressed in the fact that a number of leading social functions are entrusted primarily to men. This is largely a concession to, or result of, deeply ingrained patriarchalism which has sustained the blows of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Rural Intelligentsia

The general concept of intelligentsia denotes—as has been shown in the previous chapter—those persons who have completed at least secondary schooling and hold positions commensurate with their education. The term "rural intelligentsia" has two distinct meanings. It normally refers to the individuals who meet the requirements of the general concept of intelligentsia. Yet it has increasingly come to denote not only the persons who possess the necessary minimum of formal schooling but also a variegated assortment of so-called advanced persons (*peredoviki*) who do not necessarily meet the educational requirements. In other words, "rural intelligentsia"—as occasionally defined—includes not only agronomists, livestock experts, rural teachers, and other educated persons, but also the persons who have distinguished themselves as acknowledged champions of socialist designs in the village and as outstanding organizers, agitators, and production leaders.⁷⁸ It includes the kolkhoz administrators, brigadiers, *zveno* leaders, and as a rule the Party and *Komsomol* members. Occasionally, all kolkhozniki who receive medals or the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for superior accomplishments in artel production are regarded by amateurish writers as members of the rural intelligentsia.⁷⁹

During the last two years extensive efforts have been made to re-

organize and make more systematic and uniform the technical training of kolkhozniki. At present two types of out-of-kolkhoz schools are in operation: the two-year schools for the training of "leading cadres of kolkhozy," and the three-year schools for the training of technical cadres. The former schools are organized by regional agricultural authorities, and they grant to their graduates the title of "technician-organizers." The latter schools are of two types: those which specialize in land cultivation and those which specialize in animal husbandry. They are organized by district agricultural authorities, who are also authorized to select their students. In both the two-year and the three-year schools the "academic year" begins in October and ends in March, so that their students may spend the summer time in "practical work" in their respective kolkhozy.

The specific feature of the two-year school is that in order to become eligible for enrollment a person must hold a position in his kolkhoz which vests him with formal responsibility. For example, in 1949-50 among those accepted by these schools 16 percent were kolkhoz chairmen, 46 percent brigadiers or chiefs of livestock farms, and 6 percent various members of kolkhoz administrations; 70 percent of all students were either Party or Komsomol members.⁸⁰ In a somewhat similar way, the students of the three-year schools are selected from among the leading kolkhozniki who are engaged in nonadministrative tasks; these schools also accept a small number of "ordinary kolkhozniki." But, for all practical purposes, both types of schools are designed more to assist the "leading cadres" of the kolkhoz village to perform their functions with more competence than to provide avenues for the training of new members of the "rural intelligentsia." Their function is to improve the technical and administrative skill of those who have already achieved a higher professional standing. These schools, however, disseminate only elementary administrative and technical knowledge and do not eliminate the barriers which separate the real intelligentsia from the kolkhoz leaders who have no formal schooling.

The leaders of the kolkhoz village—the members of the "rural intelligentsia"—are the heroes of the Soviet belles-letters: they are depicted as outstanding champions of rural socialism and as symbols of full-fledged "socialist consciousness." During the early days of mass collectivizations it was the poor peasant (bedniak), the humble victim of kulak exploitation, confused but courageous, illiterate but ideologically allied with the right cause, who figured prominently in artistic literature. M. Sholokhov's and F. Panfiorov's bedniaki—the groups and individuals on whom the Party relied in its frontal attack on the traditional village—were treated less as champions of a new ideology than as victims of "decadent rural capitalism." Present-day heroes—led by Party organizers—are the persons to whom socialism has brought social recognition and leadership; they are "new men" dedicated to collective work, conscious of the virtues of Bolshevik plans, and governed by "Communist ethics." In other words, they epitomize the behavior which the architects of Soviet society regard as the ideal result of the fabric of social relations of the new rural community. Belles-lettres—

following the official lead—recognize that “the new man” is not yet commonplace: the so-called survivals of individualistic (or capitalistic) psychology are still common in the countryside. The “survivals of capitalism” have admittedly not yet been eradicated from human minds. The heroes of present-day literature—as exemplified by Sergeĭ Tutarinov of S. Babaevskii’s Cavalier of the Golden Star and the ex-soldier Arseniĭ Nikitich of Nina Popova’s Peace in the Country—are ideal types which incarnate prescribed behavior and often are too perfect (i.e. too conforming) to be human. They are ideological models rather than living human beings. Yet the hero of each novel is surrounded by a gallery of characters showing quirks of various types in their behavior and often “suffering” from deeply ingrained “capitalistic survivals.” These characters—villainized and caricatured—are the most graphic indicators of the gigantic problems with which the engineers of rural socialism are faced in their efforts to harvest psychological fruits from the effected socio-economic revolution.

“SURVIVALS OF INDIVIDUALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY”

The Problem

At the present stage of their development, kolkhozy are in the midst of a dialectical whirlwind. According to Soviet social theory, theirs is not a “smooth and even” social development; they are, in effect, a battleground of two contending forces, one of which stands for the outlived and dying old, and the other for the growing and victorious new.⁸¹ The old consists of the survivals of “petty bourgeois mentality” and the unwelcome remnants of “individualistic psychology” and private-property traditionalism. Stalin took note, as early as 1933, of the fact that technological and psychological changes do not go hand in hand and that “psychological lag” is a fact which the architects of Soviet society must keep in mind. “In its development [said Stalin on January 7, 1933] the mentality of man lags behind his actual condition. In status the members of collective farms are no longer individual farmers, but collectivists; but their mentality is still the old one—that of the owner of private property.”⁸² The so-called “socialist re-education of kolkhoz peasantry” has continued to figure as one of the cardinal problems of social planning in the rural community. It should be borne in mind that the artel form of kolkhoz has been chosen—in preference to the TOZ and agri-cultural commune—as a most effective “re-educational” medium. Although communes denied the existence of presocialist (or “capitalist”) survivals, TOZ’s made private property a primary and socialist property a secondary feature of their internal organization. Artels are based on both public and private property, but, in contrast to TOZ’s, they have elevated public property to a primary and have reduced private property to a secondary force. Thus, although they recognize the coexistence of—and a dialectical conflict between—the old and the new, they raise the latter to a sanctified position and accept the former only as a concession to psychological necessity. The long-range plan, needless to say, calls for progressive strengthening of

socialist ownership accompanied by gradual economic as well as psychological elimination of survivals of private property.

Law Versus "Psychology"

The "private-property tendencies and habits" of the kolkhoz peasantry, which are scheduled to be the losing element in the dialectical conflict between the old and the new, have called for the application of many drastic measures in the rural community. These actions have been of two-interrelated types: actions designed to establish the indisputable pre-eminence of socialist property and actions directed toward eliminating recurrent tendencies to expand private property above the legally guaranteed minimum. In 1939 Andreev informed the Eighteenth Party Congress:

There was a time when our collective farms were too weak to supply all the needs of the collective farmers from the produce of socialized husbandry. At that time it was rightly stated that the collective farmers should be allowed to have cattle and adjoining plots for their private use. Now that this has been done and all the collective farms have been given cows and plots of land for their own use, and the collective farms are firmly on their feet, we must put the emphasis on strengthening and extending the socialized collective farming, and increase its contribution to the incomes of the collective farmers and its share in taking care of their requirements. The correct combination of personal interests and public interests on the collective farms remains the fundamental principle of the collective farm system, but the personal husbandry of the collective farm households must assume more and more a strictly subsidiary character, while the socialized husbandry of the collective farms, being the main thing must grow.⁸³

During the last ten years several measures have been adopted with a view to reducing the private property of kolkhoz families to a minimum. Prior to 1939 kolkhoz livestock breeding was poorly developed, and this was an important reason for attaching more than subsidiary significance to the personal husbandry of kolkhoz families. More than a half of the total livestock were privately owned.⁸⁴ That was a factor which gave kolkhozniki a considerable degree of independence from the artel economy. During the last decade, however, a series of ordinances have made personal livestock breeding a subsidiary part of the economy. Although personal land was considered of a subsidiary nature even in 1939, subsequent measures have effected a further curtailment in its economic importance. Among these measures are ordinances ruling that each kolkhoz household must plant fifteen to twenty fruit trees of different kinds (thus reducing the already small personal plots and curtailing their production of marketable staples), that kolkhoz youth from twelve to sixteen years of age, traditionally the main working power on household plots, be included in kolkhoz work, and that the produce of these plots be subject to obligatory deliveries of determinate percentages to the state at government-determined prices.⁸⁵

Systematic endeavors to weaken the economic importance of the private husbandry of the kolkhozniki have not unfolded smoothly. The government has been compelled to fight not only the consolidation of personal agriculture within the framework of existing legal provisions but also the recurrent tendencies on the part of kolkhoz peasants to develop their "private interests" above the legally stipulated limits. On May 27, 1939, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government stated with alarm that the local government and Party authorities had allowed an illegal expansion of household plots at the expense of public (kolkhoz) land and that in many kolkhozy personal husbandry had become a primary occupation of artel members. The joint decision ruled (a) that all land held privately by kolkhoz households in excess of the prescribed limits be re-incorporated into public land; (b) that all private land situated within the complexes of kolkhoz land be incorporated into public land and that the households concerned be granted new land from special complexes selected for the purpose; and (c) that all isolated (scattered) households (*khutory*) and their plots be concentrated in one place.⁸⁶ The latter decision was based on the fact that kolkhozniki who lived outside concentrated villages had shown a more pronounced propensity toward emphasizing their personal husbandry at the expense of kolkhoz work. The remedial actions, prescribed by this momentous ordinance, were undertaken immediately with great initial successes, but during the war years a new shifting of the emphasis from kolkhoz to household husbandry became evident. On September 19, 1946, the Party and the government called for energetic actions to prevent "the plundering and squandering" of kolkhoz property and to remedy the damages already done. During the course of one year, over 14,000,000 acres of land were returned to the kolkhozy.⁸⁷ It is impossible to say what portion of this land was in formerly German-occupied territory where artels were formally broken up into individual farms, but it is significant that all the examples given are not of that character but are cases of individual appropriation of kolkhoz property.

The "survivals" and recurrences of "private-property mentality" and "petty bourgeois propensities"—the expressions with which Soviet authorities label actions incompatible with the principles of rural socialism—have been a problem of official concern not only in matters of property but also of labor. The government has been constantly faced with such anomalies as disproportionate concern of individual kolkhozniki with work on their personal plots (even if these have been kept within legal acreage), self-chosen idleness, preoccupation with "private business" of a non-agricultural nature, and so forth. In 1937, for example, there were over 13,000,000 physically able kolkhozniki who worked less than fifty work-days in various kolkhoz assignments.⁸⁸ In 1939 it was officially estimated that 19.4 percent of the total number of able-bodied kolkhozniki were "reserves of unused man power."⁸⁹ Official efforts to "contract" these reserves for work in industry generally failed, which necessitated the introduction of a draft system for recruiting peasant man power for urban work.

In an effort to remedy this acute situation the Party and the government decided on May 27, 1939, to introduce a 100-workday minimum for cotton-growing, a 60-workday minimum for central grain-producing, and an 80-workday minimum for all other regions, and to "recommend" to kolkhozy that persons who do not complete the required minimum of workdays should be regarded as having abandoned their respective artels and their rights as kolkhozniki. In 1942, the workday minimum was raised to 150, 100, and 120 respectively and more positive penalties were provided for non-conformists. "Physically able kolkhozniki [rules the Party and government decision of April 13, 1942] who do not fulfill, without warranted reason, the obligatory workday minimum in agricultural work are subject to court action and are sentenced to corrective labor in [their respective] kolkhozy for a period up to six months during which time 25 percent of their workday payments is kept by the kolkhozy."⁹⁰ These minima clearly discriminate against lower-rank kolkhozniki. A kolkhoznik in rank nine would easily meet his minimum since he would get five workdays credit for each day worked, but a worker in rank one would have to work twice as many days as the minima seem to indicate. Monetary rewards are perhaps adequate to keep the higher-paid workers at kolkhoz work, but severe legal sanctions were addressed to the lower-rank kolkhozniki. Because of relaxed control from the center during the war years, this decision has been strictly enforced only since the war. It has been also circumvented on a mass scale by the tendency to credit with sufficient workday units persons engaged in various nonproductive jobs, the numbers of which grew heavily from 1939 to 1946. The Party and government decision of September 19, 1946, ruled that immediate action be undertaken for cleaning kolkhozy of various "parasites."⁹¹ Measures were undertaken to reduce administrative ("nonproductive") staffs to minimum proportions, to rid kolkhozy of all persons not engaged in artel economy, and to coerce all able-bodied members into carrying out their assignments with prescribed efficiency. The immediate results of this campaign were that prior to the creation of enlarged kolkhozy, approximately 500,000 kolkhozniki had been transferred from "administrative" positions to work in kolkhoz brigades and that approximately 200,000 persons were proclaimed ineligible to receive any share in the distribution of kolkhoz income.⁹²

Four Techniques in the Struggle Against Rural Traditionalism

The persistent struggle against survivals of "individualistic psychology," has continually held top priority on the agenda of socio-economic planning for the rural community. The approach to this problem has generally been through four distinct techniques: persuasion, social mobilization, semi-coercion, and coercion.

Persuasion.—There are two basic types of persuasion: the one concentrated on preparing kolkhoz peasantry for future ordinances affecting the established relations in co-operative agriculture; and the second concentrated on popularizing already passed and enforced ordinances. Although the former predominated during the period preceding mass collectivization,

during the last twenty years, particularly during the last decade, the latter has become of primary importance. Persuasion is an appeal to the "socialist consciousness" of kolkhozniki to bear with the Party and the government in their efforts to consolidate rural socialism; its immediate task is to mobilize the peasantry for the fulfillment of production tasks assigned by the central authorities. Professionalized persuasion, identified as agitation, "is called upon to translate the appeals of the Party into practical language, and to explain the dependence of the success of the whole country on the success of each district, plant, kolkhoz, and working man."⁹³ The "groups of agitators" (agitkollektivy)—organized in each district by the Party and Komsomol organizations, and directly guided by the local Party secretaries—consist of rural intelligentsia (teachers, physicians, veterinarians, agronomists, etc.) and a select group of "advanced" workers and peasants. In kolkhozy agitation is an ever continuing process: its intertwined activities are so organized as to reach every person. Its "instruments" are speeches by selected agitators before the general meetings, production conferences, brigade or zveno meetings, aktiv conferences and multiform ad hoc gatherings. The agitators operate also through the local press, kolkhoz clubs, "party cabinets," posters, and all other communication media available in the kolkhoz village. The agitators, who are not necessarily Party members, are themselves subject to continual indoctrination through special seminars run by the district Party committees and by propaganda experts, that is, persons grounded in broad theoretical aspects of Marxian theory.⁹⁴ Whereas the agitators deal with concrete aspects of current problems, the propagandists deal with broader theoretical and ideological undercurrents of these problems. The former pave the way for the accomplishment of concrete current assignments (meeting the quotas of planned output, etc.); the latter throw the Marxian light on effected or projected innovations of wider social import.

Social Mobilization.—The second, typically Soviet, technique of eliminating presocialist psychological survivals is social mobilization. The aim of social mobilization is to utilize the maximum energy of the kolkhozniki for socially beneficent projects and to make as many persons as possible cognizant of their concrete part in the building of rural socialism. Every organization operating in the artel, whether it is a purely economic production unit (brigade, zveno, etc.), an artel administrative body (general meeting, managing board, auditing commission), a Soviet organization (village Soviet), a Party organization, a public association (Komsomol), or a voluntary group (civilian defense, cultural or sport clubs), is tied with all other organizations through the unity of their fundamental assignment: the upholding of Party and government policies. Thus, each person is, or is encouraged and assisted to be, a multifunctional actor in the over-all project of building up and consolidating the socialist system. The tendency is to make as many kolkhozniki as possible conscious of their contribution not only to the production processes of the artel but also to the managing of kolkhoz affairs.

In addition to the general meeting of kolkhoz members, the functions of which have been described, the kolkhozniki are "included" in "managerial work" through many other organizational media. For example, there are joint meetings of management, brigadiers, and aktivists; production conferences held on kolkhoz, brigade, or zveno level; meetings of individual brigades or zven'ia; meetings of kolkhoz women or senior kolkhoz members or kolkhoz youth; and conferences of persons of the same profession ("harrowers," "sowers," drivers, etc.).⁹⁵ This panorama of meetings and conferences of professional, sex, age and skill groups, is an integral part of total social mobilization and is devised to make each kolkhoznik conscious of his and his immediate group's responsibility for the economic and political success of their association. The outstanding feature, however, of this multitude of meetings and conferences is that they are not endowed with power; they are convenient instruments of the centralized power system. Their immediate function is to see that the Party and government policies are correctly and fully implemented. Actually, their basic task is to use all the available time of as many individuals as possible for the development of social habits and individual potentialities within a thoroughly controlled institutional framework.

Semicoercion. — Semicoercion is the third important technique applied by the Soviet authorities in their campaign against capitalist vestiges in the psychology of kolkhoz peasants. Semicoercion consists of government and, particularly, Party "recommendations" as to techniques and methods for the eliminating of antisocialist tendencies. These "recommendations" are of semicoercive nature because they provide for no clear-cut sanctions against nonconformists, and in some cases for no precise method for the carrying out of "recommended" innovations. For example, on March 25, 1931, the government made it mandatory for kolkhozy to introduce piecework.⁹⁶ The authorities did not, however, define in precise and concrete terms, the manner in which the piecework system should be organized, nor did they specify penalties for nonconformity with this innovation. Another more graphic example is provided by the Party and government "recommendation" of May 27, 1939, that definite minima of obligatory workdays be introduced in kolkhozy and that the latter be advised (posovetovat') to regard the artel members who fail to comply with these minima "as having left the kolkhozy and having lost their rights as kolkhozniki."⁹⁷ The kolkhozy were "advised" rather than "ordered" to comply with this measure, and the state did not define any coercive measures to be applied by itself. The implicit threat of violence (government coercion), which is pervasive in Soviet society, makes such a technique as "semicoercion" possible.

Coercion. — Coercion, the fourth and most potent technique in fighting the psychological hangovers of the ancien regime, consists of Party and government orders backed by definite penal sanctions. The enforcement of workday minima was "semicoercive" in 1939. Since there were not the expected results, the government and the Party decided that each kolkhoznik must meet his workday minimum or be penalized by a court sen-

tence of up to six months of corrective labor. Despite intensive Soviet propaganda to the contrary, the primary structural and functional features of the kolkhoz are a product of coercion. As a rule, coercion is always preceded, and then accompanied by persuasion, social mobilization, and semicoercion.

In relations of the state to the kolkhoz as a socio-economic unit, coercion takes the form of increasing government interference with kolkhoz production and, accordingly, of increasing dependence of the kolkhoz on the state. This coercion is expressed in the gradual transformation of general meetings of kolkhozniki into agencies for rubber-stamping the plans, programs, and orders issued by government agencies. The kolkhoz production plans, norms of output, distribution and rotation of crops, remuneration scales, insurance expenditures, system of bookkeeping, business contracts, rules of internal order, and economic development are increasingly determined by government agencies with which the kolkhoz has been surrounded and upon which it has been made dependent. The more extensive survival of "individualistic psychology" among kolkhoz peasants than among urban workers may be associated with the fact that the kolkhozy still preserve some of the independence of which industrial establishments have been fully deprived. In other words, these survivals are not so obvious in the industrial establishments because here all the outlets through which "individualistic psychology" could be expressed have been more effectively, though not thoroughly suppressed, sealed, and policed.

THE KOLKHOZNIK AND THE WORKER

Officially, the Soviet Union has two clearly differentiated social classes: the workers and the peasants. These two groups are never regarded as vertically arranged, but there is no doubt that the peasants are generally treated as a lower bracket in the hierarchy of social groups. Although the Soviet leaders do not explicitly recognize this hierarchical differentiation, they assert that the workers have made a much more impressive record in the building of the socialist system, and have, accordingly, achieved a comparatively higher stage of social development. According to Molotov, "the specific features of the paths which the workers' class and peasantry follow are obvious. Owing to the specific conditions of their class position, the workers are ahead of the peasants; at present the workers are identified with a higher form of socialist economy."⁹⁸ The officially recognized reasons for this are twofold.

In the first place, the workers were directly incorporated into the socialist system through the nationalization of industrial potentialities and were fully subordinated to government management. The peasants were indirectly incorporated into the socialist system through the introduction of two intermediary stages of development between "capitalism" and "full socialism." When in 1917 the land was nationalized, it was not generally subordinated to government management but was given to peasants for private use. Neither did the subsequent mass collectivization of land

bring a full subordination of kolkhozy to government management: co-operative socialism was chosen in preference to state socialism, although the difference between these two systems has been transformed into a difference of degree rather than of kind.

In the second place, rural conservatism has been regarded as a factor thwarting a more rapid development of "socialist mentality" among the peasants, who, as has been shown, are still influenced by the "survivals" of "individualistic" or "petty bourgeois psychology."

In addition to these official reasons, a number of other factors contributed to pushing "the two brotherly classes of Soviet society" into a vertical order. The Bolshevik leaders have constantly described, particularly prior to 1936, the Soviet political system as a dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the rule of the Bolshevik hierarchy in behalf of the proletariat over the entire nation. The peasants, with their private-property propensities were never considered proletarian; and even when the Lenin-inspired "alliance of the proletariat and the poor and middle peasants" was officially blessed, the proletariat was considered a "guiding" and the peasantry a "guided" social force. "The dictatorship of the proletariat [according to Vyshinski] is a special form of a class alliance of the proletariat and the working peasant masses. Its task is to overthrow capitalism and to achieve a decisive victory of socialism under the condition that in this alliance the proletariat serves as the guiding force."⁹⁹ In other words, the government and the Party have extensively relied on the proletariat as an intermediary force between them and the rural community. The current tendency, however, is to use the intelligentsia as an intermediary between the ruling group and both the peasants and the workers. During the 1920's and early 1930's, the central authorities sent hundreds of thousands of industrial workers to serve as their agents in the rural community. At present, the functions of official agents are gradually concentrated in the hands of engineers, agronomists, veterinarians, mechanics, teachers, district Party organizers, and rural physicians. The rise of intelligentsia as an instrument of power, however, did not disrupt the vertical order in which the peasants and workers are placed. Officially, the workers still "guide" and the peasants are "guided."

There are more tangible factors bearing on the lower status of the peasantry as a social group. The process of planned industrialization of the country has brought to prominence a new social valuation of labor, indigenous to industrial societies; the more mechanized, complex, and difficult a work assignment is, and more professional training it requires, the higher social importance is ascribed to it. This implies that the lowest mechanized industrial assignments are equally valued with the highest mechanized agricultural assignments, and is best illustrated by the fact that those workers who are transferred to the rural community (to work in MTS's) are entrusted with carrying out assignments considered very vital and too complex for kolkhozniki, whereas the peasants who move to work in factories provide the bulk of unskilled workers and are at the

bottom of the professional hierarchy. In jobs in which workers and peasants work jointly, the leadership is never entrusted to the latter: a peasant may lead only groups composed solely of the members of his class. This phenomenon is best expressed in joint MTS-kolkhoz work and in sovkhozy which engage in seasonal employment of kolkhozniki.

As recipients of numerous services from the state, industrial workers enjoy higher privileges than kolkhozniki. Transportation and communication media, educational, cultural, and medical services, and the modern needs of everyday life are available to the urban population to a considerably higher degree than to the peasants. In other words, the benefits guaranteed by the fundamental principles of socialism are unequally shared by the urban and rural communities.

All this indicates that the kolkhoz peasantry forms a social class within the socialist system and that it is set off as a clearly demarcated social group by a number of distinct features. The kolkhozniki (a) have achieved a lower (co-operative) form of socialism which recognized private means of production and private husbandry as coexistent with, although subsidiary to, the public means of production and husbandry; (b) have retained comparatively strong "survivals" of "individualistic psychology;" (c) have been officially considered a "guided" rather than a "guiding" political and socio-economic force; (d) have been engaged in a type of work officially valued as socially less important than industrial work; and (e) have been able, in comparison with the urban population, to receive from the state fewer privileges guaranteed by the basic philosophy of socialism.

This indicates that the projected urbanization of the rural community is a complex assignment. In the meantime, there can be no doubt that the contrast between the village and the town is gradually diminishing, although it is still more pronounced than in many Western societies. Urbanization of the countryside is manifested in the gradual transformation of collective work into "industrial labor;"¹⁰⁰ the increasing mechanization of work processes; the strengthening of state control over the rural community; the growth of educational, cultural, medical, and other services; and the more drastic measures employed by the government in combating recurrences of "individualistic psychology." As such, urbanization has some connotations which are peculiarly Soviet and do not fall within a Western frame of reference. For example, the universal application of piecework is regarded as indispensable for elevating traditional kolkhoz work to the level of industrial labor and of the transformation of a "peasant-universal," that is a Jack-of-all-trades, into a specialized worker. Typically Soviet is also the fact that urbanization is considered primarily in terms of socialist development.¹⁰¹

A study of influences of the urban community and socialist development in general on rural folkways has been neglected in the Soviet Union. In a recent article, published in the country's leading geographical journal, the urgent need for the development of "kolkhoz ethnography" has been emphasized.¹⁰² The new discipline would concentrate on collecting ma-

terial relevant to social changes in the rural community. "Ethnography [the author of the article argues] should undertake the important task of collecting material relevant to the new life in the kolkhoz village, which requires a thoughtful, continuous, and localized investigation. Undoubtedly, the forms of the old life are rapidly disintegrating, while we are witnessing the creation of new forms . . . Often these forms are intertwined and the old forms are filled with the new content." In order to drive her point home, the author has annotated a few observations of ethnographic interest. In 1947 she visited two kolkhozy in the Gorky region and has recorded some interesting data on the process of urbanization. She has found, for example, that women's garments in the two kolkhozy vary in degrees of urbanization. In kolkhoz A she found that all younger women wear dresses of a current city cut, whereas the older women wear dresses of a somewhat outmoded city style. In kolkhoz B, on the contrary, the younger women wear dresses of an outmoded city cut, whereas the older women wear the traditional long and wide skirts. The youth of kolkhoz A engages two evenings a week in various city dances, learned from a hired city dance teacher, whereas the youth of kolkhoz B spends its evenings in traditional singing accompanied by an accordion. An itinerant cinema visits kolkhoz A once a week, whereas it gets to kolkhoz B at much longer intervals. Both kolkhozy, however, have given emphasis to traditionally urban sports; kolkhoz A to skiing and kolkhoz B to bicycle riding. As in any other society, the differences in the degrees of urbanization are explainable primarily in terms of the proximity of these two kolkhozy to urban centers. This information, meager as it is, shows that the Soviet village is gradually becoming urbanized, not only in terms of officially postulated desiderata (that is, in terms of socialist consolidation), but also in terms of a normal diffusion of urban traits.

In general, the growing urbanization of the Soviet Union has its basic sources in the mass migration of peasants into urban centers and the transformation of rural communities into townships. During the period between the censuses of December 17, 1926, and January 17, 1939, the urban population grew from 26,300,000 to 55,900,000, an increase of 212.5 percent. During the same period the rural population decreased by 6,100,000 persons. The total influx from rural settlements to towns was estimated at 18,500,000 persons. This means, that, without taking into consideration those villages which were transformed into towns or "urban settlements," during the period from 1926 to 1939 each seventh rural inhabitant became a town dweller. According to the 1939 census, there were 2,370 urban communities as against 834 in 1926.¹⁰³

NOTES

1. K. Ostrovitianov, "Ob osnovnykh tipakh proizvodstvennykh otnosheniĭ," Problemy ekonomiki, XI, No. 5 (1939), 190ff.

2. TOZ stands for Tovarishchestvo po obshchestvennoĭ obrabotke zemli.

3. For additional pertinent details see Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M.

Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow, Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 172-78.

4. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), Kolkhoznoe pravo (Moscow, 1947), p. 44.

5. I. Laptev, Sovetskoe krest'ianstvo (Moscow, 1939), pp. 48-49.

6. This was done with the view to expediting the distribution of the commune property in the event it should break up.

7. I. Laptev, op. cit., p. 89.

8. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 306; K. Abrosenko, O sotsialisticheskom perevospitanii krest'ianstva (Moscow, 1949), pp. 21-22.

9. I. Laptev, op. cit., p. 89.

10. J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (11th ed ; Moscow, 1943), p. 501.

11. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev, and V. Khitev, Sovetskoe khoziaistvennoe zakonodatel'stvo (Moscow, 1934), I, 216-17.

12. N. D. Kazantsev, "Stalinskiĭ Ustav sel'skokhoziaistvennoĭ arteli—osnovnoĭ zakon kolkhoznoĭ zhizni," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 12 (1949), p. 80.

13. V. Chuvikov, "O vnutrikolkhoznoĭ demokratii," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 6 (1946), pp. 8-9.

14. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., p. 177.

15. Ibid., pp. 179-80; V. Abramov and I. Ermolinskiĭ, "Ob upravlencheskom apparate v kolkhozakh," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo No. 2 (1947), p. 24.

16. For additional data on the internal functioning of kolkhozy see Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), pp. 260 ff.

17. For a discussion of various Soviet theories on the legal nature of the decisions passed by kolkhoz management and the general meeting of the kolkhozniki, see I. V. Pavlov, "O pravovoĭ prirode reshenii organov upravleniia v kolkhozakh," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 11 (1948), pp. 31-38.

18. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, Administrativnoe pravo SSSR (Moscow, 1946), pp. 314-15.

19. I. D. Levin and A. V. Karass (eds.), Osnovy sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947), p. 481.

20. A. Tikhanov, "Sel'skokhoziaistvennye sektsii sel'sovetov," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo, No. 1 (1938), pp. 171-73.

21. Ibid., p. 481; I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., p. 314; D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., p. 141.

22. I. D. Levin and A. V. Karass (eds.), op. cit., pp. 482-83; I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., p. 313.

23. D. Slobodchikov and P. Lezhnev-Fin'kovskiĭ, "Agronomicheskoe obsluzhivanie," Sel'skokhoziaistvennaia entsiklopediia (Moscow, 1949), I, 78-82.

24. D. Kolpakov, Review of Vazhneishie resheniia po sel'skomu khoziaistvu za 1938-1946 gg. (Moscow, 1948), in Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 8 (1949), pp. 55-56.

25. K. P. Gorshenin, Sovetskaya prokuratura (Moscow, 1947), p. 54.

26. "O merakh po likvidatsii narusheniĭ Ustava sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli v kolkhozakh," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 9 (1946), p. 7.

27. Ibid., pp. 3-6.

28. For officially registered examples of these "abuses" see Pravda, September 26, 1946; N. I. Anisimov, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 30 let (Moscow, 1947), p. 22. Also by the same author, Pobeda sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaistva (Moscow, 1947), p. 121. See also D. T. Shepilov, Stalinskiĭ Ustav sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli - osnovnoi zakon kolkhoznogo stroia (Moscow, 1946), p. 15.

29. Vazhneishie resheniia po sel'skomu khoziaistvu za 1938-1946 gg. (Moscow, 1948).

30. Pravda, October 9, 1946.

31. V. Grigor'ev, "Voprosy upravleniia delami sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 1 (1950), p. 63.

32. F. Koshelev, "Demokraticheskie osnovy upravleniia delami sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 7 (1947), p. 19; V. Chuvikov, op. cit., p. 8.

33. See A. A. Andreev's report to the Eighteenth Party Congress. The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow (Moscow, 1939), p. 244.

34. E. Davidov, "Naselenie," Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediia, Vol. SSSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 67.

35. A. Andreev, "Stalin i kolkhoznoe krest'ianstvo," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 24 (1949), 78.

36. V. Churaev, "Rukovodstvo pervichnymi partiĭnymi organizatsiiami kolkhozov," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 11 (1949), 24-38.

37. In the rural community there are 2,200,000 members of the Komsomol. In fifty-four regions, territories, and republics each kolkhoz has a Komsomol organization. N. Mikhailov, "S'ezd molodykh stroitelei kommunizma," Bol'shevik, XXV, No. 8 (1948), 24

38. V. Churaev, op. cit., pp. 25ff

39. Ibid., p. 25.

40. Ibid., p. 27.

41. G. Shitarev, "Rol' i znachenie partiĭnykh sobraniĭ," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 11 (1949), 58.

42. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., p. 285.

43. J. Stalin, op. cit., p. 434.

44. In 1928, a total of 80.6 per cent of all kolkhozy distributed their annual harvest among the kolkhoz families on the basis of the number of family members actively participating in the artel production. N. Dem'ianova, "K istorii kolkhoznogo trudodnia," Problemy ekonomiki, XII, Nos. 5-6 (1940, 156, D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., pp. 61-62.

45. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev, and V. Khitev, op. cit., pp. 210-14.
46. Ibid., p. 215.
47. M. Kraev, "O kolkhoznom trudodne," Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 3 (1949), 37. In 1948 the government divided all types of kolkhoz work (not including livestock husbandry) into 1,100 individual assignments each of which is placed into one of the established vertical categories.
- A. Bolgov, "Trudoden' i ego rol' v kolkhoznom proizvodstve," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 22 (1949), 57.
48. A. Larionov, "Voprosy normirovaniia i otsenki truda v kolkhozakh," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 10 (1947), p. 33.
49. M. Kraev, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
50. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., pp. 295-302.
51. G. Gaponenko, "Organizatsiia i oplata truda v kolkhozakh," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 5 (1949), pp. 58-59. Note that this was a straight incentive system, not the type of compounded incentive bonus favored in the factory
52. M. Kraev, op. cit., p. 38.
53. A. Libkind, "Kooperatsiia i razdelenie truda v kolkhozakh," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 1 (1948), p. 29.
54. V. Pronin, "O proizvodstvennom plannirovannii v kolkhozakh," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 10, (1947), pp. 28-31;
- A. Libkind, "Knigi po voprosam organizatsii i oplaty truda v kolkhozakh," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 8 (1949), p. 61. Since the early 1930's the government had encouraged the kolkhozy to form the Zven'ia as parts of kolkhoz brigades. However, until a few years ago they had been used exclusively for the purpose of expediting the division of group labor within the brigades.
55. A. Liapin, "Sotsialisticheskiĭ printsip raspredeleniia po trudu," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 3 (1949), 62.
56. A. Larionov, op. cit., p. 33.
57. F. Koshelev, "Novyiĭ etap sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia v kolkhozhnoi derevne," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 8 (1948), pp. 9-11.
58. T. L. Basiuk, Ekonomika i organizatsiia sotsialisticheskogo sel'skokhoziaistvennogo proizvodstva (Moscow, 1949), p. 304.
59. I. Laptev, "Likvidatsiia protivopolozhnosti mezhdu gorodom i derevnei v SSSR," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 10 (1951), p. 15.
60. M. Tsynkov, "Organizatsiia khoziaistva ukрупnennogo kolkhoza," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 9 (1950), p. 16.
61. I. Kuvshinov, "Ukrupnenie melkikh kolkhozov—put' k novomu moshchnomu pod" ėmu sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaistva," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 8, (1950), p. 26.
62. Ibid., p. 26.
63. S. Kolesnev, "Nekotorye dannye o preimushchestvakh krupnykh kolkhozov," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 10 (1950),

pp. 17-22, N. Vybornyĭ, "Khoziaĭstvennye itogi i perspektivy razvitiia ukрупnennogo kolkhoza," Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo, No. 3 (1951), pp. 6-8.

64. L. Florent'ev and I. Bochkarev, "Organizatsionno-khoziaĭstvennoe ustroĭstvo ukрупnennykh kolkhozov," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 12 (1950), p. 53.

65. "Novyĭ adres chebashikhintsev," Literaturnaia gazeta, January 11, 1951, p. 2.

66. "Proizvodstvennaia brigada—osnovnaia forma organizatsii truda," editorial in Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo, No. 3 (1951), pp. 1-2, E. Semenova, "Organizatsiia i ukрупnenie proizvodstvennykh brigad v kolkhoze," Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo, No. 3 (1951), pp. 9-10.

67. I. Kuvshinov, op cit., p. 27.

68. Confirmation of this forecast is given in a New York Times report by Harry Schwartz on the "demand that collective chairmen be picked from the ranks of agronomists, veterinarians, and other specialists rather than from rank and file peasants." Soviet newspapers report frankly that Communist Party units simply select new chairmen and then have their choices ratified at farmers' meetings." (New York Times, December 4, 1951, p. 10.)

69. I. Laptev, "Sotsialisticheskie formy organizatsii truda v kolkhozakh i ikh preimushchestva," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 4 (1950), p. 10.

70. P. Davydenko, "Oplata truda kolkhoznikov s uchëtom urozhainosti kul'tur i produktivnosti skota," Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo, No. 3 (1951), pp. 11-13.

71. A. Ural'skiĭ, "Obshchestvennye sredstva proizvodstva—osnova bogatstva kolkhozov," Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo, No. 3 (1951), p. 5

72. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op cit., p. 292.

73. E. Orlikova, "Sovetskaia zhenshchina v obshchestvennom proizvodstve," Problemy ekonomiki, XII, No. 7 (1940), 119.

74. I. Laptev, Sovetskoe krest'ianstvo, p. 165; N. Voznesenskiĭ, Voennaia ekonomika (Moscow, 1948), pp. 92-93; E. Orlikova, "Zhenskii trud v SSSR," Planovoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 10 (1939), p. 120.

75. E. Orlikova, "Sovetskaia zhenshchina v obshchestvennom proizvodstve," op cit., p. 119. It should be noted that a person may live in the kolkhoz and not be a kolkhoz member. Thus any housewives who stayed at home would not be included in the above 52.7 per cent. Women are 52.7 per cent of the working personnel.

76. B. Markus, "Trud," Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol. SSSR, p. 1126; I. T. Goliakov, et al. (eds.), Besedy ob obshchestvennom i gosudarstvennom ustroĭstve SSSR (Moscow, 1948), p. 240.

77. V. Mel'nikov, "Podgotovka rukovodiashchikh kolkhoznykh kadrov," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaĭstvo, No. 6 (1950), p. 57.

78. G. Kolesnikova, "Povest' o novoĭ sel'skoĭ intelligentsii," Oktiabr', No. 3 (1949), pp. 179-80.

79. "Kolkhoznaia derevnia pered vyborami v Verkhovnyi Soviet SSSR," editorial in Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 2 (1950), p. 5.

80. V. Mel'nikov, op. cit., p. 56.

81. J. Stalin, Politicheskii otchet Tsentral'nogo komiteta XV S'ezdu VKP (b) (Moscow, 1936), pp. 42-43.

82. Ibid., p. 422.

83. A. A. Andreev, The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow, p. 262.

84. "Pod"ëm sotsialisticheskogo zhivotnovodstva—tsentral'naia zadacha v razviti sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR," editorial in Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 6 (1949), 13.

85. Vazhneishie reshenia po sel'skomu khoziaistvu za 1938-1946 gg., p. 146; D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., pp. 158, 410.

86. "O merakh okhrany obshchestvennykh zemel' kolkhozov ot rashishchenia," Bol'shevik, XXIII, Nos. 17-18 (1946), 73.

87. N. I. Anisimov, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 30 let (Moscow, 1947), p. 22.

88. N. Aristov, "Organizovannyi nabor rabochei sily," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 11 (1939), p. 94. This is not a strictly literal figure. For persons in category one it could mean 100 days. But since the tendency is to put few people in categories one and two, it is more apt to mean even less than 50 days.

89. A. Libkind, "Ispol'zovanie trudovykh resursov," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 9 (1947), p. 8.

90. Vazhneishie reshenia 1938-1939, p. 47.

91. "O merakh po likvidatsii narusheniï ustava sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli v kolkhozakh," Bol'shevik, XXIII, Nos. 17-18 (1946), 66ff.

92. V. Abramov and I. Ermolinskiï, op. cit., p. 25; L. Gusman, "Sokrashchenia upravlencheskogo apparata v kolkhozakh," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, No. 5 (1949), p. 60.

93. "Politicheskaiia agitatsiia—moguchee sredstvo kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia trudiashchikhsia," editorial in Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 17 (1949), 5; See also I. Grishin, "Stalingradskaia partorganizatsiia v bor'be za vypolnenie velikogo plana preobrazovaniia prirody," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 6 (1949), 25-28.

94. "Povyshenie kachestva politicheskoi uchëby kommunistov—vazhneishaia zadacha partiinykh organizatsiï," editorial in Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 3 (1949), 1-6. A thorough study of the activities of agitators in the Soviet Union is Alex Inkeles' Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950). He discusses the distinction made by Soviet writers between agitation and propaganda.

95. K. Abrosenko, op. cit., p. 81.

96. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev, and V. Khitev, op. cit., p. 215.

97. Vazhneishie reshenia 1938-1939, p. 47.

98. [Molotov] Doklad tov. Molotova na XVII Partkonferentsii (Moscow, 1932), p. 147.

99. A. Y. Vyshinskiĭ, "Uchenie Lenina-Stalina o preletarskoĭ revoliutsii i gosudarstve," in Sovetskoe sotsialisticheskoe gosudarstvo: Sbornik stateĭ (Moscow, 1948), p. 57; see also D. Shepilov, "Stalin—tvorets kol'khoznoĭ stroia SSSR," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 23 (1949), 70.

100. A. Kuropatkin, "O prevrashchenii sel'skokhoziaistvennogo truda v raznovidnost' truda industrial'nogo," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 5 (1949), 42-55; L. I. Berrī, "K voprosu o razdelenii truda v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve," Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR Otdelenie ekonomiki i prava, No. 3 (1947), p. 109.

101. P. F. Iudin, Sotsializm i kommunizm (Moscow, 1946), pp. 26 ff.

102. L. V. Tazikhina, "Po kolkhozam Gor'kovskoi oblasti," Izvestiia Vsesoiuznogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, Vol. 81, No. 3 (1949), pp. 337-42.

103. O. A. Konstantinov, "Tempy rosta gorodov SSSR i kapitalisticheskikh stran," Izvestiia Vsesoiuznogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, Vol. 81, No. 6 (1949), pp. 578-81.

III. THE SOVKHOZ

HISTORICAL SKETCH

The sovkhoz is the oldest organization of the "consistent" socialist type operating in the Soviet rural community. During the Civil War the government created several thousand state farms (sovkhozy) on the estates of dispossessed landlords. Their initial function was to serve as models of collective and scientific endeavor in agricultural production, to strengthen the ranks of the state-employed "rural proletariat," to be a spearhead of Bolshevik penetration into the village, and to secure a "direct" source of state supplies in grain and other agricultural produce.

In none of these assignments did sovkhozy perform an important function during the first decade of the Soviet regime. They could not become model farms because of poor management, inadequate mechanization of agricultural processes, heavy damage inflicted on farm installations during the Civil War, and indiscriminate plundering by the peasants. Conditions under NEP with its "reversion to individualism" also favored independent farming. The contribution of sovkhozy to strengthening the state-employed "rural proletariat" was neutralized by a gradual increase of landless peasants employed by the kulaks. In 1926-27, for example, sovkhozy employed 900,000 members of the "rural proletariat," whereas the kulaks provided employment for 1,500,000.¹ That they had not shown much success as a source of "direct" supplies of agricultural produce to the state is best illustrated by the official admission that in 1927 the kulaks produced four times as much grain available for sale as sovkhozy and kolkhozy together.²

The first systematic and consistent efforts on the part of the Soviet government and the Bolshevik Party to consolidate and expand state farms were undertaken in 1928. The new enterprises, built mostly on uncultivated land, were designated as nuclei for future development of industrial enterprises processing agricultural produce and as a bulwark of rural socialism.³ The Sixth Congress of the Soviets of the U. S. S. R. went further in defining the role of sovkhozy within the framework of socialist agriculture. On March 17, 1931, this congress ruled that sovkhozy are not only "state factories of agricultural produce" but also (a) sources of direct assistance to kolkhozy in carrying on and organizing their work; (b) models of farm enterprises showing the peasants the advantages of socialized agriculture; and (c) schools of new agricultural technology.⁴ Equal in importance to these as a government objective was to make sovkhozy an important source of state supplies of grain and other agricultural produce. This general assignment has been repeated in all the Five-Year Plans.

The post-1928 development of sovkhozy, though characterized by an over-all consolidation of this "agricultural sector," has been accompanied by systematic revisions of the original blueprints. Immediately after state farms were integrated into a network of functioning enterprises, the Soviet leaders were forced to admit that extremely large sovkhozy were admin-

istratively unwieldy and inefficient for the organization of labor. Excessive specialization tended to reduce their value as profit-making enterprises. Stalin informed the Seventeenth Party Congress:

In regard to the state farms, it must be said that they still fail to cope with their tasks. I do not in the least underestimate the great revolutionizing role of our state farms. But if we compare the enormous sums the state has invested in the state farms with the actual results they have achieved to date, we will find an enormous balance against the state farms. The principal reason for this discrepancy is the fact that our state grain farms are too unwieldy; the directors cannot manage such huge farms. The farms are also too specialized; they have no rotation of crops and fallow land; they do not engage in livestock breeding. Evidently, it will be necessary to split up the state farms and make them less specialized.⁵

Accordingly, since 1931 the government has continued to reduce sovkhosy to manageable proportions and to develop them into enterprises of versatile production, particularly through combining crop production with livestock breeding.⁶ In the mid-1930's many sovkhosy were given up altogether as unprofitable, and portions of the land of oversized enterprises were transferred to kolkhozy. From 1934 to 1938 one million hectares of sown area was given by state farms to neighboring kolkhozy. In 1938 an average sovkhos held 3,130 hectares of sown area and employed an annual average of 330 workers. The decline of sovkhosy between 1932 and 1938 is shown in the following data:⁷

	1928	1932	1938
Number of sovkhosy	1,400	4,337	3,961
Annual average of workers	316,800	1,891,500	1,319,700
Sown area (in hectares)	1,700,000	13,400,000	12,400,000
Tractors	6,700	64,000	85,000

Sovkhosy have thus far been a negligible source of state income.⁸ Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities have shown no inclination to abandon them; on the contrary, they seem determined to devise new methods and techniques to consolidate them. The reason is that the sovkhosy are, above everything else, social experiments; through them the Soviet authorities are searching for a new structural form toward which the evolution of the kolkhoz village should be directed, and through them they are exploring the potentialities of labor differentiation in agriculture, a key factor in the transformation of collective agricultural work into industrial labor. It is no secret that the kolkhoz is officially considered a lower form of socialism and that, ipso facto, it must become an integral part of "consistent" socialism before any transition to rural communism is secured. This does not mean that the present-day sovkhos necessarily represents the next

step in the development of kolkhozy, but does serve as an experimental laboratory for testing blueprints of social development with the rural community. In addition, sovkhozy are the centers at which new agrotechnology is tested before it is channeled to kolkhozy.⁹ They supply the artels with selected seeds, thoroughbred livestock, and facilities for the training of skilled agricultural workers.¹⁰

THE SOVKHOZ AND THE KOLKHOZ: A COMPARISON

The Sovkhoz, as a "consistently" socialist rural enterprise, and the kolkhoz, as a co-operative association, differ in several respects. An analysis of these differences is important for an understanding of some basic trends in the general development of the Soviet socialist system.

Legal Differences

There are four distinct legal differences between the state farm and the kolkhoz:

1. Through sovkhozy the state exercises its right to the "direct use of land."¹¹ According to the decision passed by the Sixth Congress of the Soviets of the U.S.S.R. on March 17, 1931: "Sovkhozy are state enterprises, that is, the enterprises in which the state is full manager . . . and which in no way differ from other socialist factories of the industrial type."¹² In kolkhozy, on the other hand, state management is neither all-inclusive nor direct; it is effected through management elected by artel members. Sovkhoz management is appointed by, and is solely responsible to, the proper state authorities. Kolkhoz management is elected by the members of the association and is responsible to both state authorities and artel members whose interests may be, and often are, in conflict. The state regulates production processes of the kolkhoz through local Soviet authorities, which, according to constitutional provisions, are elective. It regulates sovkhoz activities through trusts which are directly subordinated to corresponding Central Boards (Glavks) of the Ministry of Sovkhozy or other ministries; accordingly, the sovkhoz is managed exclusively by a nonelective bureaucracy.

2. A kolkhoz, as a "voluntary" association, may be organized by the peasants, whereas a sovkhoz can be established only by higher government authorities.¹³

3. Not only the production but also the internal order of the sovkhoz is directly regulated by the government, the kolkhoz has considerable independence in regulating internal order. The budgets of state farms are determined by government authorities, those of kolkhozy by artel members.


4. Kolkhoz members are entitled to "private" gardens up to 2.5 acres in size (not including the houses and farm buildings); sovkhoz members are entitled up to 1.25 acres of land (including the dwelling places and other buildings).¹⁴ This difference is substantial in one important respect: of the two groups only the kolkhozniki are in a position to produce a marketable surplus on their "private" land

Socio-economic Differences

The legal differences between the two types of socialist agricultural organizations have been listed. The differences between the "consistent" socialism of the state farm and the artel socialism of the kolkhoz are most graphically expressed, however, in terms of property division, systems of labor remuneration and social class identifications. In the sovkhos both the means of production and the output belong to the state, whereas in the kolkhoz the means of production belong either to the state (land) or to the artel (productive animals, installations, smaller equipment), and the output is co-operative property.¹⁵ The differences in property correspond to the differences in the systems of remuneration for labor. The work of a sovkhos member is evaluated in terms of set wages, expressed in rubles, on the basis of the quantity and quality of labor achieved through the system of piecework. The work of a kolkhoznik, on the other hand, is appraised in terms of workdays—standardized units for recording the labor achievements of each individual¹⁶—and remuneration is effected through distribution of produce and cash obtained by the sale of the marketable surplus. Whereas the sovkhos member is paid from state funds, the kolkhoznik is remunerated from co-operative funds.¹⁷

All these differences between the state and co-operative farms correspond with the two officially recognized social classes: the peasants and the workers. A kolkhoznik brigadier and sovkhos brigadier, for example, perform identical assignments, yet the former is a peasant and the latter a worker. As a peasant, the kolkhoz brigadier works in an agricultural organization which, as has just been shown, deviates from "consistent" socialism. This implies that the Bolshevik plan for social transformation of the kolkhoz village into an organization falling within the realm of "consistent" socialism is tantamount to a plan for the transformation of peasants into workers, of artels into socialist "factories of agricultural produce," and of collective work into industrial labor.

These basic differences between the state farm and the kolkhoz, and the differences between the workers and peasants are accentuated by the differences in the relation of the state and the Party to each. The workers, and not the peasants, are included within the system of the state social security and social insurance. They are organized into trade unions which care for their welfare. They are a guiding force in the rural ranks of the Communist Party, and are generally treated as a superior element in the ladder of social groups, or, as the Soviet writers prefer to put it, as having a higher degree of "socialist consciousness." All this seems to indicate that Soviet authorities are concerned with consolidating the sovkhos to serve as an example for the kolkhoz peasantry by showing them the paths they should follow in order to become full-fledged members of the socialist community.



GRAIN SOVKHOZ MANAGEMENT

POWER RELATIONS

Sovkhoz Administrative Organization

Sovkhoz management follows the general pattern established in industrial enterprises.¹⁸ The sovkhoz, as the factory, is subject to the production-territorial type of management: it is a cost-accounting (khozraschët) unit; and its internal order-issuing power is centralized in the hands of one man ("one-man management," edinonachalie). In line with production-territorial management the sovkhozy, engaged in the same type of production and situated in the same area, are co-ordinated into trusts, which in turn are subordinated to the corresponding Central Board (Glavk) of the Ministry of Sovkhozy, or, in cases of some highly specialized state farms, of other ministries.¹⁹ In cases where no trusts are in existence, individual sovkhozy are directly subordinated to the corresponding Glavk. Under production-territorial management a sovkhoz administration receives orders either exclusively from the trust, acting under the authority of the appropriate Glavk, or directly from the Glavk.

The trust, as an operative management agency of the Glavk, is entrusted with the following functions vis-à-vis the subordinated sovkhozy: it (a) exercises operative, planning, and technical "guidance" of the sovkhozy; (b) determines the amounts of funds on the basis of which each sovkhoz draws its annual "production and financial plan"; (c) organizes all the work processes within the sovkhoz; (d) maintains direct and continual control over the fulfillment of production plans and the utilization of funds and credits of individual sovkhozy; (e) regulates the sovkhoz assistance to kolkhozy; and (f) decides on new construction projects. This indicates that there is no important function performed by sovkhoz management which has not been set by trust authorities.²⁰

Thus, sovkhoz "one-man management" follows the pattern of factory edinonachalie; the sovkhoz director is not a source of independent power, but a "transmission belt" through which the orders of higher government agencies are channeled to individual farms. As the chief guardian of state power in his enterprise, however, the sovkhoz director is granted extraordinary prerogatives in relation to his subordinates. His authority rests on the power delegated to him by the "state." This authority has been reinforced by the fact that the sovkhoz director is not subordinated, nor in any way accountable, to local Soviets.

The sovkhoz as a cost-accounting establishment is subject to regulations governing industrial enterprises.²¹ Here, as in the factory, khozraschët is "a method for planned management of the enterprise, genuine application of the regime of economy, mobilization and utilization of reserves, reduction of production costs, and enlargement of accumulation . . ." ²² The basic function of sovkhoz khozraschët is to provide channels for control by higher authorities to the end of raising labor productivity and reducing production costs. It is directed against the tendencies of sovkhoz management to "cut down" production costs by hiding capital reserves, reducing

the quality of work, and magnifying the projected expenditures.²³ In the sovkhkozy, as in the factory, *khozraschët* is less an expression of business autonomy than of a strong control by higher authorities over vital managerial functions.

Sovkhoz Personnel

The sovkhocz personnel is sharply divided into two groups: managerial staff and workers.

Managerial staff. — The managerial staff, by training and social status, is a part of the Soviet intelligentsia.²⁴ It is divided into three general categories: the top sovkhocz management, the management of individual departments (*otdeleniia*), and the management of sections (*otrasli*), into which departments are subdivided. The top sovkhocz management, the commanding staff of the enterprise, consists of the director and senior specialists, one for each field, mostly with academic training. The commanding staff may be divided into four segments: the director, the senior agronomist, the other senior technicians, and the chiefs of "paperwork" activities.

On the top is the director, who, in accordance with the principles of *edinonachalie*, bears full responsibility to the higher authorities for the work of his enterprise. He has the right to annul or to suspend any decision passed by the other members of management. He represents the sovkhocz in its relations with all state and public organizations. The hiring of workers is under his direct command as are the financial and material means of the sovkhocz.²⁵ The tendency is to appoint sovkhocz directors from among academically trained agronomists. The senior agronomist, at least in larger grain sovkhkozy, has the title of deputy director. He is the chief co-ordinator of the work of the top managerial experts and is responsible for the planning of work. He performs an important role in the drawing and implementation of the production and financial plan, as well as in the application of agronomic measures.

The third segment includes the senior mechanic, the senior zootechnician, and the senior veterinarian, who are in full charge of the sovkhocz machinery, livestock farms, and veterinary service, respectively. In sovkhkozy which emphasize livestock breeding, the title of deputy director is usually held by the senior zootechnician.

The fourth command segment includes the chief bookkeeper, who is master of an elaborate system of wages and premiums and the boss of auxiliary administrative personnel. He is in charge of the complex system which embraces all the departments and sections. Here belongs also the newly instituted chief of fuel, who, like the other members of the top managerial staff, is directly responsible to the director. Since 1950 in many larger sovkhkozy the position of agronomist-economist has been instituted. The function of this high-ranking sovkhocz official is to see that effected expenditures conform to the provisions of the production and financial plan and that the applied wage scale does not transgress the limits prescribed

by law. He also keeps his eyes on the work of the managers of various departments and reports to the director all irregularities and all signs of poor management.²⁶

These four segments should not be interpreted in terms of subordination of lower to higher. The top specialists are all managers of their own field and are subordinated only to the director. They can be scaled only in terms of the importance attached to their positions by government authorities. Although they may receive approximately equal "regular salaries," the more highly valued groups receive premiums on a wider range of work assignments. These add up to a higher annual income.²⁷

For a more efficient organization of work and for administrative expediency each sovkhos is divided into a number of departments (or livestock farms) each having its own management operating under the sovkhos administration. Each department is given, on an average, 2,000 to 3,000 hectares of land of all types. The management of each department (or stock-farm) is a replica of the top sovkhos management: the functions of each post correspond to those of the parallel post in top management. Members of the department management, although they are members of the intelligentsia, did not necessarily complete their academic training. The department manager is subordinated directly to the sovkhos director and he is granted the right of edinonachalie within his domain. However, edinonachalie here implies centralized responsibility rather than indisputable order issuing, for each member of the department staff is de facto subordinated to the corresponding official of top management. For example, the departmental agronomist is for all practical purposes subordinated to the senior agronomist. In line with their subordination, departmental managerial staffs receive smaller initial salaries as well as smaller premiums.²⁸ Although the director is granted the right to appoint or dismiss departmental managers he must first secure approval of trust authorities.²⁹ The department manager has five basic functions: (1) management of the production of each section embraced within his department on the basis of the sovkhos production and financial plan (promfinplan), (2) drawing up of working plans, (3) administration of accounting, (4) protection of property entrusted to his department; and (5) application of approved techniques for increasing labor productivity.³⁰

Each department or farm, in turn, is divided into a number of functional sections headed by technicians, mechanics, or brigadiers, the former two normally having secondary education. One of the section chiefs is usually the deputy manager of the department.³¹ The working plans of each section are drawn by department authorities. The section staff serves as an intermediate link between the top managers and the "workers-leaders," that is, the persons who are in charge of various groups but are classified as workers (brigadiers, aggregate chiefs).

The chief mechanic of the sovkhos repair shop is granted a status equivalent to that of the department manager. He is directly subordinated to the senior mechanic. The same status is granted to the chief of the supplies department.

Sovkhoz Workers. — The basic production processes in the sovkhoz are entrusted to various types of brigades. These, unlike MTS and kolkhoz brigades, exclusively employ hired workers. Administratively, the brigades operate within the jurisdiction of individual sections; that is, they are directly subordinated to the chiefs of these sections. There are three basic types of brigades: tractor brigades, agricultural brigades, and livestock brigades.

As a rule, a tractor brigade, operating five to seven tractors and necessary hitch equipment, consists of a brigadier, two operators for each tractor, and a number of hitch men and servicing hands. As in the MTS, current emphasis is on the creation of so-called aggregates as the nuclear units of production. Each aggregate consists of a small number of persons equipped with a tractor and a full line of hitch equipment. This unit is assigned to a definite piece of land and is fully responsible for its yield. On occasion several aggregates are grouped into a synchronized functional unit.

Field brigades perform their agricultural work by hand or by the use of horses. They are normally clustered around the tractor brigades or aggregates. In order to effect a strict division of labor and a more thorough control, field brigades are usually divided into smaller operative units identified as zven'ia.

Livestock brigades, which are strictly specialized, care for herds of individual species of animals.

In general, the workers of brigades and tractor aggregates may be roughly divided into three principal groups: "workers-leaders"; auxiliary, mechanical and technical staffs; and general workers. The first group is made up of men entrusted with leadership and includes aggregate chiefs (combine operators), repair-shop mechanics, brigadiers, and team (zveno) leaders. They are considered outstanding workers, men who combine technical skill and organizational ability. They provide the direct link between management and workers. The second group consists of the "mechanical" staff and the auxiliary technical staff, the former including repair-shop workers (turners, locksmiths, and welders), truck drivers, tractor operators, and hitch men, and the latter embracing auxiliary agrotechnical workers and office personnel. The members of the "mechanical" staff are usually referred to as mekhanizatory—a term which also includes several members of the "workers-leaders" group. The third group, general workers, may be conveniently subdivided into "classified general workers" and "unskilled workers." The former include all the persons who have acquired a definite status in the professional hierarchy although their work requires no substantial specialization. As a rule, they are not machine operators. Unskilled workers have no professional status; they work on servicing assignments (hauling of water of fuel, working in servicing institutions, such as workers' restaurants).

Whereas the first two groups of workers are gradually consolidated in a permanent staff, the third group is filled seasonally with large numbers of "temporary workers," that is, seasonally-employed kolkhozniki. A kolkhoznik working for the MTS retains his class status; a kolkhoznik

working for the sovkhoz becomes a "temporary worker" and is subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. Sovkhozy are presently trying to consolidate the third group into a permanent staff and the government has undertaken several measures to facilitate this move. Particularly important are those measures which have been devised to make life in the sovkhozy more attractive to kolkhozniki—the chief source of labor supply for state farms. The 1947 February Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to give each permanent worker 1.25 acres of sovkhoz land for private use (for building his own house and necessary farm buildings), as well as to advance ten-year government loans of from 5,000 to 15,000 rubles to persons building their homes. These homes become private property after the last loan installment has been paid. The same provisions have been made for all other members of the sovkhozy,³² but they are actually a concession to the "peasant mentality" of incoming kolkhozniki. Accordingly, they are an official admission that sovkhozy, despite the legal theory, are not composed only of intelligentsia and workers, but also of peasants.

Social Mobility.—Sovkhoz personnel, from top to bottom, are increasingly recruited from three distinct sources: (a) the managerial group comes from the ranks of the intelligentsia; (b) the mekanizatory are recruited either from urban workers or kolkhoz youths trained in special mechanical schools; and (c) general workers and mekhanizatory working on simple machines (tractor operators, hitch men) come from kolkhozy without any additional training

This differentiation of sources of man power is significant, for it indicates growing barriers against vertical social mobility, a trend also manifested in the other Soviet economic organizations. It indicates a gradual building of class walls between managerial intelligentsia and "workers-leaders," and between urban and kolkhoz workers. The trend does not at this time indicate, however, the forming of closed class groups. The intelligentsia is not, and is not designed to be, a self-reproducing group; it draws new forces from young peasants and workers, as well as from its own young generation. In the same way, the urban workers draw some new forces from the intelligentsia and peasant youth as well as from their own younger generation. Our analysis does indicate, however, that the class or group identification of a Soviet citizen is frequently determined in his youth.

Sovkhoz Party Organization

Each sovkhoz has a primary Party organization—previously identified as the political section—which in its form and functional assignments closely parallels its factory equivalent.

The Party organization [as the standard description goes] mobilizes the sovkhoz personnel for the fulfillment of the production and financial plans, for the strengthening of working discipline and for the development of socialist competition. It vigilantly guards socialist property, fights laxity and poor management, and attends to the daily tasks of strengthening cultural and living conditions of

sovkhoz workers and employees. Party members serve as models for the fulfillment of state plans and assignments.³³

In brief, it is the central and dominating force in the system of social activism and in the control network. The Party emphasizes that its sovkhoz units should refrain from issuing any orders, that is, from infringing on the prerogatives of the management, but they insist that through "comradel advice and critique" they "should help" managers to carry out their tasks successfully. "The Party organization and sovkhoz administration are placed in an active interrelationship, in a Bolshevik comradeship, and they endeavor to achieve the same task through different methods."³⁴ The Party organization, containing usually a very small membership—the sovkhoz XV let oktiabria, for example, employs a total of 510 workers, specialists, and administrators, although its Party organization has only twenty-four members and Party candidates—exercises its control over sovkhoz activities, administrative and otherwise, by placing its members at strategic positions in different administrative levels. The bulk of its members are recruited from the "leading cadres" of the sovkhoz. In comparison with its factory counterpart, it appears that the sovkhoz Party organization has a smaller bureaucratic summit and more outright command over the network of agitation, over the Komsomol, and over the trade-union bodies. Unlike the factory organization, however, its orbit of operation extends far beyond the sovkhoz itself. Under its auspices sovkhoz specialists lecture and give courses to the surrounding kolkhozniki, and the agitation groups (agitkollektivy) disseminate "knowledge" relevant to current economic programs. Like its MTS equivalent, it is the ever-active champion and the ideological forefront of the Bolshevik cause in the rural community

Sovkhoz Trade-Union Organization

The sovkhoz trade-union organization—the workers' committees (rabochkomy) and shop committees—does not differ in any important respects from its factory counterpart.³⁵ It is for all practical purposes an auxiliary of the sovkhoz primary Party organization. It is an effective vehicle of social mobilization: its function is to play "an active role" in "raising political consciousness," "cultural standards," and the level of agronomic knowledge of sovkhoz members. For the latter purpose it operates so-called agrotechnical cabinets where sovkhoz agronomists, veterinarians, and other specialists give lectures on technical matters. The sovkhoz trade-union organization conducts special propaganda among seasonal workers with a view toward impressing upon them the advantages of permanent employment, the best medium for a curtailment of excessive seasonal fluidity of sovkhoz man power.

SPECIFIC SOCIAL FEATURES OF THE SOVKHOZ

Because of the nature of its production and the distribution of its work through an area far exceeding that of a factory, the internal structure of

the sovkhoz deviates from the standard practice in industrial establishments. As a matter of fact, the sovkhoz contains some structural elements of the kolkhoz, some of the MTS, and some of the factory. It has field brigades and field teams (zven'ia), the units common to kolkhozy. It has its own pool of agricultural machinery, repair shops, tractor brigades, and agromonic staffs—the standard components of the MTS. It has a factory-like over-all management. All this indicates not only that the sovkhoz represents a unique type of economic organization but also that its over-all composition is quite complex. Although the range of hierarchized statuses is not so wide as in the MTS's, by reason of an "official" absence of peasant representation, it still displays a well-defined and clearly delineated hierarchical system. The sovkhoz provides an excellent example of the tendencies in Soviet society (a) to effect a thorough division of labor through complete "professional" specialization, (b) to identify each person in terms of his specialized calling (in agriculture alone hundreds of well-defined callings have been institutionalized); and (c) to classify the callings in hierarchical order. Thus, through specialization each person automatically acquires a title and rank, which are embraced within three general strata: the workers, the peasants, and the intelligentsia.

This general trend clarifies some recent developments in sovkhozy. The February 1947 Plenum passed two important decisions relevant to the consolidation of sovkhozy as socio-economic units. The first decision called for a discontinuation of extensive labor turnover in sovkhozy, and made it mandatory for individual farm managements to expedite the formation of permanent staffs.³⁶ Cutting down labor turnover is planned to accelerate specialization, reduce frequent changes of callings by "wandering sailors," and, above all, to expedite social integration through inclusion of all persons in established systems of rank and status. The same plenum made another contribution to "professional" specialization of work assignments in state farms by providing for the establishment of special training centers for sovkhoz manpower. These follow the pattern of centers for the training of factory workers (FZO).³⁷

The sovkhoz, however, in contrast to the factory, lends itself neither to the establishment of full "professional" specialization nor to a full curtailment of labor turnover because of the seasonal character of sovkhoz production. The grain sovkhoz cannot normally provide winter employment for all workers engaged in its summer production. The seasonal element is also responsible for the fact that full annual employment necessitates several specializations on the part of each worker. To give year-round employment to a permanent staff, the Soviet government has systematically trained versatile workers; drawn necessary assistance—through labor contracts—from adjacent kolkhozy during the rush seasons; and required seasonal specialization on the part of all workers. Thus, for example, a combine operator works on a combine during the harvesting season, and during spring and autumn plowing he may work either as a tractor operator or as a brigadier.³⁸

During the winter he may be provided employment by the sovkhos repair shop. Even though he may move seasonally from one assignment to another and receive different wages for various types of work, his social status is pegged to the highest position he has held during the year, the position which is his "profession"

Sovkhozy are considered urban settlements dispersed throughout the countryside and are continually open to the organized excursions of visitors from surrounding kolkhozy. Their cultural life is deliberately elevated above the rural amateurism of kolkhozniki; their parks are tended with more professional skill; their statues are more imposing; and their medical stations (medpunkty) are better and larger. Most sovkhozy have a secondary school as well as elementary schools. Their work is mechanized to a considerably higher degree than in the kolkhozy, and their farm buildings are bigger and better constructed. Even in dress sovkhos workers are set apart from the kolkhozniki who have retained more of the traditional folk costume. By its internal organization of labor and outward mode of life and decorum the sovkhos is intended to serve as a model of "consistent socialism," and as an ideological challenge to recalcitrant kolkhozniki, who, as experience has shown, prefer their kolkhoz ruralism to the hastily engineered sovkhos urbanism.

NOTES

1 I. Larin, Sel'skokhoziaistvennyi proletariat SSSR (Moscow-Leningrad 1927), p. 51

2. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 303

3. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev and V. Khitev, Sovetskoe khoziaistvennoe zakonodatel'stvo (Moscow, 1934), I, 152-53.

4. Ibid., pp. 161-62.

5. J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (11th ed., Moscow, 1943), pp. 485-86.

6. The February 1947 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party emphasized that excessive specialization in sovkhozy has not yet been adequately curtailed. N. I. Anisimov, Pobeda sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaistva (Moscow, 1947), pp. 35-36.

7. I. Matveev, "Proizvoditel'nost' truda v sovkhosakh," Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 11 (1939), p. 100.

8. Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950) p. 287.

9. M. Sokolov, "O ser'eznykh nedostatkakh kursa 'Organizatsiia sotsialisticheskikh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh predpriatii,'" Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No 9 (1949), 113.

10. N. I. Anisimov, op. cit., p. 37.

11. G. N. Polianskaia, Zemel'noe pravo (Moscow, 1947), p. 40

12. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev and V. Khitev, op. cit., p. 162.

13. Ibid., p. 162.

14. Prior to 1947 sovkhos workers were allowed only 0.37 acres of land and the managerial staff 0.50 acres.

15. F. P. Koshelev, Sotsialisticheskaiia sobstvennost' (Moscow, 1947), pp. 17-19.

16. The workday is designed to break down the kolkhoz work into its components and to allow for higher remuneration to the kolkhozniki whose specialized assignments require more professional skill. For more details see the chapter on the kolkhoz.

17. M. Kraev, "O kolkhoznom trudodne," Voprosy ekonomiki, II, No. 3 (1949), 35, I. Dvorkin, "Sotsialisticheskii printsip raspredeleniia po trudu," Bol'shevik, XXIV, No. 4 (1947), 42.

18. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, Administrativnoe pravo SSSR (Moscow, 1946), pp. 318-19.

19. Ibid., p. 318

20. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev and V. Khitev, op. cit., pp. 202-3

21. I. Dolotov, "Puti rentabel'nosti khoziaistva," Sovkhoznoe proizvodstvo, V, Nos. 8-9 (1945), 3-7.

22. I. Kantyshev, "Voprosy khozrascheta v sovkhozakh," Voprosy ekonomiki, IV, No. 2 (1951), 32.

23. Ibid., p. 36.

24. The following discussion is in terms of grain sovkhosy, the most representative state farms.

25. S. G. Kolesnev, Organizatsiia Sotsialisticheskikh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh predpriatii (Moscow, 1947), p. 579.

26. I. Kantyshev, op. cit., p. 42.

27. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, pp. 210ff.

28. For differences in premiums see the decision of the Council of People's Commissariats of May 29, 1941. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, pp. 210-21.

29. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev and V. Khitev, op. cit., p. 173.

30. S. G. Kolesnev, op. cit., p. 578.

31. Ibid., pp. 577-78.

32. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, p. 118.

33. A. V. Fedotov, Sovkhoz "XV let oktiabria" (Moscow, 1950), p. 144.

34. Ibid., p. 148.

35. M. Dmitruk, Profsoiuzy i pod"em sel'skogo khoziaistva, Professional'nye souazy, No. 8 (1949), pp. 7-11.

36. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, p. 118.

37. Ibid., p. 120

38. Vazhneishie resheniia 1938-1939, p. 160

IV THE MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATION

The Machine and Tractor Station (MTS), like the kolkhoz, is a rural organization whose working assignments fall exclusively within the realm of agriculture. But, unlike the kolkhoz (and like the factory), it is a state enterprise; in fact, it is the principal state organization participating in agricultural production. Its functions are not confined exclusively to mechanized agricultural work. It is also an effective medium through which the government controls the kolkhozy, introduces new agricultural technology, and incorporates the countryside into the over-all system of economic planning. Since the MTS is a state enterprise, it is identified as a "consistent" socialist organization, superior in its basic principles to the kolkhoz which follows the artel type of socialism and which in several significant respects is considered an "inconsistent" socialist organization. "The leading role of MTS's in the kolkhoz village is determined by the fact that they are enterprises of a consistently socialist type, that they work in the kolkhoz fields with the state-owned means of production, and that they apply the newest technology and provide a high level of mechanization of co-operative agriculture."¹ In brief, "the MTS is the leading force in the development of kolkhoz production."² In the words of a highly competent Western student of Soviet agriculture: "A Soviet MTS is not just a farm-machinery, custom-work agency but is a powerful arm of Soviet technical assistance, management, and control of collective agriculture, as well as a highly important fiscal instrument. Its role, therefore, in present-day Soviet agricultural economy can hardly be exaggerated."³

That is to say, the MTS in the Soviet mystique represents the "higher" socialist form of organization whereas the kolkhoz represents a compromise with the backwardness of the peasants. Furthermore, in this mystique the MTS is the tool for transforming rural society in a socialist direction. It is a unique work community where the urban, skilled, politicized intelligentsia of technology mingle with the rural peasantry. Its role is to transform the latter into workers. Its function is that of a mission or of a school of socialism.

Like the factory, the MTS is not only an economic production unit but also a part of the government administration: it is a unit in the chain of organizations under the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR. Although it operates on the principles of one-man management (edinonachalie), it does not carry on business transactions in terms of its own budget: it is not a "cost-accounting" (khozraschët) organization but is financed directly from the state budget, through the State Bank.⁴ Accordingly, it does not possess the amount of business "independence" granted to the factory.

The MTS's are now two decades old. In his report to the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, Stalin emphasized the Party's intention to sponsor mass-scale organization of local agricultural machinery centers in rural communities. Two years later, on June 5, 1929, the government passed the order for the organization of local stations. In 1930 the country

had 158 MTS's, and the number grew by 1932 to 2,446.⁵ On January 1, 1941, the Soviet government directed over 7,000 MTS's which employed over 2,000,000 persons⁶ or about 27 percent of the kolkhoz population. During the same year they performed 82 percent of the total kolkhoz plowing, 52 percent of the sowing, and 34 percent of the harvesting.⁷

MTS SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION

The MTS as a socio-economic organization has several features which give it a unique place in the complex array of Soviet organizations. First, it is not engaged in its "own" production; the servicing of the kolkhozy is its sole raison d'être. This implies that its management needs no administrative staff for commercial contracting, that is, for placing its "products" on the market, but that it requires an elaborate managerial machine for regulating the production processes and planning of kolkhozy.

Second, the MTS does not operate exclusively through its own permanent staff. Its tractor brigades are filled up by the kolkhozniki who, although under full control, and as temporary members of the MTS, continue to maintain membership in their respective kolkhozy. These temporary "employees" are not remunerated for their labor from the MTS funds or exclusively from the resources of their own kolkhozy; they are paid by all the kolkhozy in which they work.

Third, no other Soviet organization offers a more striking functional juxtaposition of the three basic social groups: intelligentsia, workers, and peasants. The intelligentsia command the organization, the workers keep the machinery in working condition and operate complex machines (threshers, combines, etc.), and the peasants run the tractors and hitch equipment. The first two groups form the permanent organization of the MTS; they are the advanced units in the socialist rural community. The MTS-employed kolkhozniki are the advanced peasants, but they are not as yet the workers of "consistent" socialism; their transition from co-operative kolkhoz work to "industrial" MTS work is temporary and their ties with the kolkhoz still determine their class affiliation. Yet the MTS provides the most graphic example of the Bolshevik search for a clear delineation of the intelligentsia, workers, and peasants in terms of officially defined "social valuations" of their functional assignments. In practice this means a recognition of a hierarchical arrangement of the social statuses of the three groups.

Intelligentsia

The MTS is managed and dominated increasingly by professional men with specialized training. This top layer in the MTS hierarchy is broken down into two clearly demarcated status groups: the production commanders who run the MTS as a unit, and the administrators who operate the various MTS sections. The latter include agronomists, engineers, political directors, and so on.

The top-level group embraces the following officials:

Director of the MTS. — Since the intra-MTS administration follows, at least in principle, the rule of one-man management, the director is considered the full master of all activities. He is appointed directly by the Minister of Agriculture. The February 1947 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided that in the future MTS directors should be selected from among persons having adequate knowledge of agrotechnology, mechanical processes, and financial planning.⁸

Deputy Director for Political Work — This position in the hierarchy of MTS personnel was established by the same February 1947 Plenum in an effort to co-ordinate the management with the primary Party organization.

Deputy MTS Directors for Political Work [rules the Party decision] are assigned the task of improving the work of MTS's and kolkhozy. They see that both MTS's and kolkhozy observe the [annual] agreement and that no hiding of deficiencies in these organizations should take place. Deputy MTS Directors for Political Work must improve the work of the MTS Party organizations and develop political and educational activity among tractor operators, combine operators, and other MTS workers.⁹

They, assisted by the Komsomol, are entrusted with the task of screening the workers and of sponsoring agitation in favor of adequate training facilities.¹⁰

Deputy Director: Senior Agronomist — The government instructions pertaining to crop rotation, depth of plowing, and rationalization techniques are channeled to the kolkhozy and tractor brigades through this official. His orders to the kolkhozy are a law which must be fully observed. Senior agronomists and agronomic specialists subordinated to them are gradually becoming the most influential persons in the organization of kolkhoz production. Through them the intelligentsia is slowly taking over the commanding posts in kolkhoz management. It is no longer an uncommon practice to "elect" individual agronomists to serve as kolkhoz chairmen.¹¹

Deputy Director: Senior Engineer-Mechanic — All the machinery of the station is under the command of the senior mechanic, who bears full responsibility for the distribution of equipment among the individual brigades and for the organization of repair work. He and the senior agronomist are entrusted with the vital task of co-ordinating all phases of MTS work.

Chief Bookkeeper — This highly important official registers and controls the work achievements of all MTS work units and supplies the State Bank with "progress reports" on the basis of which the amounts of quarterly cash advances are determined. He plays a leading role in the organization of "socialist competition" within and between MTS brigades.

These five officials, together with the chief of fuel, provide the commanding staff of each MTS. The director is a centralizing force, but the remaining officials have full command over the four well-delimited branches of MTS work. Although the principle of monocratic management is stressed, its application is not religiously observed: in fact, the organization is run

by four specialists with the director as the chief co-ordinator and controller, and as the principal representative of the station in its dealings with the kolkhozy. They are the highest-paid officials and have rights to free houses, gardens, milch cows, and poultry.¹² Their authority stems from the fact that they are directly appointed by the Minister of Agriculture or, in the case of directors for political work, by the Party hierarchy.¹³

With the exception of the deputy director for political work, who is under the district Party Committee, these officials carry out decisions which are made by higher government authorities and which are channeled to them through district sections of agriculture (*raïzo*). The Central Board (*Glavk*) of MTS's, a department of the Ministry of Agriculture established in 1947, is the central office co-ordinating the work of the stations and regulating their relations with kolkhozy.¹⁴ The details of work plans must be approved by, and formulated on the basis of the instructions of, the chiefs and chief agronomists of the district agricultural authorities.

The territory within which an MTS operates is divided into sections, including usually five to six kolkhozy, for the purpose of establishing a more efficient division of labor among various work units (tractor brigades, aggregates, etc.). Each section has its own mechanic and agronomist, who operate under direct instructions from, and control by, the senior mechanic and senior agronomist, respectively. This group of sectional managers also includes the chief of the MTS repair shop (MTM) and the mechanic for the complex farm machinery. Here belongs also the MTS secretary, the person in charge of technical-administrative work (the drawing of the plan, etc.).¹⁵ All these persons have specialized technical training and are chief organizers and "one-man managers" within their special fields, although their work is actually supervised by the corresponding top MTS personnel and district agricultural authorities.


With the development of collective Stakhanovism,¹⁶ the sectional managers are placed into more extensive contact with workers and kolkhozniki. However, their position as organizers and supervisors of "socialist competition" tends to emphasize their higher standing in the MTS hierarchy of social statuses.

Workers

In addition to the managerial staff, which by its training and social status may be classified as intelligentsia, the permanent MTS staff includes also a differentiated group of workers, classified as industrial labor. This group includes the operators of complex farm machinery, repair workers, truck drivers, and various other skilled workers engaged in auxiliary branches of MTS work (electricians, communication workers, etc.).

Closely allied with MTS workers and of equal class status are MTS white-collar employees (auxiliary administrative staff), and "dispatchers," who provide liaison service between the MTS headquarters and individual

MTS: FORMAL ORGANIZATION



tractor brigades. The basic function of the "dispatchers" is to strengthen managerial control over the tractor brigades which are dispersed over a wide area. They are equipped with wireless sets which enable them to maintain continual contact with the director's office, from which they receive orders to be transmitted to individual tractor brigades and to which they report instantaneously any irregularities in brigade work. This office is a comparative innovation and, when consolidated, will probably be staffed with members of the intelligentsia

All persons classified as workers and "employees" are directly supervised by the lower managerial subgroup. They form the rank and file of the permanent MTS staff

Peasants

The tractor brigade is the basic production unit of the MTS, the "field shop" Each tractor brigade has three to four tractors and necessary hitch equipment. Each brigade receives its seasonal assignments from the administration, based on the production and financial plan of the MTS. These assignments show the kolkhozy where the work is to be done and indicate the kolkhoz brigades with which MTS brigades are to establish working co-operation. For more efficient control and distribution of assignments, the persons operating one tractor and necessary hitch equipment form a working subunit, identified as an aggregate. This would mean that each tractor brigade is broken up into three to four functional units whose work is closely synchronized.¹⁷

The tractor brigades, and tractor aggregates, are manned by peasants. Over 50 percent of the over-all MTS membership is made up of the kolkhozniki, who are temporarily attached to the MTS and retain their permanent ties with their respective kolkhozy. They are considered members of the peasant class. Each annual agreement signed by the MTS (represented by the director) and the kolkhoz (represented by its chairman) stipulates the number of kolkhozniki to be attached to the MTS as well as their specific functions.

Among MTS workers, as among industrial labor in general, the term "kolkhoznik" has become synonymous with inadaptability to mechanical processes, general clumsiness in carrying out work assignments, and lack of sense for organized endeavor.

During their work with the MTS, the kolkhozniki fall completely under the administrative jurisdiction of MTS management.¹⁸ The kolkhozniki working for the MTS are classified in three vertical groups. The top group consists of brigadiers (the chiefs of tractor brigades), administratively identified with foremen of factory brigades.¹⁹ They receive tractors and other machinery from the MTS mechanic and return them after the completion of seasonal work. Since their position is equivalent to that of foremen in the factory, they serve as channels through which the work orders are transmitted to tractor operators. They are granted considerable independence in choosing the members of their brigades (with subsequent

approval by management) and some initiative in organizing and co-ordinating work assignments of their brigades.²⁰ Thanks to their position as junior commanders in the MTS hierarchy, their standing in their respective kol-khozy is usually high and their suggestions bear substantial weight in the meetings of kolkhoz administrations.²¹ The leaders of the kolkhoz brigades which work with the tractor brigade are directly subordinated to them. Each tractor brigade is the focal point of a larger working group which also includes several kolkhoz brigades. Although they are kolkhozniki, the leaders of tractor brigades are, for all practical purposes, well on their way to becoming workers, like the permanent MTS members.

Included in this leading group, but with a considerably smaller field of activity, are assistant brigadiers and auxiliary inspectors. The former provide assistance to brigadiers in matters of work organization and supervision, and the latter, established in 1942, keep the record of work accomplished by individual tractor operators and by the brigade as a unit, and control the use of fuel.

The bulk of the middle kolkhozniki group consists of tractor operators who are classified into two subgroups: senior and junior tractor operators. The middle group also includes the operators of various agricultural implements pulled by the tractors (the hitch men). They are directly subordinated to the traktoristy, and are considered "a reserve force from which are recruited tractor operators, combine operators, and other machinists."²² The lowest kolkhozniki group includes servicing squads engaged in hauling water, fuel, and other supplies.

This brief description of the various strata operating within the framework of the MTS shows that full functional specialization has as one of its by-products a clearly defined hierarchy of statuses. Each individual is given not only a specialized assignment in the over-all scheme of work but also a definite place in the status ladder. It has also been shown that all the statuses may be grouped into three general categories: intelligentsia, workers, and peasants.

I. Intelligentsia (Management).

(a) Top level

- 1 Director
2. Deputy director for political work
- 3 Deputy director: Senior engineer-mechanic;
Deputy director: Senior agronomist
4. Chief bookkeeper

(b) Lower level

1. Sectional mechanic; sectional agronomist
2. MTS secretary

II Workers

- 1 Operators of complex machinery; roving mechanics; repair workers; auxiliary skilled workers
2. Auxiliary administrative staff

III. Peasants

1. (a) Brigadiers
(b) Assistant brigadiers; auxiliary inspectors
2. (a) Senior tractor operators
(b) Junior tractor operators
(c) Hitch men
3. Servicing squads

The MTS may be considered a melting pot of social groups and classes in the USSR. The ostensible goal of Bolshevik social planning is to reduce, and eventually to eliminate, the barriers separating various groups. Experience has shown, however, that vertical mobility has been thwarted by rigid barriers. In the MTS, the "transformation" of peasants into workers has been impeded by the fact that the MTS can absorb comparatively few skilled workers and that it can provide only seasonal employment for kolkhozniki. The demand for specialization and higher schooling has made of management a comparatively restricted group. The dominant position of management has been strengthened not only by its identification with the intelligentsia but also by the prevalent Party policy of recruiting its commanding cadres from the educated group. Thus, the MTS intelligentsia hold the key positions not only in management but also in the primary Party organization.

MTS ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

MTS Management

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that any power of independent decision making in the MTS would be held by management. The MTS, like other Soviet organizations, has no self-contained power; it is a government agency and is fully subordinated to district agricultural authorities. Since the director and the managing staff operate in behalf of and under the auspices of the government, they are vested with delegated power. The director implements the decisions which are made by the Glavk authorities and channeled through the chief of the *raïzo*. In order to enforce government orders the director makes technical decisions relevant to the production plan and the organization of work.

As has been indicated, MTS management operates on the principle of *edinonachalie* (one-man management), but this is less rigid and contains more elements of "collegial management" than in the factory. Decisions, issued in the form of orders, pertaining to over-all work emanate from the director, who may act without consulting any of his deputies. Alternately, he may arrive at decisions by consultations, formalized as conferences, of which there are three types: managerial conferences, conferences of MTS councils, and production and technical conferences. The so-called managerial conferences, meeting once a week, are attended by the director, his deputies, and the chief bookkeeper, and serve for ex-

change and co-ordination of expert opinion on current production problems and weekly allocations of work assignments.²³ Conferences of MTS councils, consisting of MTS management and the kolkhoz chairmen, discuss problems of the interrelations between the MTS and the kolkhozy.²⁴ MTS councils are not only consultative bodies but also a channel for acquainting the kolkhoz chairmen with new government policies and plans relevant to co-operative agriculture. Finally, production and technical conferences, attended by management, brigadiers, and Stakhanovite tractor operators, engage in joint appraisal of the work of tractor brigades and consider innovations pertaining to the organization of work.²⁵

Delegated power vested in the director and MTS management in general has been gradually growing as a result of the increased concern of the MTS with the organization and production problems of the kolkhozy. It has already been mentioned that the annual agreement signed by the MTS and the kolkhoz provides for considerable "guidance" of the latter by the former. The MTS is one of the leading institutions through which the Soviet government exercises its command over the kolkhozy, introduces new agrotechnical measures, incorporates the artels into the over-all system of planning, facilitates the specialization of work assignments in agriculture, and controls the functioning of kolkhoz management. It is also an important agency through which the Communist Party carries on its organizational work in the rural community.

MTS-Kolkhoz Relations

During the last two decades the relations between the MTS and the kolkhoz, as expressed by the model annual agreements, have passed through four stages of development. During the first stage (1930-33), the MTS was assigned two tasks in the rural community: raising labor productivity in agriculture and accelerating collectivization through active struggle against the kulaks. During the second stage (1933-39), the MTS became the principal government institution for strengthening kolkhozy as socialist associations. The annual agreement became more specific in assignment of duties to both the MTS and kolkhoz. For the purpose of expediting the work carried out by both organizations special "production councils,"²⁶ consisting of MTS and kolkhoz representatives, were called into regular sessions. Since 1935 the annual agreements become valid when approved by general meetings of kolkhozniki. Nevertheless, they express increased MTS "guidance" in shaping production plans and recording labor productivity.

The third stage began with the promulgation of a new model agreement²⁷ by the Soviet government on January 13, 1939. The new agreement was designed to strengthen the "organizational role" played by the MTS in kolkhozy and to define the relations between these two organizations in more specific terms. For example, it includes, in addition to the over-all plan of seasonal work, the norms for quality of labor, the dates by which individual assignments must be completed, and the obligations of the kolkhozy

to apply government-promulgated agrotechnical measures. This agreement made it mandatory for a kolkhoz to supply the MTS with necessary manpower, regardless of whether it was to be used on its own land. It also made the MTS a dominant factor in shaping the production plans of each kolkhoz and in establishing direct government control over those kolkhozniki assigned to work on agricultural machines. It also legally empowered the MTS director to supervise the productive and administrative activities of each artel. This agreement was supplemented by the decision of the government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of January 13, 1939, whereby each annual agreement between the MTS and kolkhoz must be "registered" with the district Soviet authorities, which attaches to the agreement a "force of law."

The fourth stage began on January 27, 1948, with the promulgation of a new model agreement. In the words of a Soviet interpreter:

The new model agreement between the MTS and the kolkhoz is a powerful tool in the hands of the government for the improvement of the work of these two organizations. It fully expresses the state plans relevant to all types of work and terms of fulfillment. The agreement contains precise information on kolkhoz works which are carried out by the co-operative means of production. Precisely determined are volume, quality, and periods of work, as well as basic agrotechnical measures, system of accounting, control, expenditures, and mutual responsibility of the MTS and the kolkhoz for their adherence to the agreement. The agreement has the force of law, which makes its fulfillment obligatory for both the kolkhoz and the MTS. The agreement raises significantly the responsibility of the MTS and the kolkhoz for output and is an important means for further development of socialist agriculture.²⁸

In effect, the new agreement makes the MTS the central planning and controlling authority in kolkhozy. It is an expression of formalized coercion, making it mandatory for the artels to fulfill the government-devised production plans and to carry on their work in a government-prescribed manner. It gives legal sanction to MTS supremacy in co-operative agriculture and reduces so-called kolkhoz democracy to practical insignificance. At the same time the new agreement has been devised to solidify the MTS as a component of "consistent" socialism. Under the new stipulation the MTS director has been empowered to serve as the chief guardian of state interests in kolkhozy. He has also been made responsible for prompt payments in produce and cash by the latter for work performed for them by the MTS, and has been authorized to forestall any efforts on the part of artels to curtail their production.²⁹

The increased power granted to the MTS in its relationship to the kolkhoz does not imply a strengthening of its independent decision making. Decisions made by the director are actually concrete work orders derived from specific decisions made by the raïzo authorities, who in turn act as

the agents of the MTS Glavk and the Ministry of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, there is no decision passed by the director which cannot be annulled by the chief of the raizo, and there is no decision passed by the senior agronomist which cannot be annulled by the district agronomist. The tendency, however, is to facilitate the integration of the MTS within the unified government agricultural administration by shifting expert personnel from raion Soviets to MTS's, and by establishing as direct a contact as possible between the MTS Glavk and individual stations. The MTS, like the factory, illustrates the trend of growing centralization within the government administration.

Recent government and Party decisions pertaining to remuneration for labor, particularly those promulgated according to the recommendations of the February 1947 plenum, have aimed at (a) consolidating the piecework system as the most desirable basis for wage determination, and (b) ensuring progressively larger premiums to the individuals occupying the commanding positions in the MTS hierarchy. The institution of premiums has been particularly instrumental in widening the spread in the wage scale of MTS personnel. Thus, the director may receive annually, in addition to his regular compensation, from ten to twenty monthly salaries in the form of premiums.³⁰ On the other hand, if a brigadier's premiums raise his annual income by 18 percent, or an assistant brigadier's by 8 percent, they are considered worth newspaper notice. According to the new wage scale—expressed in terms of workdays—the range of remuneration for the members of tractor brigades has been widened so that the tractor brigadier earns on an average 2 5 times as much as a tractor operator.³¹

MTS PARTY ORGANIZATION

The Party hierarchy has always considered the MTS not only as an all-important factor in stabilizing and expanding state socialism in the countryside, but also as a gateway for the penetration of urban Party organizers into the rural community. During the first few years of the MTS's existence, the Party established its cells, composed almost exclusively of urban workers, in all of them. In January 1933, Stalin emphasized to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party the need for accelerated political work in the village in order to combat the rural forces which opposed mass collectivization. As a result, over 17,000 selected Party organizers were sent to the MTS's and sovkhozy; the Party cells were raised to the level of Political Departments (Politotdely); and the secretaries of the Party cells were raised to the position of chiefs of the Politotdely.³² In 1934, with the collectivization completed, the Politotdely were transformed into primary Party organizations. Thus a strict dichotomy between government and Party authority in the MTS was re-established. This organizational setup remained in force until 1947.

In February 1947, Andreev, the Politburo's agricultural expert, read a long report before the plenum in which he stressed several unfavorable

developments in the rural community, such as the weakening of the unified government power, extensive violations of the basic principles of socialist agriculture, unorganized selection of leading cadres, and so forth. His report was followed by a far-reaching decision to re-establish full government and Party authority in the kolkhoz village. One of the decisions called for an acceleration of the organizing and mobilizing aspects of Party work in agriculture.³³ Party organizers were sent en masse to the MTS's, the strategic Bolshevik spots in the countryside. The primary Party organization retained its old name, but its secretary was elevated to the position of a deputy MTS director. This gave him added authority in dealing with the kolkhozniki, strengthened the position of the primary Party organization as a control agency, and in general reinforced the political domination of the MTS over the kolkhoz.

As in the other economic organizations, the distribution of power within the MTS Party organization favors the members of the intelligentsia. Yet it appears that the role of workers is still significant, although gradually being curtailed. After the February 1947 plenum the Voronezh Regional Party Committee appointed 165 Communists to serve as deputy directors for political work. None of these Communists was a kolkhoznik; they were evenly distributed among the workers and intelligentsia.³⁴ Around each deputy director for political work is clustered a small number of experts (usually agronomists) who work out the details of Party-sponsored Stakhanovite competition, agrotechnical agitation, and political propaganda. In general, it can be said that the primary Party organization is dominated by managerial intelligentsia, that advanced workers are its functional backbone, and that tractor operators are its rank and file. This conforms to the current Bolshevik "theory" according to which the leading cadres should have higher specialized education, and the workers should be the vanguard of rural communism.

As in the factory, the MTS Party organization performs a triple function: managerial, control, and mobilizing. The managerial role has been formalized in the institution of the deputy director for political work, a feature not found in other economic organizations. It breaks any formal lines separating the Party organization from management, a separation which is very carefully maintained in the factory. This is one of the reasons why the Party press recognizes the flexibility of MTS edinonachalie in contrast to the rigidity of factory monocratic management. In the division of administrative functions the Party organization has been granted the right to screen personnel filling essential technical positions and to "suggest" innovations in the organization of work processes.

Originally the deputy director for political work was simultaneously the secretary of the MTS primary Party organization. The present trend is to have another person fill the secretarial position and operate as the chief assistant of the deputy director for political work in matters pertaining to intra-Party control and social mobilization.³⁵

The MTS primary Party organization is chiefly a unifying and guiding

force in the system of control and is the basic agency of social activism. As a control agency, it concentrates on the full utilization of all channels which bring the MTS influence to bear on the kolkhozy and also on the proper distribution of work assignments. Its intricate system for spying watches over all tendencies leading to the creation of informal groups. As a mobilizing agency, the Party organization runs the propaganda and agitation apparatuses, organizes "socialist competition," and leads political schools, seminars, and multifarious discussion groups. It is interesting to note that in organizing "socialist competition" the Party tries to apply the Stakhanovite techniques tried and commended by industrial establishments. At the present time special attention is given to hourly work schedules and to the creation of "technical councils" which conduct the technical aspects of collective Stakhanovism, and in which management, Party, and advanced workers are represented.

Until recently the Party hierarchy favored a comparatively small MTS primary organization. Moreover, MTS's without a primary Party organization were a common phenomenon. In 1947, for example, only two MTS's in the Voronezh region had organized Party units. During the last two years, eighty-three additional MTS primary Party organizations were established in the same region.³⁶ This is part of a plan to intensify Party activities in the rural community and to increase Bolshevik representation in the village.

GENERAL TRENDS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The trends in the development of the MTS reveal several significant phenomena which throw light on the trends in the development of Soviet society as a whole. Particularly important is the tendency to recruit the bureaucracy from the intelligentsia, thereby delimiting vertical social mobility and making the managerial group a comparatively inaccessible social stratum. The socio-economic position of the managerial group has risen as a result of (a) disproportionate increases in regular and supplementary remuneration, special housing, and other privileges;³⁷ (b) the Party policy to entrust the local Party leadership to "the commanders of production"; (c) the growing concentration of power in the hands of management in the direction and control of kolkhoz work; and (d) officially bestowed "social" recognition.

Differences between the workers and the peasants, the two officially recognized "social classes" of Soviet society, are pronounced and their statuses are hierarchized. Tractor operators, though essentially peasants, represent the transitional group between the two classes. It is significant that as peasants they are considered an advanced group of kolkhozniki, although as "workers" their position is peripheral to the realm of "consistent" socialism. The boundaries dividing the MTS workers and peasants are open, but vertical mobility is extremely slow for three reasons: the MTS demand for skilled workers is very limited, totaling about one million

workers; the stations utilize only a comparatively small number of kolkhozniki (about another million of the 74 million kolkhozniki); and for financial reasons the government prefers that MTS kolkhozniki retain their artel membership, for this implies that the bulk of their remuneration is drawn from kolkhoz rather than state resources. Brigadiers, although legally members of the kolkhoz, have crossed the periphery of the working class and receive recognition as organizers and managers of work carried out by their brigades, the basic MTS labor units. They are junior commanders of production and "one-man managers" within their groups, but their groups are made up exclusively of kolkhozniki. Management intelligentsia commands the personnel classified as "workers," but the kolkhozniki are technically "guided" by roving mechanics, normally recruited from brigadiers with distinguished production achievements.³⁸

NOTES

1. P. Kuchumov, "Ob uluchshenii podgotovki inzhenerov dlia mashin-notraktornykh stantsii," "Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo", No. 8 (1948), p. 15.

2. Y. Lovkov and M. Gumerov, "Ukrupnenie melkikh kolkhozov i rabota MTS," "Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo", No. 12 (1950), p. 32.

3. Lazar Volin, A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture [Agricultural Monograph No. 5], 1951), p. 57.

4. L. Galimon, "Mery ukreplenii finansovogo khoziaistva MTS," "Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo", No. 3 (1947), p. 7 ff.

5. A. Karavaev, "Sotsialisticheskaiia rekonstruktsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva," Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol. SSSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 854.

6. At the beginning of 1938 there were in the kolkhoz villages 1,402,949 persons engaged in the basic mechanical work of the MTS's and MTM's (Machine and Tractor Repair Shops). Of this number 943,000 were tractor operators, 120,000 brigadiers, 247,000 combine operators, and 215,000 truck and automobile drivers. A. Kuropatkin, "O prevrashchenii sel'skokhoziaistvennogo truda v raznovidnost' truda industrial'nogo," Bol'shevik, XXVI, No. 5 (1949), 53.

7. N. I. Anisimov, Pobeda sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaistva (Moscow, 1947), p. 42. See also Alexander Baykov, The Development of the Soviet Economic System (Cambridge, Eng.: The University Press, 1947), p. 331.

8. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), Kolkhoznoe pravo (Moscow, 1947), p. 368.

9. Vazhneishie resheniia po sel'skomu khoziaistvu za 1938-1946 gg (Moscow, 1948), p. 130. See also K. Zhukov, "O partiino-politicheskoi rabote v MTS," Bol'shevik, XXVIII, No. 5 (1951), 54.

10. "V sovershenstve ovladet' novoï sel'skokhoziaïstvennoï tekhnikoï," editorial in Mashinno-traktornaia stantsiia, No. 1 (1951), p. 6.

11. Y. Tsvetov, "Predsedatel' kolkhoza—agronom," Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo, No. 3 (1951), pp. 14-16.

12. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, p. 245.

13. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruksol (eds.), op. cit., p. 367.

14. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, p. 117.

15. B. Kikin, "O metodakh upravleniia proizvodstvom v MTS," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaïstvo, No. 3 (1947), p. 42.

16. See Chapter I, "The Factory," pp. 30-33.

17. A. Shushakov, "Brigada," Sel'skokhoziaïstvennaia entsiklopediia, I (Moscow, 1949), 248-49. See also S. G. Kolesnev, Organizatsiia sotsialisticheskikh sel'skokhoziaïstvennykh predpriatii (Moscow, 1947), pp. 576-77.

18. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., p. 365.

19. It is interesting to note that during the early 'thirties the brigadiers were recruited almost exclusively from urban workers and their position in the hierarchy of MTS statuses was considerably higher than at the present time. Sectional agronomist, sectional mechanic, and brigadier were considered "the middle commanding group of the MTS." I. A. Iakovlev, Voprosy organizatsii sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaïstva (Moscow, 1933), p. 5.

20. B. Kikin, op. cit., pp. 39-43.

21. T. Shakun, "Dogovor MTS s kolkhozami—osnova bor'by za vysokie urozhai," Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo, No. 1 (1951), p. 6.

22. A. Yarova, "MTS i ukрупnennye kolkhozy," Mashinno-traktornaia stantsiia, No. 2 (1951), p. 21.

23. B. Kikin, op. cit., p. 40.

24. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, p. 175.

25. B. Kikin, op. cit., p. 40.

26. D. M. Genkin and A. A. Ruskol (eds.), op. cit., p. 375.

27. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, pp. 170-75.

28. D. Kolpakov, Review of Vazhneishie resheniia po sel'skomu khoziaïstvu za 1938-1946 gg. (Moscow, 1948), in Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaïstvo, No. 8 (1949), pp. 55-56.

29. "Vazhneishiaia khoziaïstvenno-politicheskaiia zadacha," editorial in Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaïstvo, No. 7 (1949), p. 6.

30. P. Kuchumov, op. cit., p. 17.

31. I. Kuznetsov, "Opyt primeneniia novoï sistemy oplaty truda rabotnikov traktornykh brigad," Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaïstvo, No. 10 (1949), p. 20.

32. History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 317.

33. Vazhneishie resheniia 1948, pp. 129-30.

34. K. Zhukov, op. cit., p. 54.

35. Ibid., p. 54.

36. Ibid.

37 Vazhneishie reshenia 1948, p 245. See also D. Slobodchikov and P. Lezhnev-Fin'kovskii, "Agronomicheskoe obsluzhivanie," Sel'skokhoziaistvennaia entsiklopedia, I, 81.

38. Pëtr Nikitin, "Mekhanizatory sotsialisticheskikh polei," Slaviane, No. 9 (1949), p 45.

V. INDUSTRIAL AND ARTISAN CO-OPERATIVES

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT

Consumers' and producers' co-operative associations, two separate organizational networks, are the principal subdivisions of the Soviet co-operative "movement." For our purpose, consumers' co-operative societies, representing what Soviet authorities identify as a "lower form" of co-operation,¹ are not of special importance since they do not (a) reflect the social status and group identification of their members, for these are determined through production organizations; nor (b) contribute to an understanding of vertical social mobility; nor (c) exhibit any distinctive features in power sharing and the system of control. In other words, membership in a production organization is always the primary membership; membership in a consumers' association is always a secondary membership.

Producers' co-operatives are associations of primary membership in that their members are socially identifiable through their ties with, and work in, these organizations. The most important type of producers' co-operative, the agricultural artel (*kolkhoz*), has already been discussed. Following the same organizational pattern, but operating in other fields, are industrial and artisan co-operatives. These are officially defined as working people's associations established through voluntary pooling of the means of production and adhering to collective work, new technology, and socialist organization of labor.²

During the last three decades the Soviet authorities have worked consistently toward uniting as many independent artisans as physically possible into co-operatives, integrating artisan co-operatives into the socialist system, and transforming small enterprises into larger collective units employing mechanical power. The Party program promulgated in 1919 emphasized that the government should encourage artisans to unite into artels and that the latter should be assisted in the procurement of raw materials and credits.³ The Party considered this measure indispensable for preventing small artisans from growing into industrialists (and capitalists), on the one hand, and for supplementing industrial production, on the other. During the 1920's the industrial and artisan artels—the voluntary associations based on the pooling of the means of artisan production, collective work, and collegial management—became a recognized part of the socialist system. State mastery over their production and internal organization was established though not fully consolidated. The financing of co-operatives was effected through state banks and through budgets of republican and local government authorities. Thus the state acquired the power to regulate the development of artisan production and to co-ordinate it with other sectors of national economy. The artels were made fully dependent on the state in the procurement of raw materials, tools, and equipment. At the same time, the government established the practice of issuing mandatory directives

pertaining to the recruitment and training of co-operative members. Finally, the government began to include co-operatives in the annual national economic plans.⁴

Prior to 1922 artisan artels were not united into larger territorial-administrative alliances. Their work was not co-ordinated by higher co-operative bodies and the liaison with the state economic authorities was maintained through local Soviets. In 1922 the artisan co-operatives were merged into alliances, which were organized along production and territorial (regional, republican) lines, and in turn were subordinated to a single, all-union body: the Council of Artisan Co-operation. The alliances and the council were not government bodies, and yet in many respects they served as intermediaries between the Soviet authorities and individual artels. The artels which did not enter these alliances were known as "wild co-operatives," which during the late 'twenties embraced almost one-third of the co-operative artisans.⁵ At the same time, the government maintained direct contact with co-operative enterprises through its own agents in the local Soviets. Accordingly, the government regulated artisan co-operation through two types of intermediary agencies, the Soviet agencies and the co-operative alliances, each of which commanded its own pyramidal organization.

During the 'thirties there was a gradual shift of emphasis from the co-operative alliances to the Soviet agencies. The council was deprived of any operative functions and its work was confined to submitting suggestions for co-operative development and to "representing" artisan co-operatives before the state authorities. The government of the RSFSR was the first to organize the Chief Administration of Artisan Co-operation as a department directly subordinated to the Republican Council of Ministers and having its agencies in all districts and autonomous regions.⁶ This deprived the co-operative alliances and the council of a *raison d'être* and at the same time signified the full subordination of the network of artisan co-operatives to governmental control. This process came to an end in 1946 when the Soviet government abolished the council and organized the Chief Administration for Artisan Co-operation, an office directly subordinated to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.⁷ According to this decision, the artisan co-operatives of each district were subordinated to a "district combine of artisan enterprises" (*raïpromkombinat*), an office of the district executive committee.⁸

Among other trends in artisan co-operation, which bear directly on the place of producers' co-operatives in the Soviet economic system and which indicate some important features of the development of Soviet society in general, the following are worth mentioning:

1 During the 1920's the range of articles produced by artisan co-operatives was very extensive; they produced not only consumers' goods in mass demand but also factory equipment, tractor parts, and precision instruments. The trend since has been toward confining artisan production primarily to a score of consumers' goods. This curtailment has been calculated to facilitate over-all state planning of co-operative production.

2. From the beginning there were three general types of artisan co-operatives: the specialized co-operatives, engaged in the production of a single type of consumers' or other goods; mixed co-operatives (artisan-kolkhozy) which were engaged simultaneously in artisan production and agriculture; and co-operatives producing several types of handicraft articles.⁹ The government has worked systematically and gradually toward full elimination of the last and toward preventing mixed co-operatives from extensive development. The government's main concern has been for a systematic development and consolidation of specialized co-operatives. These can be most easily transformed into industrial establishments and follow the over-all pattern of strict specialization in industrial production.

3. During the 'twenties an overwhelming majority of co-operative artisans relied on "hand power." Gradually, the use of electric power has become predominant, transforming co-operative workshops into small "industrial" plants, and artisans into skilled workers. This means that artisan workshops have become training centers for skilled industrial labor and that co-operation has come a step closer to industrial socialism. During the first Five-Year Plan alone, artisan co-operatives supplied industry with 400,000 skilled workers.¹⁰

4. Consolidation of artisan co-operatives has been continually challenged by excessive labor turnover. In 1937, for example, 861,000 persons entered artisan artels, while 987,000 left them, which means that the labor turnover involved over 50 percent of all co-operative artisans.¹¹ This problem has not yet been fully solved, although, the government has compelled co-operative managements to apply various measures to discourage members from leaving their associations.¹² The prevalent practice is to release only those persons who are needed by industrial establishments.

According to the 1939 census, persons employed by artisan co-operatives, and their families, number 3,388,434, or 2.29 percent of the total Soviet population.¹³ Their importance in the field of national economy is best indicated by their role in production: in 1937-38 they produced 35 percent of the total Soviet output of furniture, 50 percent of sweaters, 35 percent of felt boots, 42 percent of metal utensils, and 33 percent of needle-work goods.¹⁴ The production of toys, musical instruments, and school equipment is almost exclusively in the hands of artisan co-operatives for the simple reason that these articles are not manufactured on a mass industrial basis.

THE PLACE OF PRODUCERS' CO-OPERATIVES IN SOVIET SOCIETY

The artisan co-operative is outside the realm of consistent socialism: its means of production and output are owned by the co-operative association rather than by the state; its subordination to state "guidance" is not direct as in the factory, but indirect, that is, through artel management; and, finally, the members of the artel are remunerated for their work from the resources of the association. As such, the artisan co-operatives are regarded by the Soviet power holders as convenient media for incorpo-

rating the traditionally individualistic craftsmen into the general orbit of socialism, as schools of socialist education, as recruiting centers for skilled industrial labor, and as potential industrial establishments. It is significant, in connection with the last-named aspect, that Soviet authorities have already established the practice of treating small local industrial plants and artisan co-operatives as one economic category; both are subject to identical government decisions relevant to the matters of production and distribution of finished goods. The current Five-Year Plan treats these two organizations as a unit.¹⁵

These points at which local industry and artisan co-operatives meet are significantly overshadowed by the points at which they diverge. Local industry is managed directly by the government, the latter being represented by local Soviet authorities.¹⁶ This practice is not applied in larger industrial establishments which are managed by central government authorities. The artisan co-operative, however, is subject to artel management of the type practiced in the kolkhoz, and frequently referred to as "co-operative democracy."

Artisan Administrative Organization

The "highest authority" in an artisan co-operative is the general meeting of artel members which meets at regular intervals. Within its jurisdiction fall such important matters as determination of production norms, acceptance of new and expulsion of old members, and drawing of production plans.¹⁷ This body elects the managing board and auditing commission, the first being an administrative office and the second a supervisory agency. The managing board functions as a collegial body and is elected by secret vote from among persons not related to each other by blood. They may be dismissed and replaced by other persons whenever the general meeting of artel members finds their work unsatisfactory. In turn, however, the authority of the board is expressed in the fact that it plans the distribution of work among the members and no person is allowed to refuse work assigned to him.

It is clear from what has been said earlier about the relations of government authorities to artisan co-operatives that neither the general meeting of artel members nor its executive committee (management) possesses any genuine power. They are front organizations designed to cover daily intervention by government authorities in every phase of co-operative activity. Whereas the general meeting is a mobilizing agency, the managing board is, for all practical purposes, an adjunct of the local Soviet authorities. As in the kolkhoz, "co-operative democracy" is a psychological concession to the pronounced individualism of artisans. At the present time, the district Soviet authorities regulate every phase of the administrative and productive life of the artisan artel, and "decisions" passed by the general meeting of artel members are scarcely more than repetitions or elaborations of orders received from the government. Moreover, although

labor conflicts are dealt with by the general meeting of artel members, the decisions of the latter body may be appealed to the co-operative office of the district Soviet, whose decision is final.

Artisan Labor

The organization of labor in artisan co-operatives has several distinctive features. The work is carried on either jointly in co-operative workshops, or individually at the home of each member, or through a combination of both. In the beginning, work "at home" was predominant, but at present the combination of workshop and home production is most common. During the last ten years, however, an extensive building of co-operative workshops has considerably reduced homework, and its full elimination in the near future is quite possible. Co-operative workshops are run as miniature plants. Although the provisions of the Labor Code concerning safety techniques and the safeguarding of labor are applicable to co-operative workshops, the extent of their actual application depends on the financial status of the co-operative.¹⁸

The artisans, engaged in a type of work which in many respects occupies an anomalous position in the socialist scheme of things, have been overshadowed by the three officially defined larger group formations—the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. Soviet writers, in giving statistical surveys of social groups, as a rule place co-operative artisans into the same rubric with kolkhozniki.¹⁹ In one important respect kolkhozniki and the co-operative artisans do form a social unit: their organizations are patterned after the same model (the artel), and both display features incompatible with "consistent" socialism. Neither group is entitled to membership in trade-union organizations,²⁰ and neither is embraced within the state social insurance system.²¹ Despite this identification, based on the adherence of both groups to co-operative socialism, the artisans and the peasants continue to be distinct social groups, if not "social classes."

Soviet writers emphasize that in several respects artisans are socially identifiable with industrial labor. Both are subject to an identical taxation system²² and to identical provisions of the Labor Code. Industrial and artisan artels, like factories and unlike kolkhozy, carry on their work in an even rhythm throughout the year; that is, their work requires no special seasonal concentration. For this reason their work is conducive to the same regulations as industrial establishments; for example, the introduction of the eight-hour working day in factories by the decree of June 26, 1940, was automatically applied to artisan and industrial co-operatives. Co-operative artisans are also subject to the same penalties for the unauthorized leaving of a job and for recurrent absenteeism. Again, like industrial plants, industrial and artisan co-operatives may determine in advance the pay rates for different types of work and can effectively apply the piecework system. As a rule, however, the co-operatives do not give their members special premiums for overfulfillment of planned output assignments. Moreover,

with the gradual identification of local industry and artisan co-operation by state authorities, and with the tendency to transform the latter into auxiliary or supplementary "industrial" units, the differences between workers and co-operative artisans tend to diminish. It should also be mentioned that, whereas kolkhozniki are absorbed by industry as unskilled or seasonal labor, the co-operative artisans are absorbed mostly as skilled workers. In determining the eligibility of former co-operative artisans transferred to industrial employment for old age pensions, full recognition is given to the time they had spent in artel workshops, which is not true in the case of ex-kolkhozniki.²³ This rule does not apply to co-operative artisans who were engaged in "home work." All this shows that although the kolkhozniki and co-operative artisans belong to the same general group of "social class"—defined in terms of socialist criteria—the latter occupy a somewhat higher position in the ladder of the socialist class structure; they are more readily transformed into the workers of "consistent" socialism.

GROUP DIFFERENTIATION

It is interesting to note that during the 'twenties the co-operative artisans were primarily peasants in habit, custom, and social affiliation,²⁴ but during the recent period they have tended to come closer to industrial labor. Their ranks have not, however, been consolidated into a homogeneous social group. Co-operative members can be roughly divided into four distinct groups according to the type of work they perform and the location of their enterprises.

The first group consists of those artisans who work in large metropolitan enterprises ("artisan factories") and have come closest to being identified with industrial labor. Examples of "artisan factories" are the Kotlotop-stroi, manufacturing boilers, and the Vpered, manufacturing leather goods. Both are in Moscow, and each employs up to one thousand artisans.²⁵ Also included in this group are artisans whose artels are adjuncts of large industrial establishments. For example, several items needed by the Gorky automobile plant are manufactured by local artisan co-operatives.²⁶ These two types of co-operatives carry on their work in modern plants which favor an industrial organization of labor. They represent the models to be followed and eventually emulated by other artisan associations. To this category belong also "fuel co-operatives"—the artels which specialize in extracting coal and other fuel resources. In the Kirghiz S. S. R., for example, there are nine small coal mines which are operated by producers' co-operatives. During the first eight months of 1939 these mines produced 45,000 tons of coal, or one-tenth of the entire output of co-operative coal mines in the U. S. S. R. during the same period of time.²⁷

The second and largest group is made up of artisans working in diminutive enterprises engaged in the production or repair of various consumers' goods. This group bears much of the traditional artisan identification as

a distinct social group. Its work is less susceptible to industrial processes than that of the first group, and its members are not so readily transformed into industrial workers. Economically, however, this group forms the most vital component of artisan co-operation because of the generally underdeveloped state of consumers' goods industry in the Soviet Union. The current Five-Year Plan calls for an expansion of the total share of local consumers' goods industry in national production. The development of small artisan co-operatives in the industrially underdeveloped regions has been particularly and urgently emphasized. The members of this group fall into two categories: those who work in special co-operative workshops and those who work at home ("home workers"). Although in the RSFSR alone there are still over 100,000 "home workers,"²⁸ the tendency, as already noted, is to eliminate this special category through gradual construction of co-operative workshops.

The third group embraces those artisans who work and live in the countryside and are engaged primarily in processing foodstuffs. Their co-operatives are also engaged in agriculture, which, however, is subsidiary to their main occupation. Their members are peasants for all practical purposes.

The last group is composed of artisans, primarily peasants, who are engaged in the production of various articles of decorative arts drawing their motifs from traditional folk culture and current Soviet themes. Over 40,000 persons, engaged in three hundred different types of decorative folk art, are embraced within the network of artisan co-operatives. Outstanding among their products are artistic miniatures on papier-mâché, bone carving (particularly in the Archangelsk region), oxidation art products, folk embroidery, and rug production (particularly in Daghestan).²⁹ In an effort to preserve the decorative folk arts and to blend them with modern life, the Soviet authorities have opened twenty-five professional technical schools for training of "folk-artists." It is interesting to note that whereas decorative folk art was traditionally an anonymous art, the present regime has inaugurated the policy of giving prizes and wide publicity to its leading "masters." The outstanding products of the best-known "masters" are displayed at numerous museums.

Internal social stratification within artisan co-operatives is less pronounced than in either the kolkhoz or the factory. Unlike the factory, the artisan artel (except for a comparatively small number of metropolitan co-operative giants) contains no managerial intelligentsia, and unlike the kolkhoz, it is not subject to a wide range of vertical professional differentiation, although each artel classifies all its members in terms of "skill categories." It normally employs neither persons with higher technical education nor persons without any technical training: all its members may be classified into those who have elementary and those who have secondary technical training. Engineers and other "hired labor" may be temporarily employed by artisan co-operatives if their service is found indispensable, but they cannot become artel members;³⁰ accordingly, their identification

with "consistent" socialism continues to be unchallenged despite their temporary identification with a co-operative. They, however, cannot constitute more than 10 percent of the total man power of the artel.³¹ Engineers and members of artel management are entitled to special premiums and, accordingly, form a privileged income group within the artel.

Although the Soviet authorities consistently emphasize their intention not only to preserve but also to expand artisan co-operation, they regard it as a transitory phenomenon which is intrinsically unadaptable to advantageous implementation of the socialist organization of work, labor discipline, remuneration, and control. In comparison with the factory, the artisan co-operative is not susceptible to total state control and has retained many outlets through which "capitalist" and "petty bourgeois" psychology find expression. For example, the agents of the district procurator are continually reminded by higher authorities to keep their eyes on co-operative embezzlements, which in the past have been a recurrent phenomenon. Some of these outlets, however, are not survivals of the prerevolutionary past—as the Soviet critics usually identify them—but unavoidable results of the official economic policy. In practice the artisan co-operative is forced to search for its "own" sources of raw material and for channels for placing its goods on the market, although in theory it is supposed to conform to the plan.

NOTES

1. A. P. Klimov, Sovetskaiia potrebitel'skaia kooperatsiia (Moscow, 1948), p. 9.

2. "Ustav kooperativno-promyslovoi proizvodstvennoi arteli," in L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev, and V. Khitev, Sovetskoe khoziaistvennoe zakonodatel'stvo (Moscow, 1934) I, 147.

3. A. Sen'ko, "Kustarnaia promyshlennost' v sotsialisticheskom khoziaistve," Planovoe khoziaistvo, 12 (1938), p. 50.

4. D. N. Shapiro, "Kustarno-promyslovaia kooperatsiia," in V. P. Miliutin (ed.), Kooperatsiia v SSSR za desiat'let (Moscow, 1928), p. 166.

5. Ibid., p. 148.

6. I. Vatenberg, Kooperatsiia v SSSR, Bulgarian trans. by V. Peneva-Tyagunencko (Sofia, 1945) p. 62.

7. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, Administrativnoe pravo SSSR (Moscow, 1946), pp. 28, 304.

8. Ibid. p. 304.

9. D. N. Shapiro, op. cit., p. 150.

10. I. Vatenberg, op. cit., p. 62.

11. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., pp. 28, 304.

12. Ibid., p. 304.

13. E. Davydov, "Naselenie," Bol'shaia sovetskaiia entsiklopediia, Vol. SSSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 67.

14. A. Sen'ko, op. cit., p. 53.

15. P. Evseev and A. Sen'ko, "Razvernut' proizvodstvo tovarov shirokogo potrebleniia," Planovoe khoziaistvo, 1 (1941), p. 13.

16. Ibid p. 13.

17. I. D. Levin and A. V. Karass (eds.), Osnovy sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947), pp. 436-37; I. Vatenberg, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

18. I. D. Levin and A. V. Karass (eds.), op. cit., p. 427.

19. See, for example, K. V. Ostrovitianov, Sotsialisticheskaia sistema khoziaistva i eë preimushchestva pered kapitalisticheskoi sistemoi (Moscow 1947), p. 4; A. A. Arutinian and B. L. Markus (eds.), Razvitie sovetskoi ekonomiki (Moscow, 1940), p. 446. It is interesting to note that the latter book, a capital study of Soviet economic development, ignores not only the problem of the social status of the artisans but also the general significance of artisan co-operation within the Soviet economic system.

20. N. G. Aleksandrov (ed.), Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo (Moscow, 1949) p. 365.

21. P. F. Kravchuk, Novo u radu zanatskog zadrugarstva u SSSR, trans. into Serbo-Croatian by V. Shtavlyanin (Belgrade, 1947), p. 20.

22. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, op. cit., p. 303.

23. I. T. Goliakov (ed.), Zakonodatel'stvo o trude: kommentarii (Moscow, 1947), p. 277.

24. D. N. Shapiro, op. cit., p. 154.

25. P. F. Kravchuk, op. cit., p. 10.

26. Nicholas Mikhaïlov, Soviet Russia: The Land and Its People (New York, 1948, translated from the Russian by George H. Hanna), p. 90.

27. I. Vatenberg, op. cit., p. 63. This would indicate that all co-operative mines produced in 1939 less than one-half of one percent of the country's total coal output.

28. Ibid p. 63.

29. P. F. Kravchuk, op. cit., pp. 14-16.

30. L. Gintsburg, A. Kosteltsev, and V. Khitev, op. cit., p. 148.

31. Trudovoe zakonodatel'stvo SSSR (Moscow, 1941), p. 590.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, AND OFFICIAL SOURCES

- Abrosenko, K Q sotsialisticheskom perevospitani krest'ianstva ["Socialist Re-education of Peasantry"]. Moscow, 1949
- Aleksandrov, N G (ed). Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo ["Soviet Labor Law"] Moscow, 1949.
- Aleksandrov, N G Trudovoe pravootnoshenie ["Labor Legal Relations"] Moscow, 1948
- All-Union Communist Party (B), The
XVII S'ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b): Stenograficheskiĭ otchet ["The Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b): Stenographic Report"] Moscow, 1934.
- XVIII S'ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b). Stenograficheskiĭ otchet ["The Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b). Stenographic Report"] Moscow, 1939
- The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow. Reports and Speeches at the Eighteenth Party Congress Moscow, 1939
- Rezoliutsii XVIII Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii VKP (b) ["Resolutions of the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the Bolshevik Party"] 6th ed , Moscow, 1941
- VKP (b) v rezoliutsiakh ["Resolutions of the Bolshevik Party"] 6th ed. , Vol I; Moscow, 1941
- Anisimov, N I Pobeda sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaĭstva ["Victory of Socialist Agriculture"] Moscow, 1947
- Sel'skoe khoziaĭstvo SSSR za 30 let ["Thirty Years of Soviet Agriculture"]. Moscow, 1947
- Arutunian, A A , and Markus, B L (eds) Razvitie sovetskoĭ ekonomiki ["Development of Soviet Economy"] Moscow, 1940
- Basiuk, T L. Ekonomika i organizatsiia sotsialisticheskogo sel'skokhoziaĭstvennogo proizvodstva ["The Economics and Organization of Socialist Agricultural Production"] Moscow, 1949.
- Baykov, Alexander The Development of the Soviet Economic System. Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1947
- Bienstock, Gregory; Schwarz, Solomon M ; and Yugow, Aaron Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture London, New York Oxford University Press, 1944
- Bol'shaia sovetskaiia entsiklopediia ["Bolshevik Soviet Encyclopedia"] Vol SSSR, Moscow, 1947
- Bratus, S N. Iuridicheskie litsa v sovetskom grazhdanskom prave ["Juridical Persons in Soviet Civil Law"] Moscow, 1947
- Denisov, A. I Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo ["Soviet State Law"] Moscow, 1947
- Deutscher, Isaac. Soviet Trade Unions. Their Place in Soviet Labour Policy London, New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950
- Engels, Frederick Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science [Anti-Dühring] New York. International Publishers, 1935
- Evtikhiev, I I , and Vlasov, V A. Administrativnoe pravo SSSR ["Administrative Law of the U S S R "] Moscow, 1946.

- Fedotov, A V Sovkhoz "XV let oktiabria" ["State Farm 'Fifteen Years since the October Revolution'"]. Moscow, 1950.
- Genkin, D M , and Ruskol, A A (eds). Kolkhoznoe pravo ["Kolkhoz Law"]. Moscow, 1947
- Gintsburg, L. ; Kosteltsev, A ; and Khitev, V. Sovetskoe khoziaistvennoe zakonodatel'stvo ["Soviet Economic Legislation"], Vol. I, Moscow, 1934.
- Goliakov, I T (ed) Zakonodatel'stvo o trude: kommentarii ["Labor Legislation. Commentaries"] Moscow, 1947
- Goliakov, I. T , et al (eds.). Besedy ob obshchestvennom i gosudarstvennom ustroistve SSSR ["Talks on the Social and State Structure of the U.S.S.R."'] Moscow, 1948
- Gorshenin, K P Sovetskaia prokuratura ["Soviet Procurator's Office"]. Moscow, 1947
- History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course New York, International Publishers, 1939.
- Hubbard, Leonard E The Economics of Soviet Agriculture London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd , 1939
- Iakovlev, I A Voprosy organizatsii sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaistva ["The Problems Pertaining to Organization of Socialist Agriculture"] Moscow, 1933
- Inkeles, Alex Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion. Cambridge, Mass . Harvard University Press, 1950
- Iudin, P. F Sotsializm i kommunizm ["Socialism and Communism"] Moscow, 1946
- Jasny, N The Socialized Agriculture of the U S S R : Plans and Performance Stanford, Calif : Stanford University Press, 1949
- Kareva, M. P (ed) Teoriia gosudarstva i prava ["Theory of State and Law"] Moscow, 1949
- Klimanov, A , et al Partiinaia rabota na predpriatii ["Party Work in the Factory"] Moscow, 1949
- Klimov, A P Sovetskaia potrebitel'skaia kooperatsiia ["Soviet Consumers' Co-operatives"] Moscow, 1948
- Kolesnev, S G Organizatsiia sotsialisticheskikh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh predpriatii ["The Organization of Socialist Agricultural Enterprises"]. Moscow, 1947
- Koshelev, F P. Sotsialisticheskaja sobstvennost' ["Socialist Property"]. Moscow, 1947
- Kravchuk, P F Novo u radu zanatskog zadrugarstva u SSSR ["New Developments in the Co-operatives of the U.S.S.R."'] Translated into Serbo-Croatian by V. Shtavlyanin Belgrade, 1947
- Laptev, I. Sovetskoe krest'ianstvo ["Soviet Peasantry"]. Moscow, 1939
- Larin, Iu. Sel'skokhoziaistvennyi proleteriat SSSR ["Agricultural Proletariat in the U S S R."'] Moscow and Leningrad, 1927
- Lenin, V I Leninskiĭ sbornik ["Collection of Lenin's works"], Vol XI Moscow, 1924-45
- Sochineniia ["Works"], Vols XXII, XXIV, XXV Moscow-Leningrad, 1929
- Levin, I D , and Karass, A V (eds) Osnovy sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava ["Foundations of Soviet State and Law"] Moscow-Leningrad, 1947
- Liapin, A P Trud v strane sotsializma ["Work in the Land of Socialism"] Moscow, 1947

- Mead, Margaret Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951
- Mikhailov, Nicholas Soviet Russia: The Land and Its People Translated by George H. Hanna New York: Sheridan House, 1948
- Miliutin, V. P. (ed.) Kooperatsiia v SSSR za desiat' let ["Ten Years of Soviet Co-operatives"] Moscow, 1928.
- Molotov, V. M. Doklad tov. Molotova na XVII Partkonferentsii ["Molotov's Report at the Seventeenth Party Conference"] Moscow, 1932
- _____, V bor'be za sotsializm Rechi i stat'i ["In the Struggle for Socialism Speeches and Articles"]. Moscow, 1935.
- Obolenskiĭ, K. P. Upravlenie delami v peredovykh kolkhozakh ["Management in Advanced Kolkhozy"] Moscow, 1949
- Ostrovitianov, K. V. Sotsialisticheskaiia sistema khoziaistva i ee preimushchestva pered kapitalisticheskoi sistemoi ["The Soviet Economic System and Its Superiority over the Capitalistic System"]. Moscow, 1947
- Pasherstnik, A. E. Kollektivnyi dogovor v SSSR ["Collective Agreement in the U S S R "] Moscow, 1949
- Polianskaia, G. N. Zemel'noe pravo ["Land Law"] Moscow, 1947
- Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, 1938-1944 gg ["Collection of Laws of the U S S R and of Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U S S R., 1938-1944"] Moscow, 1945
- Schwartz, Harry Russia's Soviet Economy New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950
- Selitskiĭ, I. A., and Khoi'skiĭ, R. I. Sbornik postanovlenii o promyslovoi kooperatsii i kustarnoi promyshlennosti ["Collection of Decisions on Handiwork Co-operatives and Artisan Industry"] Moscow, 1932.
- Sel'skokhoziaistvennaia entsiklopediia ["Encyclopedia of Agriculture"]. I Moscow, 1949
- Shepilov, D. T. Stalinskiĭ ustav sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli—osnovnoi zakon kolkhoznogo stroia ["The Stalin Charter of Agricultural Artels—The Basic Law of Kolkhoz Order"] Moscow, 1946
- Stalin, J. Politicheskii otchet Tsentral'nogo komiteta XV S'ezdu VKP (b) ["The Political Report of the Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of the Bolshevik Party"]. Moscow, 1936
- _____, Problems of Leninism 11th ed., Moscow, 1943.
- Studenkin, S. S. Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo ["Soviet Administrative Law"] Moscow, 1950
- Towster, Julian Political Power in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1947. New York. Oxford University Press, 1948
- Trudovoe zakonodatel'stvo SSSR ["Labor Legislation of the U S S R. "]. Moscow, 1941
- Vatenberg, I. Kooperatsiia v SSSR ["The Co-operatives in the U S S R. "] Bulgarian translation by V. Peneva-Tyagunenko.
- Vazhnei'shie resheniia po sel'skomu khoziaistvu za 1938-1939 gody ["The Most Important Decisions Pertaining to Agriculture, 1938-1939"]. Moscow, 1939
- Vazhnei'shie resheniia po sel'skomu khoziaistvu za 1938-1946 gg ["The Most Important Decisions Pertaining to Agriculture, 1938-1946"]. Moscow, 1948
- Venediktov, A. V. Gosudarstvennaia sotsialisticheskaiia sovstvennost' ["The State Socialist Property"] Moscow-Leningrad, 1948.
- Volin, Lazar A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture. Washington: United States Department of Agriculture (Agriculture Monograph No. 5), 1951

- Voznesenskiĭ, N Voennaia ekonomika SSSR v period otechestvennoĭ voĭny ["War Economy of the U S S. R. During the Fatherland War"] Moscow, 1948
- Vyshinskiĭ, A Iu Sovetskoe sotsialisticheskoe gosudarstvo: Sbornik stateĭ ["Soviet Socialist State, Collection of Articles"]. Moscow, 1948
- Weber, Max The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated from the German by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons New York. Oxford University Press, 1947.
- _____. From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. Translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Zakon o piatiletnem plane ["The Law of the Five-Year Plan"] Moscow, 1946.

II PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Sociological Review

- Inkeles, Alex "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950," XV, No. 4 (1950), 465-79.
- Moore, B., Jr. "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 1928-1944," IX, No. 3 (1944), 267-78
- Bol'shevik. Theoretical and Political Journal of the Central Committee of the the All-Union Communist Party (B).
- Editorial "Ispol'zovat' tekhniku do dna" ["For a Full Use of Technique"], XXVIII, No. 3 (1951), 1-8
- _____. "O merakh okhrany obshchestvennykh zemel' kolkhozov ot rashkhishcheniia" ["Concerning Measures of Protection of the Kolkhoz Public Land from Plunder"], XXIII, Nos. 17-18 (1946), 70-74
- _____. "O merakh po likvidatsii narushchenii ustava sel'skokhoziaĭstvennoĭ arteli v kolkhozakh" ["Concerning Measures Designed to Stop Violations of Regulations of the Agricultural Association in the Kolkhozy"], *ibid*, 66-70
- _____. "Politicheskaya agitatsiia—moguchee sredstvo kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia trudiashchikhsia" ["Political Agitation—A Powerful Medium for Communist Education of the Working People"], XXVI, No. 17 (1949), 1-9
- _____. "Povyshenie kachestva politicheskoi ucheby kommunistov—vazhneishaya zadacha partiinykh organizatsii" ["Raising the Quality of Political Courses for Communists—The Most Important Task of Party Organizations"], XXVI, No. 3 (1949), 1-6
- _____. "Shire razvertivat' bol'shevistskuiu kritiku i samokritiku" ["For a Broader Development of Bolshevik Criticism and Self-Criticism"], XXVII, No. 3 (1950), 1-7
- _____. "Vsemerno uluchshat' rukovodstvo sotsialisticheskim sorevnovaniem v promyshlennosti" ["For an All-Around Strengthening of Guidance over Socialist Competition in Industry"], XXVII, No. 9 (1950), 1-8
- _____. "Za zheleznuiu distsiplinu truda, za vysokuiu kulturu proizvodstva" ["For Iron Discipline, for High Culture of Production"], XVII, No. 13 (1940), 1-9
- Andreev, A. "Stalin i kolkhoznoe krest'ianstvo" ["Stalin and the Kolkhoz Peasantry"], XXVI, No. 24 (1949), 74-79
- Beliaev, N. "Podgotovka i vospitanie predsedatelei kolkhozov" ["Training and Education of Kolkhoz Chairmen"], XXVIII, No. 5 (1951), 61-67
- _____. "Pravil'naya organizatsiia truda—vazhneishee uslovie uspehnogo

- razvitiia kolkhozov" ["Correct Organization of Work—The Most Important Condition for the Development of Kolkhozy"], XXVI, No 13 (1949), 37–45
- Bolgov, A. "Trudoden' i ego rol' v kolkhoznom proizvodstve" ["The Work-day and Its Role in Kolkhoz Production"], XXVI, No 22 (1949), 52–62
- Churaev, V. "Rukovodstvo pervichnymi partiinymi organizatsiiami kolkhozov" ["The Guidance of the Primary Party Organizations in Kolkhozy"], XXVI, No 11 (1949), 24–38.
- Dvorkin, I. "Sotsialisticheskiĭ printsip raspredeleniia po trudu" ["The Socialist Principle of Distribution According to Work"], XXIV, No 4 (1947), 28–46
- Grishin, I. "Stalingradskaia partorganizatsiia v bor'be za vypolnenie velikogo plana preobrazovaniia prirody" ["The Stalingrad Party Organization in Struggle for the Fulfillment of the Grand Plan for Improvement of Nature"], XXVI, No 6 (1949), 23–35
- Khromov, P. "O rezervakh povysheniia proizvoditel'nosti truda v sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti" ["Possibilities for a Raise of Labor Productivity in Socialist Industry"], XXVIII, No 4 (1951), 22–31
- Klochko, V., and Furov, V. "Rukovodstvo partiinykh organizatsii kul'turno-prosvetitel'noi rabotoi na sele" ["Guidance of Party Organizations in the Cultural and Educational Work in the Village"], XXVIII, No 10 (1951), 82–88
- Kuropatkin, A. "O prevrashchenii sel'skokhoziaistvennogo truda v raznovidnost' truda industrial'nogo" ["Transformation of Agricultural Work into a Variety, of Industrial Work"], XXVI, No 5 (1949), 42–55
- Kuzminov, I. "Novye formy stakhanovskogo dvizheniia" ["The New Forms of the Stakhanovite Movement"], XVII, Nos 11–12 (1940), 35–45
- Leont'ev, A. "O sotsialisticheskom trude" ["Socialist Work"], XVII, No 13 (1940), 16–24
- Leskov, A. "Rol partiinoi organizatsii na proizvodstve" ["The Role of Party Organization in Production"], XVIII, No 2 (1941), 8–15
- Liapin, A. "O bol'shevistskikh printsipakh khoziaistvennoi raboty" ["Bolshevik Principles of Economic Operations"], XVII, Nos 15–16 (1940), 76–91
- _____. "Sotsialisticheskiĭ printsip raspredeleniia po trudu" ["The Socialist Principle of Distribution According to Work"], XXVI, No. 3 (1949), 49–63
- Mel'nikov, L. "Partiinye organizatsii ukрупnennykh kolkhozov" ["Party Organizations of Enlarged Kolkhozy"], XXVIII, No 4 (1951), 50–58
- Mikhailov, N. "S'ezd molodykh stroitelei kommunizma" ["The Congress of Young Builders of Communism"], XXV, No 8 (1948), 22–36
- Nemov, N. "Tekhnologicheskaiia distsiplina—nezyblemyĭ zakon proizvodstva" ["Technological Discipline—The Basic Law of Production"], XVIII, No 6 (1941), 25–34
- Podugol'nikov, M. "O rukovodstve zavodskimi partiinymi organizatsiiami" ["The Guidance of Factory Party Organizations"], XXVIII, No 8 (1951), 49–57
- Pozdniak, I. "Kolkhoznyĭ aktiv—opora partiinykh organizatsii na sele" ["The Kolkhoz Aktiv—The Prop of Party Organizations in the Village"], XXVI, No. 2 (1949), 49–58
- Prots'ko, M. "Intelligentsiia strany sotsializma" ["Intelligentsia of the Socialist Country"], XXVI, No 6 (1949), 9–22

- Shepilov, D. "K novomu pod'ĕmu kolkhoznogo proizvodstva" ["Toward a New Rise of Kolkhoz Production"], XVII, No. 10 (1940), 23-37.
- "Stalin—tvorets kolkhoznogo stroia SSSR" ["Stalin—The Creator of the Kolkhoz Regime in the U S S R"], XXVI, No. 23, (1949), 66-84
- Shitarev, G. "Rol' i znachenie partiinykh sobraniĭ" ["The Role and Importance of Party Meetings"], XXVI, No. 11 (1949), 53-60
- Shvernik, N. "O perekhode na vos'michasovoi rabochii den'" ["Transition to an Eight-Hour Working Day"], XVII, No. 11-12, 1940, 6-13.
- Slepov, L. "O bol'shevistskom metode rukovodstva khoziaĭstvennymi organami" ["Bolshevik Methods of Guidance in Economic Institutions"], XXVIII, No. 2 (1951), 47-55
- "O bol'shevistskom stile v partiinoi rabote" ["The Bolshevik Style in Party Work"], XXVI, No. 18 (1949), 27-41.
- Sokolov, E. "Sovetskie profsoiuzy—shkola kommunizma" ["Soviet Trade Unions—The School of Communism"], XXVI, No. 2 (1949), 34-48.
- Storozhev, I., and Slepov, L. "Proverka ispolneniia—vazhneishaia zadacha partiinykh organizatsii" ["Fulfillment Control—The Most Important Function of Party Organizations"], XVIII, No. 9 (1941), 12-26.
- Zhukov, K. "O partiino-politicheskoĭ rabote v MTS" ["Party and Political Work in the MTS"], XXVIII, No. 5 (1951), 53-60,
- Zhukovskii, Y. "Edinonachalie—osnovnoi metod upravleniia sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti" ["One-Man Management—The Basic Administrative Method in Socialist Industry"], XVII, No. 17 (1940), 16-25.
- Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR Otdeleniie ekonomiki i prava ["Reports of the Academy of Sciences of the U S S R. The Economics and Law Section"]
- Aleksandrov, N. G. "Obshchestvenno-trudovye otnosheniia i pravo" ["Social and Labor Relations and Law"], No. 5 (1946), p. 362
- Berri, L. I. "K voprosu o razdelenii truda v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve" ["The Question of the Division of Labor in Socialist Society"], No. 3 (1947), pp. 155-72
- Izvestiia Vsesoiuznogo geograficheskogo obshchestva ["Reports of the All-Union Geographical Society"]
- Konstantinov, O. A. "Tempy rosta gorodov SSSR i kapitalisticheskikh stran'" ["The Tempo of Urban Growth in the U S S R and Capitalistic Countries"], Vol. 81, No. 6 (1949), 577-83
- Tazikhina, L. V. "Po kolkhozam Gor'kovskoi oblasti" ["In the Kolkhozy of the Gorky Region"], Vol. 81, No. 3 (1949), 337-42.
- Kolkhoznoe proizvodstvo ["Kolkhoz Production"] A publication of the Ministry of Agriculture of the U S S R
- Editorial "Proizvodstvennaia brigada—osnovnaia forma organizatsii truda" ["The Production Brigade—The Basic Form of Work Organization"], No. 3 (1951), pp. 1-2
- Davydenko, P. "Oplata truda kolkhoznikov s uchĕtom urozhainosti kul'tur i produktivnosti skota" ["Payment for Work of Kolkhozniki according to Crop Yields and Livestock Productivity"], No. 3 (1951), pp. 11-13.
- Semenova, E. "Organizatsiia i ukрупnenie proizvodstvennykh brigad v kolkhoze" ["The Organization and Enlargement of Production Brigades in Kolkhozy"], No. 3 (1951), pp. 9-10
- Shakun, T. "Dogovor MTS s kolkhozami—osnova bor'by za vysokie urozhai'" ["MTS Contract with Kolkhozy—The Basic Factor in the Struggle for High Yields"], No. 1 (1951), pp. 5-7

- Tsvetov, Y "Predsedatel' kolkhoza—agronom" ["A Kolkhoz Chairman—Agronomist"], No 3 (1951), pp. 14–16
- Ural'skiĭ, A "Obshchestvennye sredstva proizvodstva—osnova bogatstva kolkhozov" ["The Public Means of Production—The Basis of Kolkhoz Wealth"], No 3 (1951), pp. 3–5
- Vybornyĭ, N "Khoziaĭstvennye itogi i perspektivy razvitiia ukрупnennogo kolkhoza," ["Economic Results and Perspectives of the Development of Enlarged Kolkhozy"], No 3 (1951), pp. 6–8
- Literaturnaiia gazeta ["Literary Gazette"]
- "Novyiĭ adres chebashikhintsev" ["A New Address of Chebashikhintsev"], January 11, 1951, p. 2
- Mashinno-traktornaiia stantsiia ["Machine and Tractor Station"]. A publication of the Ministry of Agriculture of the U S S R.
- Editorial "V sovershenstve ovladet' novoi sel'skokhoziaĭstvennoi tekhnikoĭ" ["Toward a Perfect Command over the New Agricultural Technique"], No 1 (1951), pp. 3–6
- Yarova, A "MTS i ukрупnennye kolkhozy" ["MTS and Enlarged Kolkhozy"], No 2 (1951), pp. 20–25
- New York Times
- Schwartz, Harry Report, December 4, 1951, p. 10
- Novyiĭ mir ["New World"]
- Gorelik, I. "Stalinskiĭ laureat. Dokumental'naiia povest' " ["The Stalin Laureate A Documented Story"], No 12 (1949), pp. 102–74
- Oktiabr' [October]
- Kolesnikova, G "Povest' o novoi sel'skoĭ intelligentsii" ["A Story About the New Rural Intelligentsia"], No 3 (1949), pp. 179–80
- Rossiĭskii, Nikolaĭ "Novye gorizonty" ["New Horizons"], No 9 (1949), pp. 160–70
- _____ "Trud i mir ["Work and Peace"], No 9 (1950), 180–97
- Planovoe khoziaĭstvo ["Planned Economy"] Political-economic Journal of the State Planning Commission of the U S S R
- Aristov, N "Organizovannyĭ nabor rabocheĭ sily" ["Organized Recruitment of Workers"], No 11 (1939), pp. 89–99
- Baranov, I "Khoziaĭstvennyiĭ dogovor—orudie vypolneniia gosudarstvennykh planov" ["Business Contract—A Means for the Fulfillment of State Plans"], No 5 (1949), pp. 63–72
- Evseev, P., and Sen'ko, A "Razvernut' proizvodstvo tovarov shirokogo potrebleniia" ["For an Increase of the Production of Mass Consumption Goods"], No 1 (1941), pp. 13–27
- Gaponenko, G "Organizatsiia i oplata truda v kolkhozakh" ["Organization of, and Payments for, Work in Kolkhozy"], No 5 (1949), pp. 47–62
- Grigor'ev, A "Novye formy sotsialisticheskogo truda" ["The New Forms of Socialist Work"], No 9 (1939), pp. 27–37
- Ivanov, P "O vnedrenii sredneprognoznnykh norm v promyshlennosti" ["Concerning the Fixing of the Average Rate of Production in Industry"], No 4 (1947), p. 47
- Kosiachenko, G "Gosudarstvennyiĭ plan—nerushimyi zakon" ["The State Plan—An Inviolable Law"], No 1 (1951), pp. 34–46
- Malenkov, G "O zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii v oblasti promyshlennosti i transporta" ["The Functions of Party Organizations in the Fields of Industry and Transportation"], No 3 (1941), pp. 3–27

- Matveev, I "Proizvoditel'nost' truda v sovkhozakh" ["Labor Productivity in State Farms"], No 11 (1939), pp 100-111.
- Orlikova, E "Zhenskii trud v SSSR" ["Women's Work in the U. S. S. R."], No 10 (1939), pp 107-20
- Peremiagin, F, and Sen'ko, A "Mestnaia promyshlennost' i zadachi mestnykh sovetskikh organov" ["Local Industry and the Tasks of Local Soviets"], No 9 (1939), pp. 112-22
- "Rezoliutsiia po dokladu tov. Malenkova, primataia XVIII Vsesoiuznoi konferentsiei VKP (b)" ["Resolution on the Report of Comrade Malenkov: Adopted by the Eighteenth Conference of the All-Union Communist Party (B)"], No 3 (1941), pp 48-56.
- Sen'ko, A "Kustarnaia promyshlennost' v sotsialisticheskom khoziaistve" ["Artisan Industry in Socialist Economy"], No 12 (1938), pp. 48-58
- Sonin, M. "Organizovannyi nabor rabochei sily dlia promyshlennosti" ["Organized Recruitment of Manpower for Industry"], No 5 (1941), pp. 66-74
- Pod znamenem marksizma ["Under the Banner of Marxism"]
- Baskin, M "Prinuzhdenie i ubezhdenie pri sotsializme" ["Coercion and Persuasion Under Socialism"], No 2 (1941), pp. 11-26
- Kheinman, S "O vosproizvodstve rabochei sily pri kapitalizme i pri sotsializme" ["Labor Productivity Under Capitalism and Under Socialism"], No 3 (1941), pp. 27-55
- Pravda ["Truth"]
- Khrushchev, N S "O nekotorykh voprosakh dal'neishego organizatsionno-khoziaistvennogo ukrepleniia kolkhozov" ["Certain Questions Concerning the Further Organizational and Economic Strengthening of Kolkhozy"], April 25, 1950, p 2.
- See also the issues of September 26, 1946, and October 9, 1946.
- Problemy ekonomiki ["Economic Problems"]
- Editorial "O roli мастера na proizvodstve" ["Concerning the Role of the Foreman in Industry"], XII, No 7 (1940), 17-21.
- Dem'ianova, N "K istorii kolkhoznogo trudodnia" ["Toward a History of the Workday"], XII, Nos. 5-6 (1940), 191-203
- Karavaev, A "Sel'skoe khoziaistvo v period bor'by partii za sotsialisticheskuiu industrializatsiiu strany" ["Agriculture During the Period of the Party's Struggle for Industrialization of the Country"], XI, No 5 (1939), 158-75
- Kheinman, S "Ob izlshkakh rabochei sily i o proizvoditel'nosti truda" ["Manpower Surplus and Labor Productivity"], XII, Nos 11-12 (1940), 102-29
- Lokshin, E "Organizatsionnye problemy promyshlennosti SSSR" ["The Organizational Problems of Soviet Industry"], XI, No. 4 (1939), 39-53.
- Markus, B "Uslovnye voprosy organizatsii truda v tret'eii piatiletke" ["The Basic Problems in the Organization of Work During the Third Five-Year Plan"], XI, No 3 (1939), 152-66
- Orlikova, E "Sovetskaiia zhenshchina v obshchestvennom proizvodstve" ["The Soviet Woman in Public Production"], XIII, No. 7 (1940), 106-22.
- Ostrovitianov, K "Ob osnovnykh tipakh proizvodstvennykh otnoshenii" ["The Basic Types of Production Relations"], XI, No 5 (1939), 176-95.
- Pogostin, S "Stakhanovskoe dvizhenie i zadachi tekhnicheskogo normirovaniia" ["The Stakhanovite Movement and the Functions of Technical Norm-Setting"], XI, No. 1 (1939), 125-36.

Shepilov, D. "Sotsialisticheskaia sobstvennost'—osnova kolkhoznogo stroia" ["Socialist Property—The Basis of Kolkhoz Organization"], XI, No. 4 (1939), 9–23

Trubnikov, S. "Istochniki komplektovaniia rabochei sily v SSSR" ["Sources of Supplementary Labor Forces in the U S S R"], XI, No. 6 (1939), 145–59

— "Podgotovka kvalifitsirovannykh rabochikh v promyshlennosti SSSR" ["Training of Skilled Industrial Labor in the U S S R"], XII, Nos. 11–12 (1940), 130–41

Professional'nye soiuzy ["Trade Unions"]

Dmitruk, M. "Profsoiuzy i pod'em sel'skogo khoziaistva" ["Trade Unions and the Development of Agriculture"], No. 8 (1949), pp. 7–11

Osipov, A. "Kollektivnye dogovory na 1950 god" ["Collective Agreements in 1950"], No. 1 (1950), pp. 16–19

Sokolov, E. "Kritika i samokritika—bol'shevistskii metod vospitaniia kadrov" ["Criticism and Self-criticism—The Bolshevik Method of Training the Specialist"], No. 1 (1950), pp. 20–25

"Ustav professionalnykh soiuзов SSSR (27 april' 1949)" ["The Charter of the Trade Unions of the U S S R"], No. 5 (1949), pp. 19–25.

Slaviane

Nikitin, Pëtr. "Mekhanizatory sotsialisticheskikh polei" ["Mechanizers of Socialist Fields"], No. 9 (1949), pp. 43–46

Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo ["Socialist Agriculture"] Publication of the Ministry of Agriculture of the U S S R

Editorial. "Dvadsat' let stroitel'stva mashinno-traktornykh stantsii" ["Twenty Years of Building the Machine and Tractor Stations"], No. 6 (1949), pp. 3–6.

— "Kolkhoznaia derevnia pered vyborami v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR" ["The Kolkhoz Village Before the Elections for the Supreme Soviet of the U S S R"], No. 2 (1950), pp. 3–6

— "Osnovnoi zakon kolkhoznoi zhizni" ["The Basic Law of Kolkhoz Life"], No. 3 (1950), pp. 3–9

— "Vazhneishaiia khoziaistvenno-politicheskaia zadacha" ["The Most Important Economic-political Task"], No. 7 (1949), pp. 3–7

Abramov, V., and Ermolinskiĭ, I. "Ob upravlencheskom apparate v kolkhozakh" ["The Kolkhoz Administrative Apparatus"], No. 2, (1947), pp. 21–27

Benediktov, I. "Bol'shevistskaia programma rastsveta sotsialisticheskogo zhivotnovodstva" ["The Bolshevik Program for the Development of Socialist Animal Husbandry"], No. 5 (1949), pp. 9–17

Chuvikov, V. "O vnutrikkolkhoznoi demokratii" ["Internal Democracy in Kolkhozy"], No. 6 (1946), pp. 8–15

Florent'ev, L., and Bochkarev, I. "Organizatsionno-khoziaistvennoe ustroistvo ukрупnennykh kolkhozov" ["Organizational and Economic Structure of Enlarged Kolkhozy"], No. 12 (1950), pp. 42–54

Galimon, L. "Mery ukrepleniia finansovogo khoziaistva MTS" ["Measures for an Improvement of the Financial Economy of MTS's"], No. 3 (1947), pp. 7–17

Grigor'ev, V. "Voprosy upravleniia delami sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli" ["Administrative Problems of Agricultural Artels"], No. 1 (1950), pp. 62–64

- Gusman, L. "Sokrashcheniia upravlencheskogo apparata v kolkhozakh" ["Reduction of Administrative Apparatuses in Kolkhozy"], No. 5 (1949), pp 60-62.
- Kaminskiĭ, A., and Obolenskiĭ, K. "Razvitie obshchestvennogo khoziaĭstva vпередovykh kolkhozakh" ["The Development of Public Economy in Advanced Kolkhozy"], No. 9 (1949), pp 29-42.
- Kikin, B. "O metodakh upravleniia proizvodstvom v MTS" ["The Methods of Production Management in the MTS"], No. 3 (1947), pp. 39-43.
- Kolesnev, S. "Nekotorye dannye o preimushchestvakh krupnykh kolkhozov" ["Some Facts on the Superiority of Large Kolkhozy"], No. 10 (1950), pp 17-22.
- Kolpakov, D. Review of Vazhneišie resheniia po sel'skomu khoziaĭstvu za 1938-1946 gg ["The Most Important Decisions Pertaining to Agriculture for 1938-1946"], No. 8 (1949), pp 53-59.
- Koshelev, F. "Demokraticheskie osnovy upravleniia delami sel'sko-khoziaĭstvennoi arteli" ["Democratic Bases of Kolkhoz Management"], No. 7 (1947), pp 17-26.
- _____. "Novyi etap sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia v kolkhoznoi derevne" ["The New Phase of Socialist Competition in the Kolkhoz Village"], No. 8 (1948), pp. 7-14.
- Kuchumov, P. "Ob uluchsheniĭ podgotovki inzhenerov dlia mashinno-traktornykh stantsii" ["Improvement in the Training of Engineers for the Machine and Tractor Stations"], No. 8 (1948), pp 15-21.
- Kuvshinov, I. "Ukrupnenie melkikh kolkhozov—put' k novomu moshchnomu pod'ĕmu sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaĭstva" ["The Consolidation of Small Kolkhozy Is the Way to a New Powerful Development of Socialist Agriculture"], No. 8 (1950), pp 24-28.
- Kuznetsov, I. "Opyt primeneniia novoi sistemy oplaty truda rabotnikov traktornykh brigad" ["Experience in the Application of the New System of Payments for Work in Tractor Brigades"], No. 10 (1949), pp. 18-27.
- Laptev, I. "Likvidatsiia protivopolozhnosti mezhdu gorodom i derevnei v SSSR" ["Elimination of the Contrast Between the City and the Village in the U. S. S. R. "], No. 10 (1951), pp 9-21.
- _____. "Sotsialisticheskie formy organizatsii truda v kolkhozakh i ikh preimushchestva" ["Socialist Forms of Work Organization in Kolkhozy and Their Advantages"], No. 4 (1950), pp 3-14.
- Larionov, A. "Voprosy normirovaniia i otsenki truda v kolkhozakh" ["The Questions of Norm-Setting and Work-Appraisal in Kolkhozy"], No. 10 (1947), pp 32-39.
- Libkind, A. "Ispol'zovanie trudovykh resursov i rasshirennoe vosproizvodstvo v kolkhozakh" ["Utilization of Labor Reserves and Expansion of Production in Kolkhozy"], No. 9 (1947), pp 6-15.
- _____. "Kooperatsiia i razdelenie truda v kolkhozakh" ["Co-operation and Division of Labor in Kolkhozy"], No. 1 (1948), pp 22-30.
- _____. "Knigi po voprosam organizatsii i oplaty truda v kolkhozakh" ["Books on the Subject of Organization of, and Payment for, Work in Kolkhozy"], No. 8 (1949), pp 60-62.
- Lovkov, Y. and Gumerov, M. "Ukrupnenie melkikh kolkhozov i rabota MTS" ["Enlargement of Small Kolkhozy and the Work of the MTS"], No. 12 (1950), pp 32-41.

- Mel'nikov, V. "Podgotovka rukovodiashchikh kolkhoznykh kadrov" ["Training of Kolkhoz Specialists"], No 6 (1950), pp 56-59
- Pronin, V. "O proizvodstvennom plannirovani v kolkhozakh" ["Production Planning in Kolkhozy"], No 10 (1947), pp 28-31
- Tsyngov, M. "Organizatsiia khoziaistva ukрупnennogo kolkhoza" ["Organizing of Economy in the Consolidated Kolkhoz"], No 9 (1950), pp 15-23.
- Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost' ["Socialist Legality"]. Publication of the Office of the Procurator of the U S S R
- Livshits, S. "Nedostatki v sudbenoi praktike po delam o khishcheniakh i razbazarivani prodovol'stvennykh i promyshlennykh tovarov" ["Deficiencies in Legal Practices Concerning the Acts of Plundering and Squandering Provisions and Industrial Goods"], XII, No 6 (1945), 28-31
- Rychkov, N. "Okhrana obshchestvennoi sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti—svyashchennii dolg trudiashchikhsia" ["Protection of Public Socialist Property—The Most Sacred Duty of the Working People"], XII, Nos 1-2 (1945), 6-11
- Sapozhnikov, I. "Bor'ba s khishcheniami na predpriatiiakh tekstil'noi promyshlennosti" ["Struggle Against Plunder at Plants of Textile Industry"], XII, No 3 (1945), 25-28
- Smirnov, L. "Chemu uchiu opyt rassledovaniia khishchenii i rastrat" ["What Can Be Learned from Investigations of Plunder and Embezzlement"], XII, Nos 11-12 (1945), 49-53
- Sukhorukov, [?] "Iz praktiki bor'by s raskhitatekami sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti" ["From the Practical Struggle Against the Plunderers of Socialist Property"], XII, No 8 (1945), 37-39
- Uzunov, A. "O nadzore za sobliudeniem sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v oblasti promyshlennosti" ["Concerning the Control over Observance of Socialist Conformity in the Field of Industry"], VII, No 11 (1940), 12-16
- Sovetskoe gosudarstvo ["The Soviet State"]
- Krynskaia, B. "Finansovyi kontrol i finansovaiia distsiplina" ["Financial Control and Financial Discipline"], No 3 (1938), pp 93-101
- Tikhonov, A. "Sel'skokhoziaistvennye seksii sel'sovetov" ["Agricultural Sections of Village Soviets"], No 1 (1938), pp 170-80
- Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo ["Soviet State and Law"]
- Aleksandrov, N. "Pravovye voprosy ukrepleniia sotsialisticheskoi distsipliny truda" ["Legal Questions in Strengthening Socialist Labor Discipline"], No 1 (1939), pp 78-83
- Arsenev, B. I. "Iz istorii uchrezhdeniia sovetskoi prokuratury" ["From the History of the Establishment of the Soviet Office of Procurator"], No 5 (1947), pp 22-31
- Kazantsev, N. D. "Stalinskii Ustav sel'skokhoziaistvennoi arteli—osnovnoi zakon kolkhoznoi zhizni" ["The Stalin Charter of Agricultural Artels—The Basic Law of Kolkhoz Life"], No 12 (1949), pp 79-94.
- Krasnopol'skii, A. S. "Trudovoi dogovor kak forma vovlecheniia rabochei sily v narodnoe khoziaistvo" ["Labor Agreement as a Method of Drawing Manpower into Industry"], No 6 (1948), pp 45-51
- Mozheiko, V. N. "O pravovoi prirode sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo arbitrazha" ["The Legal Nature of Soviet State Arbitration"], No 6 (1947), pp 16-23
- Pasherstnik, A. E. "Voprosy kollektivnogo dogovora v SSSR" ["Questions Concerning Collective Agreement in the U S S R"], No 4 (1948), pp 38-54

Pavlov, I. V. "O pravovoi prirode reshenii organov upravleniia v kolkhozakh" ["The Legal Nature of Decisions of Kolkhoz Administrative Organs"], No. 11 (1948), pp. 31-38.

Sovkhoznoe proizvodstvo ["State-Farm Production"]

Dolotov, I. "Puti rentabel'nosti khoziaistva" ["Paths to Profitableness of Economic Enterprises"], V, Nos. 8-9 (1945), 3-7.

Voprosy ekonomiki ["Economic Questions"]. Monthly publication of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U S S R.

Editorial "Pod"zem sotsialisticheskogo zhivotnovodstva—tsentral'naia zadacha v razvitiu sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR" ["Raising of Socialist Stock-breeding is the Main Task in the Development of Agriculture in the U S S R"], II, No. 6 (1949), 7-22

———. "Polnost'iu ispol'zovat' rezervy osnovnykh fondov" ["Fully Utilize Reserves in the Basic Funds"], III, No. 1 (1950), 15-29

D'yachenko, V. "Khozraschët kak sotsialisticheskii metod khoziaistvovaniia" ["Cost-accounting as a Socialist Method of Economic Management"], IV, No. 2 (1951), 3-23.

Kantyshev, I. "Voprosy khozraschëta v sovkhovakh" ["Questions Concerning Cost-accounting in the State Farms"], IV, No. 2 (1951), 32-43.

Kraev, M. "O kolkhoznom trudodne" ["The Kolkhoz Workday"], II, No. 3 (1949), 33-44

Maslova, N. "Lenin i Stalin—vdokhnoviteli i organizatory sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia v promyshlennosti" ["Lenin and Stalin—The Inspirers and Organizers of Socialist Competition in Industry"], III, No. 1 (1950), 30-39

Mnatsaganova, V., and Sokolovskii, A. "Lichnye scheta stakhanovtsev i premirovanie za ekonomiu materialov i za vypusk produktii otlichnogo kachestva" ["Personal Accounts of Work by Stakhanovites and Premiums for Economical Use of Materials and for High-quality Output"], III, No. 3 (1950), 91-103

———. "Metod inzhenera F. Kovalëva v deistvii" ["The Method of Engineer Kovalëv in Action"], IV, No. 3 (1951), 103-8.

Mokhova, E. "Gosudarstvennye trudovye rezervy—osnovnoi istochnik popoleniia rabocheho klassa v SSSR" ["The State Labor Reserves—The Principal Source for the Expansion of the Workers' Class of the U S S R"], II, No. 4 (1949), 36-48.

Orlovskii, I. "V bor'be za dosrochnoe vypolnenie piatiletki" ["In the Struggle for an Earlier Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan"], II, No. 2 (1949), 30-43

Sokolov, M. "O ser'eznykh nedostatkakh kursa 'Organizatsiia sotsialisticheskikh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh predpriatii'" ["Concerning Serious Deficiencies in the Course on 'The Organization of Socialist Agricultural Enterprises'"], II, No. 9 (1949), 111-14.

Sokolovskii, A., and Mnatsaganova, V. "Opyt organizatsii vntrizavodskogo khozraschëta na moskovskikh zavodakh" ["Experience of Moscow Plants in the Organization of Intrafactory Cost-accounting"], II, No. 7 (1949), 93-103

Tatur, S. "Lichnye scheta ekonomii—novaia forma sotsialisticheskogo sorevnovaniia i khoziaistvennogo raschëta" ["Personal Accounts of Economy—A New Form of Socialist Competition and Cost-accounting"], II, No. 10 (1949), 16-26.

- Teriaeva, A. "Stalin i sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie v kolkhozakh" ["Stalin and Socialist Competition in Kolkhozy"], III, No. 1 (1950), 40-51
- Vorob'eva, A. "Vsemerno razvivat khozraschët vnutri predpriiatiia" ["For a Full Development of Cost-accounting in the Plants"], II, No. 7 (1949), 3-15
- V pomoshch' fabrichno-zavodskim i mestnym komitetam ["Assistance to Factory and Local committees"] Publication of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
- Khudorovskii, L., and Yaroslavov, K. "Zavodskoi organizatsionno-tekhnicheskii plan" ["The Plant Organizational and Technical Plan"], VIII, No. 23 (1947), 8-11.
- Kuznetsov, V. V. "O khode vypolneniia sotsialisticheskikh obiazatel'stv v chest' tridsatoi godovshchiny Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii" ["Concerning the Fulfillment of Socialist Pledges in Honor of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution"], VIII, No. 15 (1947), 1-8
- Tsarogradskii, I. "Aktivno pomagat' prevrashcheniiu sovkhozov v obraztsovye khoziaistva" ["Actively Support the Transformation of State Farms into Model Economic Enterprises"], VIII, No. 14 (1947), 8-12.